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ABSTRACT 
 
 
A Transaction Cost Approach to Unilateral  
Presidential Action. (December 2005) 
Miner Peek Marchbanks III, B.S., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. B. Dan Wood 
 
Presidents have two major assets at their disposal when seeking to alter policy: 
executive orders and legislative action.  There are certain advantages and disadvantages 
to each course.  Although presidency scholars have focused extensively on presidential 
efforts in the legislative arena, little attention has been paid to how a president affects 
policy through direct action.  Because executive orders have been under-researched, there 
has been a dearth of theory development that adequately explains when presidents will 
act unilaterally through executive orders and when they will instead seek legislative 
avenues to policy change. 
This project develops a parsimonious theory grounded in the transaction costs 
framework that explains how a president chooses between seeking congressional action 
versus acting unilaterally through executive orders to accomplish policy change.  The 
theory holds that when presidents desire policy change, they balance the transaction costs 
executive orders and legislative action present, selecting the course that presents the 
greatest benefit after accounting for the transaction costs present. 
After outlining the theory, I test my predictions using an original data set.  Each 
executive order from 1946 to 2004 was read and examined for policy content.  Unlike 
most prior studies of presidential use of executive orders, this study only includes orders 
 iv
that affect policy in the data analyses.  The series of empirical tests provide support for 
my theory:  Presidents consider the transaction costs that executive orders and the pursuit 
of legislation pose and take the action that maximizes their utility when seeking policy 
change 
 v
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION  
 
 Of a particular policy enacted during the Reagan administration, George H.W. 
Bush’s White House Counsel remarked that it is “one of the most far reaching 
government changes made by the Reagan administration” (Gray 1989, 221, quoted in 
Mayer 2001, 6).  Considering which policy could earn such a label, one might think of 
“Reaganomics” and the massive tax cuts of the early 1980s.  One might also think of the 
nuclear arms negotiations and treaties with the Soviet Union.  Instead, what this official 
referenced is Executive Order 12291 (Reagan 1981).  With this order, President Reagan 
forced all “major” regulations promulgated by the bureaucracy to be justified by cost-
benefit analyses and submitted to the Office of Management and Budget.  Instantly, the 
president gained unprecedented control over the regulatory process. 
 One striking feature of this policy change is that the implementation occurred 
without the consent of Congress.  The president was able, “with the stroke of a pen” to 
alter the political landscape.  Surely, were the president forced to negotiate with the 
legislature to create a means for executive review of regulatory policies, the result would 
not have been nearly as advantageous as the executive order was. 
While not all executive orders are as important as Executive Order 12291, major 
policy changes created unilaterally are not at all uncommon.  The following represent 
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merely a sample of instances where presidents have utilized executive orders in 
important ways: 
• President Harry Truman issued Executive Order 9981, thereby integrating the 
armed forces in 1948 
• President Dwight Eisenhower placed the Arkansas National Guard under Federal 
control and ordered the Secretary of Defense to utilize troops to ensure 
compliance with judicial orders concerning the integration of Little Rock, 
Arkansas schools in 1957 with Executive Order 10730. 
• With Executive Order 11063, President John Kennedy prohibited racial 
discrimination in housing owned by the government or in property developed or 
maintained through federally subsidized grants or loans in 1962. 
• President Gerald Ford banned the practice of assassinations in 1976 through 
Executive Order 11905. 
• Jimmy Carter issued pardons to those who evaded the Vietnam draft in 1977 with 
Executive Order 11967 and Proclamation 4483. 
• In 2001, President George W. Bush directed agencies to “coordinate a 
comprehensive departmental effort to incorporate faith based…organizations in 
Federal programs” in Executive Order 13198. 
• President George W. Bush created the Office of Homeland Security in 2001 with 
Executive Order 13228. 
Clearly, presidents utilize executive orders to make significant policy changes.  
Before presidential unilateral action acquired the term “executive orders,” President 
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Jefferson carried out the Louisiana Purchase through what is essentially an executive 
order (Mayer 1999, 7).   
HISTORY OF EXECUTIVE ORDER USE 
 Presidents in the United States have used executive orders since the beginning of 
the nation.  In the early days of the republic, however, there was not a formal system in 
place to catalogue presidential directives.  In fact, prior to the twentieth century there 
was no attempt to report executive orders (Church 1974, 2).  Because of this lack of 
historical data, there is no way of definitively determining which presidential directives 
would be treated as executive orders today.   
In the early years, presidents were free to issue directives in as public or private a 
manner as they desired.  Some early directives were as simple as presidential 
endorsements on the margins of maps.  Others were more formal documents, including 
formulaic prose and the impression of the national seal (Church 1974, 2).   This lack of 
formality resulted in early executive orders penned by individuals other than the 
president.  In fact, of the first thirty-three orders in the numbered series, the Secretary of 
State signed seven (Keenan and Williams 1974, 23). 
The process of tracking, cataloging and reporting executive orders has, for most 
of the nation’s history, been an arcane process.  In 1895, the Government Printing Office 
(GPO) housed a documentary catalog of each executive order deposited on a single 
sheet.  However, there was no clear method for publication beyond the GPO (Keenan 
and Williams 1974, 28). 
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The Department of State began enumerating each executive order it was aware 
of, beginning the series with President Lincoln’s order of October 20, 1862 (Keenan and 
Williams 1974, 26).  Many orders, however, never made it into the State Department’s 
numbered series.  Though there is no certainty as to the number of orders missing, 
estimates put the number between 15,000 and 50,000 (Church 1974, 2). 
In 1935, the process for publicizing executive orders became clearer.  The 
Federal Register Act of 1935, 44 U.S.C. 1501 et seq. requires that presidents submit all 
executive orders and proclamations that are applicable to anyone outside of the 
government for publication in the Federal Register.  However, if a president does not 
label an order as either an executive order or proclamation, it may escape publication.  
The designation is up to the president, but failure to publicize the order removes the 
order from being applicable to citizens who are not employees of the government 
(Church 1974, 3-4). 
As Figure 1.1 shows, there has been a great deal of variation in the use of 
executive orders over time.  There are few orders reported prior to the twentieth century.  
A portion of the discrepancy, however, is likely due to the poor reporting procedures that 
were in place prior to 1935.   
The removal of the requirement for an executive order issuance when a president 
desired to exempt an employee from mandatory retirement explains some of the 
additional differences in the time-series.  Carter caused this change by delegating the 
president’s authority to exempt Federal employees to the Office of Personnel 
Management.  At other times before Carter’s delegation of authority, presidents would  
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Figure 1.1: Annual Number of Executive Orders
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exempt whole classes of employees to avoid issuing individual exemptions to employees 
(Mayer 2001, 74-75).  Individual employees who were not a part of the broad 
exemptions, individual executive orders were required to exempt them from the 
mandatory retirement requirements. 
LEGAL FOUNDATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS 
 Executive orders, properly issued, have the full force of law.  When a president 
issues an order based upon powers granted the office through either the Constitution of 
delegated by Congress, the courts view the order as a reflection of the president’s legal 
authority [Independent Meat Packers Association, et al v. Butz 526 F.2d 228 (8th Cir., 
1975); Jenkins v. Collard 145 U.S. 546 (1891); Marks v. Central Intelligence Agency 
590 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir., 1978); Mayer 1999, 58; cases cited in Mayer 1999, 241 fn 122].  
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In this section, the foundation of presidential authority to act unilaterally is discussed, 
including some of the major judicial cases and laws. 
 Article II of the Constitution charges the president to “take care that the laws are 
faithfully executed.”  To accomplish this directive, presidents must be able to order 
agencies to take actions that are in concert or furtherance of statutes.  This constitutional 
charge, then, provides the president, through implication, with the right to issue binding 
orders to the executive branch (Keenan and Williams 1974, 32-33). 
 Congress can also grant the president authority to issue executive orders.  Often, 
the legislature explicitly gives the president the authority.  For instance, in 5 U.S.C. 
3323a the legislature granted the president the authority to act through executive order to 
exempt certain employees from mandatory retirement when in the nation’s best interest 
(noted in Keenan and Williams 1974, 34).  Furthermore, by issuing the Federal Register 
Act of 1935, 44 U.S.C. 1501 et seq. requiring that presidents publish executive orders, 
Congress essentially conceded that the president possessed the authority to issue such 
orders. 
 When Congress delegates policy-making authority to the president, the executive 
may have a wide range of options for influencing the policy.  The available options are 
often termed “residual decision rights” and represent the areas where presidents can 
move policy toward their preferences without violating the letter of the law.  Presidents 
are often able to use these residual decision rights to move policy in ways that Congress 
likely never anticipated (Mayer 1999, 49; Moe and Wilson 1994, 14-15). 
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 The courts have long held that presidents cannot issue executive orders in areas 
where Congress has spoken with clarity.  Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170, 179 (1804) 
represented the first legal challenge of a presidential directive.  President John Adams 
had authorized the seizure of any ship sailing to or from French ports.  However, 
Congress had only authorized the commandeering of boats holding France as a 
destination.  Captain George Little, implementing President Adams’s order, seized a 
Danish ship that had departed from France.  The Court concluded that the president 
overstepped his discretion in issuing the order, for Congress had issued a more 
restrictive statute.  Through this case, the Court established the precedent that law 
always trumps an executive order when the two conflict (Howell 2003; Mayer 1999). 
 Perhaps the most eloquent report of the foundation of presidential power is 
penned by Justice Robert Jackson in his concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet and 
Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) where he states: 
“Presidential Powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction 
or conjunction with those of Congress…  
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization 
of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he 
possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate…If his act 
is held unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually means that 
the Federal Government as an undivided whole lacks power… 
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or 
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his independent powers, but 
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there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent 
authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.  Therefore, 
congressional inertia, indifference, or quiescence may sometimes, at least 
as a practical matter, enable, if not invite measures on independent 
presidential responsibility.  In this area, any actual test of power is likely 
to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables 
rather than on abstract theories of law. 
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or 
implied will of Congress, his power is at his lowest ebb, for then he can 
rely only upon his constitutional power minus any constitutional powers 
of Congress over the matter.  Courts can sustain exclusive presidential 
control in such a case only by disabling Congress from acting upon the 
subject.  Presidential claims to a power at once so conclusive and 
preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the 
equilibrium established by our constitutional system” (635-663; quoted in 
Mayer 1999, 37). 
According to Jackson’s framework, there are times when presidents possess clear 
authority to act.  For instance, the president has the authority to alter court martial 
procedures using authority granted the office by the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
and the president’s constitutional role as commander-in-chief of the armed forces.  There 
are also policy areas under Jackson’s framework where presidential action is prohibited.  
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Presidents have no authority to unilaterally alter social security policy.  While presidents 
would certainly relish the power, this is a policy area dictated by legislation. 
Jackson’s second characterization, the “zone of twilight” is where presidents are 
best able to garner additional authority.  When Congress fails to react to a presidential 
power grab, they are essentially ceding that authority to the president.  Thus, presidents 
are able to “ratchet” up their authority, making only positive advances (Moe and Wilson 
1994, 28).  The Court has held that congressional acquiescence to unilateral action 
essentially grants the president the power to take similar action in the future [AFL-CIO v. 
Kahn, 618 F. 2d 784, D.C. Circuit. Cited in Mayer 2001, 47-48; Cooper 2002, 34-35; 
Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981), cited in Cooper 2002, 34; Mayer 2001, 48]. 
IMPORTANCE OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS FOR POLITICAL SCIENCE 
 Unilateral action represents a major component of presidential power.  Without 
fully understanding how presidents utilize this important tool, presidency scholars will 
be unable to conceptualize how presidents make policy and how they use the instruments 
at their disposal to their advantage (or disadvantage).  By focusing largely on the 
behavioral aspects of presidential power and on the president’s veto power, scholars 
have learned much about presidential policy-making; however, by studying the use of 
executive orders, our knowledge of the presidency will expand. 
 Unilateral action should not be of interest only to students of the presidency; 
rather, it should be of interest to all scholars of American political institutions.  Many 
studies of American politics examine the policy-making process.  Furthermore, many of 
the studies focus on the relationship between other institutions and Congress (Arnold 
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1979; Bond and Fleisher 1990; Cameron 2000; Edwards 1980; 1986; 1989; Edwards and 
Barrett 2000; Fisher 1993; Krehbiel 1998; West 1995; Wood and Waterman 1994).  
Without understanding how presidents utilize all the tools at their disposal, scholars will 
be unable to fully appreciate and model the relationship that exists between the president 
and the other institutions of American government. 
 Furthermore, the study of unilateral action is applicable to other areas of political 
science as well.  For instance, state and local scholars can apply theories of presidential 
unilateral action to similar actions taken by governors, commissioners and mayors.  In a 
comparative context, the study of unilateral action can be focused on the executives of 
foreign nations.  Pereira, Power and Rennó (2005) who study presidential decrees in 
Brazil take such an approach.   
Since many executive orders pertain to foreign affairs, the study of unilateral 
action also has value for international relations scholars.  Additionally, since unilateral 
action bypasses the traditional method of policy-making and since second-term 
presidents are not facing a future election, there are normative concerns with the use of 
executive orders for political theory scholars to contemplate.  Public administration 
researchers undoubtedly recognize the importance of executive orders.  Presidents are 
able to greatly alter the behaviors and outputs of agencies through unilateral action.   
Since unilateral action is a tool enabling presidents to alter policy, the study of 
executive orders is of value to public policy scholars as well.  This is true for scholars 
concentrating on the policy process more generally, since executive orders are a key 
factor in policy-making.  However, scholars specializing in specific policies are 
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interested in the use of executive orders, for their use can dictate the outcomes of a given 
policy.  Morgan (1970) recognized this, concentrating her work on the ways presidents 
altered civil rights policies through the issuance of executive orders. 
IMPORTANCE OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS FOR DEMOCRATIC THEORY 
 More important than issues for political science, executive orders raise 
fundamental questions concerning democratic theory.  In crafting the Constitution, the 
founders sought to create a government intentionally fragmented in accord with 
Montesquieu (1914).1  Individual powers were granted the three branches of government 
so that the each institution would check the power of the other institutions.  In the words 
of Federalist 51, “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition” (Madison [1788] 
1982, 262).   
Under the constitutional framework developed, the power to create law lay 
squarely on the shoulders of Congress.  Accounting for the wishes of the executive is the 
president’s right to veto legislation deemed unacceptable.  The courts possess the 
authority to review the laws and speak to their constitutionality (Hamilton [1788] 
1982b).  However, it is fair to say that the Constitution placed the role of legislating 
squarely on the shoulders of Congress. 
The role of executing the policies of the government is in the hands of the 
president.  By placing such power in an individual, the framers sought to improve the 
effectiveness of the office, and thus the effectiveness of the government.  According to 
Federalist 70, “a feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A 
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feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill 
executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government” 
(Hamilton [1788] 1982a, 355) 
If presidents are able, by decree, to make commands that carry the weight of law, 
then the office of the executive possess both the power to implement law and to make 
law.  Such a proposition lies outside the generally understood intent of the Constitution.  
Federalist 51 instructs us “that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of 
government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the 
preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own” 
(Madison [1788] 1982, 261). 
Executive policy-making encroaches upon the domain of the legislature.  
Because of this, executive orders raise serious concerns for democratic theory.  
Especially serious are the concerns if presidents are able to utilize executive orders in the 
largely carte blanche fashion implied by much of the current literature (Cooper 2002; 
Howell 2003; Mayer 1999; 2001).  Rousseau warns, “It is not good for him who makes 
the laws to execute them” (1762).  However, executive orders place the president as both 
the creator of law and the one responsible for its implementation 
However, if presidents consider and account for the policy wishes of Congress 
and the Courts (through respect for the Constitution and statutes) then the concerns 
become less serious.  For then presidents are not acting as a monarch, but are instead 
constrained by the policy wishes of the other institutions.  In order to consider how 
executive orders relate to democratic theory and the systems of checks and balances 
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established in the Constitution, it is imperative that we know how presidents use them 
and whether the president considers the policy wishes of Congress when utilizing them.  
PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION 
Unilateral action by the president represents an important component of both 
public policy and presidential power.  Without fully understanding how the tool is used, 
scholars will never be able to fully comprehend the concept of presidential power.  
Furthermore, given the importance of unilateral action to the making of policy, 
increasing knowledge concerning the utilization of presidential directives is integral to 
comprehending the policy-making process in the United States. 
 Despite the importance of unilateral action, there is a dearth of theory concerning 
when a president will act unilaterally to make policy.  A need for such a theory to 
advance our understanding of presidential policy-making is apparent.  Through the 
course of this dissertation, I will advance a theory that predicts when presidents rely on 
unilateral action when seeking policy change.  I then subject the theory to empirical 
testing.  
Chapter II reviews the major literature on unilateral action by the president.  A 
lack of theory characterizes most past work.  Many studies do not even attempt to 
develop theory, but are instead either exploratory or descriptive.  Additionally, 
inappropriate dependent variables often characterized these works.  Scholars routinely 
use a count of all executive orders, which include orders that do not make policy, or use 
only “significant” executive orders, which ignore the vast majority of executive orders.  
Each approach has shortcomings to be discussed later. 
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 Chapter III introduces the theory of presidential policy-making used in this 
dissertation. A transaction costs framework is utilized to explain when a president will 
act unilaterally with executive orders versus seeking legislative action to generate a 
policy change. Economists developed the transaction costs framework to explain when a 
firm will produce its own goods or buy them from a contractor.  However, the 
framework is easily applied to political matters.  Political scientists are beginning to 
recognize its attractiveness and many have successfully incorporated the framework into 
their research (Bawn 1995; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Globerman and Vining 1996; 
Huber and Shipan 2000; Ostrom, Schroeder and Wynne 1993; Potoski 1999; Wood and 
Bohte 2004).  
Chapter IV subjects the theory of executive action to empirical tests.  This 
project introduces a new dataset constructed by analyzing each executive order and 
coding it based upon its policy substance.  Only those orders that make policy are 
included in the analysis.  The results of the analysis provide strong support for the theory 
outlined in chapter III.  To ensure that the results are not an artifact of improper 
methodology, advanced time-series methods are used to test the theory.  Again, the 
results support the transaction costs based model of presidential policy-making. 
Chapter V subjects the theory to further testing by looking at particular subsets of 
the data. One sub-sample includes executive orders that are concerned with policy areas 
where presidents are routinely assumed to possess higher levels of discretion.  The other 
sub-sample contains the remaining orders.  The sub-samples are then used to conduct 
tests similar to those in chapter IV.  This approach ensures that the results are not being 
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driven by one type of policy.  Like the results in chapter IV, the analysis continues to 
support a transaction cost interpretation of unilateral action by the president.  
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 CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 The previous chapter gave a brief introduction into how presidents unilaterally 
alter policy through executive orders.  Until recently, most of the scholarship on 
executive orders consisted of legal research, focusing primarily on presidents’ authority 
to alter policy through unilateral action (Cash 1965; Fleishman and Aufses 1976; 
Neighbors 1964).   
Over the past decade, political scientists have witnessed a surge of new research 
on presidential uses of executive orders.  In this chapter, I outline some of the more 
important works that focus on presidential use of unilateral actions.  Though not 
exclusively, the works primarily are from the 1990s forward, and the tendency among 
these works is not to generate theory of when a president will act unilaterally to alter 
policy versus seeking legislative changes to a given policy. 
 Morgan (1970) led one of the earliest forays into theory development concerning 
presidential use of executive orders.  Her book was largely a historical study of 
presidential use of executive orders in the realm of civil rights. The decision calculus for 
unilateral action, according to her exposition is as follows.  First, presidents determine 
whether they wish to take any action at all (78).  While this is elementary and obvious, 
presidents may see a problem, but decide that governmental action is either unnecessary 
or not prudent.  The president’s personal values, ideological beliefs and view of the 
nature of the problem influence the determination of how to act.  The president’s belief 
in the role of the executive is also important.  Presidents, such as Eisenhower, who hold 
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to the philosophy of executive restraint should be less likely to act unilaterally, but will 
instead work with Congress to search for a solution. 
 Morgan also postulates that there must be some public demand for a national 
solution to a problem before a president will act.  She states that this demand comes, in 
large part, from interest groups.  In determining potential policy goals, the president will 
attempt to balance the demands of competing interest groups to produce a policy that 
alienates the fewest citizens.   
 Once a president decides to take action, deciding whether to act unilaterally via 
an executive order or by recommending legislation to Congress that addresses the issue 
is the next action required.  The president considers four items in making this 
determination.  First, the president considers how important the issue is.  There is little 
need to spend political capital on rectifying an issue of minor importance. 
 Second, the president considers whether the potential solution can be 
accomplished solely through administrative action.  If the problem is such that 
legislation is necessary, then there is little reason to pursue unilateral action. 
 Third, a president must consider the chances of success in the legislative arena.  
When a president has little chance of success with Congress, the executive order may be 
the only tool available to affect the given policy. 
 Last, the president must consider what effect the action will have on other 
programs supported by the administration.  Because of the symbiotic relationship that 
exists between the executive and Congress, a president must consider how the proposals 
will affect the relationship with the legislature.  If an executive order will cause hostility 
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between the president and Congress, the president may be well advised to avoid action 
so that success in other endeavors is more likely.   
 Though Morgan’s work was concerned with the civil rights, the theory she 
developed is applicable to other policy areas as well.  Even though the theory was 
developed in an ex-post fashion, it provided a good first step in the development of 
theory surrounding unilateral executive action. 
 Wigton (1996) added to Morgan’s analysis by examining presidential use of 
executive orders in a variety of issue areas.  Among the findings of his limited case study 
is that presidents can utilize executive orders for altering the policy landscape in such a 
manner as to prevent a change through legislation. 
 Another point Wigton makes is that the use of executive orders does not create a 
permanent change in an issue.  He notes the continual change in abortion policy that has 
taken place through executive orders.  Any future presidents that disagree with abortion 
policies made by executive order are free to revoke any of the orders at any time.   
 This lack of permanence, however, can be an asset.  When dealing with a 
complicated issue, the president can utilize the executive order to make flexible changes 
in policy and is free to change them when necessary without waiting on the slow 
processes of Congress.  
 Wigton notes that executive orders are best suited for policy areas that are 
complex and non-salient.  In such areas, presidents can craft an order specifically 
addressing a situation.  Alterations can be made to the policy as changes in the political 
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environment warrant.  Salient policies, however, are more difficult to change 
unilaterally. 
 Wigton’s study dovetails nicely with Morgan’s (1970) work in that it does not 
rely on one issue area.  However, there is little or no new theory.  Rather, it is more of a 
historical/legal analysis.  Through this study, one can see that the executive order is a 
tool that benefits presidents and executive orders are not equal substitutes for legislation.  
 Consistent with this theme, Light (1991) postulates that executive action is the 
second resort for presidential policy-making.  Using a brief examination of quantitative 
patterns of use and many quotes from administration officials, he concludes that 
presidents prefer to have their policies enacted via legislation.  One Nixon official is 
quoted as saying, “it (administrative action) was about all we could do” (116).  He 
concludes that executive orders can be used as a means to alter the policy landscape 
rapidly, when legislative action would simply take too long.   
 Light also states that executive orders can be used as short-term solutions.  After 
issuing an order, the president can attempt to move toward legislation in an effort to 
make the policy change permanent and to give the policy more stature.  According to 
one Department of Health, Education and Welfare officer quoted by Light, “Executive 
action is easier to fight and easier to undermine.  The career civil service is not inclined 
to agree with executive action if the executive action doesn’t agree with them” (118).  
Thus, a president would be well advised to seek policy change through legislation as 
doing so will increase the permanence of the policy change and make bureaucratic 
implementation of the policy more likely. 
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 Executive orders are not the focus of Light’s study.  There are no more than five 
pages dedicated to the topic.  However, his point concerning executive orders being a 
tool of second resort is worth note.  Presidents likely do not prefer unilateral action to 
favorable legislation.  However, when legislative action becomes too difficult, they will 
utilize executive orders to alter policy. 
 King and Ragsdale (1988) examine patterns in the use of executive orders and 
conclude that executive orders are only used to make incremental changes.  They also 
observe that the “type and frequency of executive orders issued by any new president is 
thus predominantly a function of the plural institution of the presidency already in place” 
(124). 
 Glieber and Shull (1992) are probably the first to examine executive orders 
quantitatively. Their study lacked a coherent theory.  However, they did test several 
propositions.  For example, they found that presidents with more allies in Congress are 
more likely to utilize executive orders than their counterparts who have fewer 
supporters.  They also conclude that, “neither presidential preferences nor political 
resources explain much variance in the use of executive orders” (458).  They postulate 
that this is caused by the random need to implement legislation and unsystematic 
political situations that require a reaction from the president.   
 Krause and Cohen (1997) also conducted an early quantitative analysis of 
presidential use of executive orders.  Their examination is largely a foundational one to 
see how common factors in the political environment affect the use of executive orders.  
An important finding of their study is that as presidents become more successful in the 
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legislative arena, they become more likely to issue executive orders.  The authors 
conclude that this result likely indicates that the president will utilize executive orders in 
order to strengthen legislation that has passed Congress (470). 
 Another interesting finding of Krause and Cohen is that party support in the 
House is positively related to use of executive orders while party support in the Senate is 
negatively related to use of unilateral action.  They conclude (unconvincingly) that this 
difference may be accounted for by the stricter party rule and simple majority control 
present in the House versus the Senate (472).  A more likely explanation for this result is 
that congressional support presents conflicting influences on how presidents make their 
decisions to issue executive orders.  As Congress becomes more opposed to presidents’ 
legislative agendas, presidents are more likely to desire unilateral action.  However, at 
such a time, they are less able to take unilateral action without facing a harsh reaction 
from Congress, potentially overturning the orders.  The differing House and Senate 
results are likely capturing different influences, with the House variable reflecting the 
increased discretion afforded presidents who have high levels of support, and the Senate 
coefficient reflecting the decreased need to act unilaterally when they possess increased 
support in Congress.  
 Surprisingly, the authors find no relationship between popularity of the president 
and use of executive orders.  However, they do find a positive relationship between the 
“misery index” and use of executive orders.  The authors postulate that this relationship 
is due to an effort by the president to take action to reverse the negative effects of a 
sagging economy (472). 
  
22
 Krause and Cohen’s study is a quality step into quantitative analyses of unilateral 
presidential action.  However, the study was largely exploratory and devoid of theory.  
Since a theory was not initially postulated, one might be skeptical of the results.  In 
addition, the dependent variable in this study is annual counts of executive orders. One 
should be hesitant to assume that there is not significant variation occurring within each 
year that affects the president’s likelihood of utilizing executive orders.  
 Also, the authors rather than focus solely on orders that make policy the authors 
include orders that do not make policy in their analysis.  They did remove orders that 
took cultural actions and those of a ceremonial nature (Krause and Cohen 1997, 466).  
However, there are still actions that do not make policy included in their dataset such as 
orders that deal with routine administrative concerns.  As such, this is more of an 
examination of how presidents use executive orders in general, rather than an 
examination of how presidents utilize executive orders to alter policy. 
 Taking heed of Krause and Cohen’s results showing that presidents are no more 
likely to issue executive orders when the legislative route is difficult, Deering and 
Maltzman (1999) devise a study to determine why.  According to their theory, a 
president is likely to issue an executive order when the legislative route is more difficult, 
but not if there is an increased likelihood that the order will be overturned.  Consistent 
with their expectations, they find that when presidents are unpopular, they are led toward 
using executive orders due to the increased difficulty they will have in getting legislation 
passed. 
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 Likewise, when presidents face a Congress with an ideologically opposed median 
member [measured using Poole and Rosenthal’s (1997) W-NMOINATE scores] they are 
more likely to issue executive orders rather than pursue legislation.   
 Another interesting finding of Deering and Maltzman is that the more likely an 
order is to be overturned (measured by the W-NOMINATE distance from the 2/3 veto 
override position), the less likely a president is to use executive orders.  This finding, in 
conjunction with their other findings, is important in that it shows that presidents do 
utilize executive orders to work around a difficult legislature.  However, presidents are 
cognizant of potential legislative reactions to the order and will avoid issuing an order if 
there is a high likelihood Congress will overturn the order through legislation. 
 The Deering and Maltzman study is a step in the direction of understanding 
unilateral executive action by the president.  However, their annual aggregation likely 
misses significant variation, and their model is probably underspecified since they do not 
include variables of interest such as recession or end of term effects.  Also, as with other 
studies, there is no effort to remove non-policy orders from the analysis, making the 
results irrelevant to presidential efforts to alter policy through unilateral action. 
 One important point from the Deering and Maltzman study is that presidents are 
strategic when issuing executive orders.  They do not issue orders when they feel that 
Congress will overturn the action.  As such, they do not have the ability to alter policy 
by fiat, but instead must consider the reactions of Congress to their orders. 
 Krause and Cohen (2000) utilize presidential use of executive orders as a 
dependent variable to test their theory of the development of the institutional presidency.  
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According to their theory, presidents exploited the advantages of the growing 
administrative state until the presidency was fully institutionalized in the late 1960’s.  
After, this point, they are largely constrained by the institutional nature of the office and 
are constrained by the political environment.   
Their empirical tests support the declining use of executive orders through time.  
The tests found that from 1939-1996 the “misery index” and presidential dummy 
variables are significant predictors of annual counts of executive orders issued.  This 
same relationship holds when the sample is reduced to 1939-1968, the era the authors 
refer to as the “institutionalizing presidency era.”  During this time, they postulate that 
presidents acted in an opportunistic fashion when issuing executive orders and are not 
bound by the constraints posed by factors such as House and Senate party margins and 
bureaucratic growth.   
When the timeframe 1969-1996 is examined, the authors find that misery index, 
bureaucratic growth and presidents in their first year are significantly related to the use 
of executive orders.  They conclude that these variables are indicative of variables that 
constrain presidential behavior.  Presidents are simply responding to changes in the 
political environment when issuing executive orders. 
Krause and Cohen’s (2000) study is an initial step in developing a theory of how 
the institutionalization of the presidency constrains a president and when/how presidents 
exploit the institutionalization to their favor prior to the constraints era.  However, their 
theory lacks generality in that it does not explain when presidents will decide to issue an 
executive order. 
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Furthermore, like Krause and Cohen (1997), the dependent variable for the 
analysis is annual counts of executive orders.  This is a needless upward aggregation of 
data that eliminates significant variation and may mask important effects. 
In addition, like Krause and Cohen (1997), this study includes a host of orders 
that do not make policy.  There is no effort to remove orders that are of a ceremonial 
nature or otherwise do not create policy (Krause and Cohen 2000, 96 fn11).  As such, 
one cannot assume that the results from this analysis reflect how presidents make policy 
through executive orders.   
Marshall and Pacelle (2005) utilize annual counts of executive orders as a 
dependent variable to test Wildavsky’s (1966) “two presidencies” thesis.  They propose 
that if, as Wildavsky predicts, presidents possess greater levels of discretion in foreign 
policy matters, then there should be differences in how presidents determine whether to 
issue executive orders to affect foreign versus domestic policies. 
Among Marshall and Pacelle’s (2005) findings is that the president’s party share 
of congressional seats is unrelated to the issuance of foreign policy directives.  However, 
they find there is a relationship between the president’s party strength in Congress and 
the issuance of executive orders to affect domestic policy.  They conclude that this 
points toward increased discretion afforded presidents in the foreign policy realm.  
Compositional changes in Congress do not affect presidential prospects for legislative 
success in foreign policy, and, as such, presidents are not led towards executive orders to 
make changes in foreign policy at the exclusion of statutory changes. 
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Marshall and Pacelle’s (2005) study puts an interesting twist on studies of 
unilateral action.  The key point is that presidential discretion affects the president’s 
proclivity for unilateral action.  Presidents make their determinations on how to act 
based upon how they expect other institutions to react and the discretion those 
institutions allow the president.     
However, their analysis did not advance a general theory of when presidents will 
issue executive orders. Rather, they test a theory of differing presidential discretion 
across policy types.  Furthermore, Marshall and Pacelle’s (2005) study utilizes annual 
counts of executive orders.  Again, such aggregation ignores a large amount of variation 
that is present in the data within years.  Monthly counts are a more natural metric that 
will allow for more variation in both the independent and dependent variables.  If a 
significant portion of the variation that occurs within a year really occurs within a few 
select months, annual aggregation can miss important relationships.  Furthermore, 
spurious findings are more likely as variation that occurs in an independent variable at 
one month may be linked to variation in the dependent variable that occurs in another 
month.  In addition, the data include a host of executive orders that do not create policy.  
This masks effects due to policy. Therefore, one cannot be confident that they are 
revealing true patterns of presidents’ propensity to act unilaterally in domestic and 
foreign policies.  
Cooper (2002) is more of a textbook analysis, which gives extensive coverage to 
the many tools of unilateral action.   He devotes individual chapters to executive orders, 
presidential memoranda, presidential proclamations, national security directives and 
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presidential signing statements.  His work is largely of a descriptive and normative 
nature.  He dedicates much attention to tracing when and how presidents utilize the tools 
at their disposal to alter the policy landscape.  
After tracing the legal issues surrounding executive orders and detailing the 
process used by presidents to issue orders, Cooper describes what presidents can 
accomplish by issuing executive orders.  Copper continues his analysis by outlining 
some of the advantages of using executive orders.  First, executive orders can be used to 
rapidly alter policy.  There are several instances where presidents would want to take 
action quickly.  For example, executive orders can be used as an effective component of 
an administration’s transition strategy.  He notes that the Reagan administration did a 
good job of surveying existing executive orders prior to arriving in office and quickly 
issued orders to affect policy.  Executive orders allow a new administration to act 
quickly since they do not require coordinated action with the legislature. 
The speed of unilateral action is also useful in reactions to emergencies.  Cooper 
notes the success that Roosevelt had by closing the banking system and making changes 
in response to economic hardships (2002, 69).  Legislative action simply cannot compete 
with the speed of executive orders. 
Cooper also notes that executive orders are useful at directing action from the 
executive branch.  Drawing on the role as “chief executive,” the president can force 
changes in the administrative branch through unilateral action.  However, presidents are 
not able to force changes that exceed their statutory requirements.  Where the legislature 
has spoken, with clarity, the president must listen.  
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Another advantage of executive orders that Cooper mentions is that they allow 
presidents to take action in areas that need attention and where Congress is unwilling to 
act.  He notes that Truman was able to desegregate the military at a time when Congress 
was not poised to act to reduce discrimination in America. 
Despite the many advantages that executive orders present, Cooper also notes 
that there are disadvantages that flow from their use.  Presidents have often declared 
emergencies to justify their unilateral action when there is really no rationalization for 
the declaration of an emergency.  Cooper states that such action undermines the 
president’s credibility, an important asset to any politician. 
Even when presidents are on firm ground in declaring an emergency, special care 
should be taken because, “experience over time suggests that emergency actions 
frequently leave messes to be cleaned up after the fact that can be troublesome in 
instances where the emergency actions did not contemplate these future normalization 
issues” (Cooper 2002, 72).  Orders can remain in force long after the emergency passes 
due to the difficulty of pinpointing the true end of an emergency or from simple neglect 
of revoking out of date orders. 
Cooper also notes that executive orders can cause a degradation of 
intergovernmental relations.  Executive orders, like legislation, can deal with issues that 
affect state and local government.  However, because unilateral action is not 
contemplated in an open forum like legislation, there exists a possibility for lower levels 
of government to be caught off guard.  If action taken is not favorable to state and local 
governments, relationships can be damaged. 
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Another problem Cooper notes is that presidents may face blame for policy-
gone-bad with executive orders.  If presidents push for regulation through an agency 
rather than through executive order, any problems that arise from the policy can be 
blamed on the agency.  However, when the president makes the regulation, there is no 
one to shift the responsibility to. 
Next, Cooper notes that there may be intra-cabinet hostilities caused by executive 
orders.  If cabinet officials are not included in the drafting of the order they may feel the 
president is “doing an end run around (them)” (2002, 74).  Further, if presidents do not 
utilize members of the administration on advisory committees, hostilities may arise.  If 
an investigative commission is created without utilizing the involvement, permanence 
and expertise of the administrative agencies, presidents can be sending a clear signal 
about how they feel about those working for them (2002, 74-5). 
While presidents are able to rapidly alter policy through the utilization of 
executive orders, one important downside to unilateral action that Cooper notes is that 
future presidents can remove these changes with equal speed.  There is little permanence 
to policy change made unilaterally.  He notes that thirteen of the twenty-two non-Iran 
hostage related orders issued by Jimmy Carter following his 1980 defeat were repealed, 
superseded or amended by his successor, Ronald Reagan (Cooper 2002, 77-78). 
In addition to the many disadvantages presidents face when using executive 
orders, Cooper also notes some disadvantages of a more normative nature for the nation 
as a whole.  First, executive orders undermine the administrative law process.  This 
process was created to ensure that important governmental actions are taken only after 
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following an open and just process.  The creation of executive orders is anything but 
open and participants in the process include only those whom the president desires.  One 
ironic point Cooper makes is that presidents act unilaterally to side-step the tedious 
administrative law process, but this process is tedious, in large part, due to the many 
requirements placed on agencies by executive orders (2002, 75).  
Cooper also expresses concern that executive orders can create bad public policy.  
This is, of course, a concern.  However, it is a concern that can be applied to all methods 
of policy-making.  Because executive orders are, or at least can be, made through the 
deliberation of only one person, there may exist a greater likelihood that the policy may 
have been made without considering the potential negative consequences of the change.  
Cooper’s (2002) work is a good review of how presidents act unilaterally to alter 
the policy landscape.  He thoroughly analyzes how presidents have used executive 
orders in the past.  The work is a must in providing a background for students of 
unilateral action.  It gives a concrete understanding of how executive orders and other 
tools of unilateral action can and have been used and the legal foundations of the tools.  
However, the study does not establish a theoretical framework explaining when a 
president will act unilaterally versus acting through the legislature. 
Mayer (2001) moved toward this end by positing that executive orders can be 
explained using a neo-institutional framework.  His analysis begins by highlighting 
anecdotes where presidents have utilized executive orders to alter policy.  He then notes 
that presidency scholars have long focused on the behavioral aspects of presidential 
power at the relative exclusion of the institutional factors that relate to a president’s 
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authority.  Because of this, researchers concentrated on “the president’s ability to lead 
public opinion, strike deals with congressional leaders, manage press relations, mobilize 
constituencies, and conserve political capital” (2001, 12).   
He attributes the neglect of the formal aspects of presidential power to Neustadt’s 
(1960) seminal work.  By making the focus of presidential power the executive’s ability 
to persuade others to the administration’s position, questions of how a president’s legal 
authority, such as the ability to act unilaterally, affects the powers within the office 
became less interesting to political scientists.  Thus, legal scholars primarily addressed 
these questions. 
 Legal scholars, Mayer notes, focus primarily on the constitutional issues 
surrounding unilateral action when studying executive orders and rarely ground their 
studies to a broader theoretical framework.  As Edwards and Wayne (1997) state, “The 
legal perspective, although it requires rigorous analysis, does not lend itself to 
explanation…although studies that adopt the legal perspective make important 
contributions to our understanding of the American politics, they do not answer most of 
the questions that entice researchers to study the presidency” (448, quoted in Mayer 
2001, 15). 
 Mayer’s central argument is that presidents care about the formal basis of 
executive power.  Presidents receive important authority from statutes and the 
Constitution.  The presidency’s institutional setting bolsters this authority.  This enlarged 
power frequently allows presidents to take the first step on policy matters when they so 
choose (2001, 10).  This study, then, is an attempt to evaluate how presidents utilize one 
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of the legal tools of executive power, the executive order, to further their authority 
(2002, 4). 
 After tracing much of the legal basis behind the use of executive orders, Mayer 
introduces the new institutional economics (NIE) framework, which is very similar to 
the principal-agent framework.  This framework, when used to study public 
organizations, is used to examine how the organizations are arranged to create the 
benefits sought by the creators of the organization (2002, 23).  According to this 
framework, presidents seek control over policy and process (2002, 24).  Because of the 
intrinsic significance of the administrative process and institutions to the outcome of 
policy, presidential-legislative conflict over the structures of institutions is of greater 
importance than the routine bargaining over individual policy issues.  How institutions 
are organized and maintained and how policy is implemented take priority (2002, 24). 
 According to the NIE and Mayer, “the politics of the presidency is about getting 
control of the institutions that create and implement policy” (2002, 24).  Mayer relates 
the bulk of his study to this statement.  The common theme that he finds in significant 
executive orders is that presidents have used unilateral action to control policy, create 
and sustain institutions, mold the policy agenda, maintain relationships with important 
constituencies and manage their overall standing (2002, 28). 
 Mayer’s (2001) study is devoted mainly to case studies of how presidents have 
utilized executive orders to shape policy in different areas.  The first area that he 
examines is the institutional presidency.  He examines a host of orders that presidents 
have issued to create institutions and to gain control of existing institutions. In particular, 
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he examines how presidents have gained control of the budget process and seized more 
power in the regulatory process through unilateral action.  In regards to the budget 
process, Mayer concludes:  
The presidential budget and growth of BoB power illustrates the pattern: 
societal and political pressures serve as the impetus for a new government 
capability; Congress and the president compete over the question of 
control; the president prevails and uses the new capability in 
unanticipated ways to develop even more power, and Congress can do 
little to stop him.  Over time, the new powers-once so controversial-
become institutionalized as a routine and accepted part of the presidency 
(2001, 121). 
He draws a similar conclusion after examining the evolution of presidential 
regulatory control.  He concludes that the increased control that presidents possess is the 
result of an evolutionary process with each successive president extending and adjusting 
what previous administrations have done (2001, 137).   
 Mayer also examines presidential control of foreign affairs through executive 
orders.  He conducts studies of how presidents have acted to alter the classification 
process (i.e. top-secret information) and the organization of the intelligence community.  
In this area, he finds a pattern consistent with the institutional analysis where the power 
of the chief executive gradually evolves through the exploitation of any statutory 
ambiguity.  Over time, this gradual evolution of power leads to presidential dominance 
of the policy (2001, chapter V). 
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 Mayer also examines how presidents have influenced civil rights policies through 
executive orders.  He asserts that presidential initiative comprised a key role in widening 
the reach of civil rights policies through a series of increasingly forceful presidential 
actions.  These actions helped drag the legislature and the courts along (2001, 185). 
 Of particular note is the discussion of affirmative action policies, or the granting 
of preferences to minorities and women in employment or education decisions.  Ronald 
Reagan entered office an ardent opponent to governmental affirmative action policies.  
There was little doubt that he possessed the right to reverse all of the affirmative action 
policies that were made by his predecessors through executive orders.  However, there 
were many political obstacles constraining him from doing so.  Mayer points to the 
inability of the president to control this policy as one of the problems of creating policy 
or institutions through executive order.  Once created, institutions can resist serious 
attempts to create meaningful change.  He notes that this is a central premise of the new 
institutional economics framework (2001, 208). 
 In an effort to determine if presidents utilize executive orders to alter policy, 
Mayer (2001) also builds upon his (1999) empirical work.  He begins by detailing the 
methods used to record executive orders.  Next, Mayer reports on the patterns that exist 
in the subject matter and importance of executive orders.  To accomplish this task, he 
draws a random sample of all executive orders issued between March 1936 and 
December 1999.  The random sample consisted of 1,028 orders (2001, 79).  He then 
codes each of these orders based upon policy type and based upon its significance. To 
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code significance he utilizes a host of criteria, including press or congressional attention 
and agency creation. 
 He finds a dramatic decrease in the percentage of executive orders that attend to 
land matters and civil service issues.  This has occurred while there has been a sizeable 
increase in the percentage of executive orders that deal with domestic and foreign 
policies and management of the executive branch. 
 His findings for significant orders are interesting.  Presidents have issued 
approximately fourteen significant executive orders each year since 1970.  While there is 
a noticeable decline in the reduction of significant orders following the 1940s (attributed 
to the end of World War II), there is a sizeable increase in the issuance of significant 
executive orders since the 1960s.  From this, Mayer concludes that presidents have 
increased their usage of executive orders to affect policy over the past few decades 
(2001, 86).  However, consistent with Krause and Cohen (2000) his time series graph of 
executive orders shows a decrease in the trend of issuance of significant executive 
orders.  Following the 1970s, presidents appear to be exhibiting a downward trend in 
their issuance of executive orders.  Mayer does not make note of this, and the trend is not 
great, but to conclude that presidents are utilizing executive orders more from this 
evidence is shaky at best.  Given the increased scrutiny of the presidency following 
Watergate and Vietnam, there is reason to believe that this downward trend could be the 
result of less discretion being available for presidents due to heightened attention to their 
actions. 
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Mayer also examines how the political environment influences the president’s 
propensity to issue executive orders.  He holds that if presidents use executive orders to 
alter policy, then their use should vary based upon the situations presidents find 
themselves.  However, if they are only used for routine matters, then there should be 
little variation in their use based upon the political environment (2002, 87).   
He uses an event count model where the dependent variable is the monthly count 
of executive orders issued (excluding orders that addressed specific pieces of land or 
removed mandatory retirement restrictions for individuals).  Among his findings is that 
presidents issue substantially more executive orders in their last month when the new 
president is from the opposite party.  Mayer concludes that this is evidence that 
executive orders do have a strong policy element.  Otherwise, there would be little 
reason for a president to issue last-minute orders (2001, 97).  There is no significant 
change in the last month of office for presidents that are not preceding a party change. 
 He also finds that presidents issue more executive orders as they become less 
popular.  Mayer holds that executive orders present a way for weak presidents to seek 
policy change in the face of other institutional figures that are poised to stand up to an 
administration that is perceived as weak (2001, 90). 
 Mayer also finds that Republican presidents issue fewer executive orders than 
their Democrat counterparts do.  This comports with his hypothesis that Democrats issue 
more executive orders than Republicans based upon their historical inclination for 
expansive government (2001, 88). 
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 One finding that surprises Mayer is that presidents issue more executive orders 
under unified government.  Instead of including a dummy variable for unified 
government, he instead compares the Clinton, Eisenhower and Truman administrations 
and their use of executive orders while they were experiencing unified government and 
when the served during divided government.   
 Mayer (2001) is an important contribution to the study of unilateral action.  He 
seeks to ground the study of executive orders in a coherent theoretical framework.  
However, as with all prior work his framework does not develop a theory of when 
presidents will act unilaterally instead of through the legislature.  Rather, it is a 
framework that posits presidents will seek control of institutions in their efforts to 
control policy.  Thus, the study represents an advance in the development of an overall 
theory of presidential policy-making; but is limited for understanding the specific causes 
of presidential behavior when taking unilateral action.  
 Furthermore, the theory is tested primarily through case studies.  This approach 
has the advantage of allowing an in-depth analysis of how a theory relates to certain 
events.  However, there is limited generalizability to this method. One cannot be certain 
that conclusions would vary based on who is doing the analysis and various possible 
interpretations of the record.  
 Another shortcoming of the Mayer study is that the quantitative chapter was not a 
test of theory; rather it was an examination of whether presidents do alter policy through 
executive orders.  A more appealing analysis would be rooted in a theory that explains 
when presidents will act unilaterally.   
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Furthermore, the data used in the Mayer study contains many orders that are 
trivial and do not affect policy. He did eliminate orders that dealt with public land and 
orders that exempted individuals from mandatory retirement; however, he included 
orders that take actions such as ordering flags at half-staff, forming advisory committees 
with no policy-making authority and taking care of routine executive branch matters.  By 
including non-policy orders in the analysis, one cannot be certain that the results reflect a 
president’s proclivity to act unilaterally to alter policy. 
 Mayer and Price (2002) extend the analysis a bit further.  In this study, the 
authors utilize Mayer’s sample of significant executive orders from his 2001 text.  They 
conduct Poisson regression on the annual counts of significant orders issued. Among 
their core results, the authors find that as presidents become more popular they issue 
fewer significant executive orders.  These presidents are better situated to maneuver 
through the complicated political environment by leveraging their popularity into 
legislative success. 
Again, Mayer and Price’s analysis does not develop a theory to explain when 
presidents will issue executive orders rather than pursue legislation.  Instead, they show 
that “presidents rely on executive orders to implement significant domestic and foreign 
policies” (2002, 368).  Executive orders, thus, can be viewed as surrogates for legislative 
changes. 
Interestingly, Mayer and Price’s (2002) dependent variable is unique.  They 
randomly selected executive orders and examined the selected orders for policy 
significance.  The dependent variable is the count of significant orders for each year.  
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However, there is no discussion as to how reliable the estimates are for each, only how 
reliable the number is for the entire series (including ten years prior to the sample used 
in their analysis).  Their estimates should be much less accurate for the yearly counts 
than for the count of the overall sixty-year span because each year has a smaller sample 
taken than the sample taken in the overall sample.  Because of this, one cannot be certain 
that the counts in each year are fully representative.   
A better method would be to examine each order and code the order based upon 
its policy substance.  Not only does this allow for a more accurate count of the orders 
issued in a given period that create policy, one could aggregate by month rather than by 
year.  Mayer and Prices’ estimates would simply be too inaccurate if aggregated at the 
monthly level.  
Howell (2003) recognizes the paucity of theory in the study of unilateral action 
and develops a “unilateral politics model” of executive action.  Similar to the work in 
this dissertation, Howell seeks to explain when policy change will occur through 
unilateral versus legislative action.   
Howell’s (2003) model builds upon earlier work by Moe and Howell (1999a; 
1999b).  It also borrows heavily from Krehbiel’s (1998) game theoretic model of pivotal 
politics.  Indeed, the only deviation from Krehbiel’s game theoretic model is that the 
president can move first in an effort to make policy by issuing an executive order, or 
other unilateral directive, to change the status quo of a policy before Congress has a 
chance to act on the policy.  The option of acting first allows the president to more 
closely match the final policy to the administration’s preferences.   
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Howell’s work is the first to propose a theory that explains presidential uses of 
executive orders.  As such, the study represents a major improvement in explaining 
presidential use of executive orders.  However, the theory is deficient in several areas. 
First, his theory makes predictions that are unlikely at best.  For instance, Howell 
predicts that under certain circumstances a president will issue an executive order 
moving policy further away from the preferred outcome in hopes that Congress will 
overturn the order and move the final policy closer to the president’s wishes (39).  This 
is one example of game theory making counter-intuitive predictions that are counter-
intuitive for a reason: they are unlikely to occur in the real world.  Any president that has 
an order overturned by Congress loses prestige within the institution.  As Howell 
eloquently states, “executive power is inversely proportional to legislative strength.  
Presidential power expands at exactly the same times, when and precisely the same 
places that, congressional power weakens…for it is the check that each places on the 
other that defines the overall division of power” (2003, 100).   
A president that has an order overturned by Congress is likely losing power 
relative to the legislature.  Even if the president took the action purposefully, members 
of Congress are more likely to be emboldened to act in the future against unilateral 
directives after having tasted success.  The power the president loses does not only affect 
the ability to utilize executive orders, but to act on legislation as well. Defeat can be 
embarrassing and harm the leverage presidents have in dealing with Congress in the 
future.  Egger and Harris (1963) outline the turbulent relationship that exists between the 
executive and legislative branches:  
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If, as it is alleged, nature abhors a vacuum, it is equally true that politics 
abhors equilibrium.  Two great energy systems, each with powers of 
aggression and defense, each active in areas which vitally involve the 
interests of the other, and neither able to operate without some degree of 
concurrence from the other unavoidably become involved in a contest as 
to which shall receive the superior accommodation at any particular time 
(43). 
Each executive loss that occurs tips the balance of power towards the legislature.  
For example, Edwards (1980) describes how Lyndon Johnson felt that a legislative loss, 
particularly in the early years of his administration, would be damaging to his 
professional reputation and future legislative success (135).  Surely having an order 
overturned would damage a president’s reputation as well.  This reputation is important 
to the future success of the president (Neustadt 1960).  Future negotiations with 
Congress may be more difficult as the president may be less able to resort to unilateral 
action in the face of an emboldened legislature.  
While the possibility exists that presidents consider taking such bold action as 
moving policy away from their preferences in order to generate congressional reaction 
moving the policy closer to their wishes, such action is unlikely for the reasons listed 
above.  In his text, Howell did not give a single example of such a case.  Given the 
thousands of orders issued over the past two centuries, if such a prediction reflected 
reality, finding an example should not prove difficult.  Given the lack of even an 
anecdote to support his argument and the fact that such action would be counter-
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productive for the president for the reasons listed above, this portion of the model is 
unrealistic. 
A second flaw in Howell’s game theoretic model is the assumption that policy 
change made through unilateral means is equal to that made through legislative means.  
There is little debate left among political scientists that presidents do alter policy through 
executive orders.  Examples abound of presidents using unilateral action to make policy.  
However, such policy change does not have the permanence that traditional legislation 
possesses.   
 A president who cares about the duration of a policy change should seek 
legislative change, for such changes are more difficult to alter.  Any future president 
wishing to modify policy crafted through unilateral action need only issue a new 
executive order moving the policy to the desired point.  However, a president wishing to 
change policy made through legislation must obtain at least a majority in each House to 
side with the administration’s position (another ten percent in the Senate to invoke 
cloture).  Such action can be difficult and concessions are likely to be required to obtain 
such a majority.  Under any circumstance, altering an executive order is easier for a 
president than securing legislative change to a policy.  As such, ceteris paribus, 
presidents likely prefer legislative change to unilateral directives to accomplish their 
policy goals.  Howell’s game theoretic model does not account for this imbalance.  By 
treating unilateral action as an equal of legislation, the model surely differs from reality 
where obvious differences are present. 
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 Another part of Howell’s study that is deserving of a second look is the asserted 
power of the presidency. He examines the success presidents have experienced when 
members of Congress mount challenges to executive orders.  At first glance, the data are 
compelling in showing that presidents are rarely overturned when they issue executive 
orders. Since 1971, Congress has only overturned four executive orders.  The conclusion 
Howell draws from these data is that the legislature is ill equipped to constrain 
presidential use of executive orders.  However, this conclusion is simplistic and probably 
wrong.  Rather, such data can be interpreted another way: presidents seek to anticipate 
the reactions of members of Congress to unilateral directives.  Realizing that a 
successful legislative challenge would be embarrassing and damaging to future 
negotiations with Congress, they avoid issuing orders that are likely to be overturned.  
The four instances of congressional action overturning a president indicate that when a 
president misjudges the available discretion, the legislature will react by overruling the 
president.  
 Howell notes that a striking feature of the bills overturning executive orders is 
that they “involved relatively unimportant matters” (116).  While this is not in dispute, 
he notes that one of the main reasons Congress is at a disadvantage relative to the 
president in reacting to executive orders is that members “take on those issues that most 
affect their reelection prospects, and pay considerably less attention to the rest…on those 
issues that attract little interest within Congress, the president is afforded a residuum of 
discretion” (109).  As such, one would expect that those orders overturned would be 
more prolific.  However, presidents likely give greater consideration before issuing high 
  
44
profile orders.  In such instances, they likely deliberate at length on the probable reaction 
of Congress to the order.  As such, these orders should be less likely to be overturned. 
 To conclude after an examination of the data that Congress is unable to rein in 
the president due to a dearth of actual instances of congressional action is to conclude 
that neither the president nor Congress is capable of rational action.  A president that is 
acting rationally will not issue an order that will provoke a congressional backlash.  At 
the same time, rational members of Congress will not sit idly by while a president 
unilaterally moves policy away from their desired positions.  If one concludes that these 
politicians are unable to act rationally then the entire model is suspect, for all predictions 
of the model hinge upon rational actors playing the game. 
 Another flaw in Howell’s analyses is the dependent variable used in the 
empirical analysis.  Howell recognized that all previous large-n studies of executive 
orders utilized a count of all, or nearly all, executive orders issued within a given time 
frame.  For instance, Krause and Cohen (1997) examined an annual count of executive 
orders issued as a dependent variable.  Mayer (1999; 2001), on the other hand, analyzed 
a monthly count of executive orders.  While such studies may reveal a pattern of 
presidential use of executive orders, the pattern is of little value, because one cannot be 
confident that it reveals how a president utilizes executive orders to affect policy.  
Presidents issue executive orders to accomplish a great number of objectives: honoring a 
deceased public official, delegating authority to subordinates or setting holidays for 
bureaucrats.  While orders accomplishing these objectives may have policy 
ramifications, a president issuing such order is likely doing so without any objectives 
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other than fulfilling the role of head of state incumbent upon the office.  Inclusion of 
such orders into a study seeking to explain presidents’ proclivity to alter policy 
unilaterally can mask important realities, as patterns found may simply be patterns of 
non-policy orders.  At the same time, if these orders do not co-vary with the policy 
orders, empirical patterns that do exist may be missed. 
 Because of the flaws inherent with using a total count, Howell creates a new 
dependent variable, “significant” executive orders.  Howell codes orders as significant if 
they were “mentioned in either the appendix of the Congressional Record or in the 
federal court opinions of at least two different cases” within fifteen years of the orders 
issuance (2003, 80-81).  To account for the years 1986-1998, where orders had not yet 
been present fifteen years, he utilized mentions in the New York Times.  Using OLS 
regression on the data from 1969-1985, where data are available from the New York 
Times, Congressional Record and court opinions, he generates predicted values of 
significant executive orders for 1986-1998 based upon the number of times executive 
orders were mentioned in the New York Times in a given year.  While such an approach 
is a step forward from the “total count” method utilized in the past, there are several 
shortcomings to this approach. 
 First, and foremost, the dependent variable is not an appropriate test of his 
theory.  According to his theory, large policy changes will usually be made through 
legislation, not executive orders.  Executive orders, Howell’s theory predicts, will 
consist of matters of “lower to intermediate importance” (2003, 48-49).  Of course, there 
are exceptions; presidents have utilized executive orders to make important policy 
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changes.  However, if the theory predicts matters that have less importance characterize 
the policy content of executive orders, the dependent variable in the analysis should 
include these policy matters.  Furthermore, an analysis that only includes “significant” 
orders misses a substantial amount of policy generated by the president.  
 Another potential flaw in Howell’s analysis is the level of aggregation in the 
dependent variable.  Howell’s aggregates his data by congressional term.  This ignores a 
great deal of variation that occurs over time.  A more logical aggregation would be 
monthly or even annual counts.  This is especially true when one introduces control 
variables into the model.  For instance, there is a great deal of variation that can occur in 
the unemployment rate over a two-year period.  Treating the entire congressional term 
the same misses this variation.  In addition, war was coded as a dummy variable.  If the 
nation is at war anytime during the term, this approach characterizes the whole term as if 
a war were present.2  For periods such as the Vietnam War era when entire congressional 
terms experienced wartime posture, this does not present a problem.  However, conflicts 
such as Desert Storm/Shield did not span an entire term, making this level of aggregation 
problematic. 
 The level of aggregation can influence the analysis and results as well.  Howell 
notes that when he analyzed the data annually, a dynamic process is present, leading him 
to conclude that a linear Poisson autoregressive model may be more appropriate (2003, 
210-11 n11).  Granted, such models are more labor intensive to compute; however, one 
should not aggregate up until the dynamic process is eliminated.  Instead, every effort 
                                                 
2 37% of the terms were coded positive on the “war” variable.  However, Howell does 
not state what periods were coded as war periods. 
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should be made to analyze data as close to the natural data generating process as 
possible. 
 Further, Howell was missing data from 1986-1998. To bring his data set into the 
maximum time frame, he utilizes predicted values of the dependent variable for these 
years.  To create the predicted values, Howell uses OLS regression to predict the values 
for the number of significant executive orders occurring during a congressional term 
based upon the total number of orders mentioned in the New York Times during that 
period.   
There are two problems with this procedure.  First, employing regression analysis 
on a series that is partially non-stochastic is inappropriate.  It does not take into account 
the deflated standard errors that occur due to using already predicted data. Second, due 
to the nature of the predicted values there is a mix of count and non-count data.  Under 
this circumstance, simple OLS regression is inappropriate.  When OLS is used to 
analyze an integer dependent variable, estimates can be biased, inconsistent and 
inefficient (Long 1997, 217).  In such an instance, Poisson or negative binomial 
regression would be more appropriate.  Yet, some of Howell’s data is non-integer 
making a mixed estimator more appropriate. 
 A simple “inter-ocular” examination of Howell’s predicted values in relation to 
the overall time-series in his Table 4.1 suggests that there may be some level of bias in 
the estimates (p. 84).  There is a noticeable increase in the values of the dependent 
variable once predicted values are used that one would not expect using the history of 
the time-series as the only predictor.  Given that there is not a corresponding increase in 
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the number of total orders issued during this time; the likely culprits are biased 
estimators. 
 Without Howell’s data, I cannot state with certainty that utilization of proper 
methodology would alter the predicted values.  However, given the fact that OLS 
estimators often possess bias in the presence of integer dependent variables and that the 
predicted values appear questionable, one must question whether the utilization of these 
data is appropriate. 
 Because Howell’s model was tested using improper data, one cannot assign a 
great deal of confidence to his results.  The selection of a dependent variable requires 
great care, for the wrong data often produce the wrong answers. 
 Nevertheless, Howell’s (2003) study is a noticeable improvement in scholarship 
on unilateral action by the president.  He seeks to ground the study of presidential action 
in theory and to test that theory with empirical data. Where should one go from here?  
Howell himself suggests the path forward in the study of presidential use of executive 
orders and unilateral action.   
He notes that his study has ignored the transaction costs facing the president in 
choosing between executive orders and legislative action (Howell 2003, 49).   Further, 
he states, “as future scholars find ways to introduce transaction costs to formal models of 
lawmaking, our estimation of the president’s power to act unilaterally should only 
increase” (2003, 51).   
By incorporating transaction costs into a theory of unilateral action, the produced 
theory should do a better job of explaining when a president will turn towards unilateral 
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action, as doing so incorporates the very costs that shape a president’s decision regarding 
policy change.  Such an improvement will greatly improve the theoretical foundation of 
the study of unilateral action.   
In the next chapter, I outline a theory of presidential policy-making where a 
president balances the transaction costs associated with legislative action and executive 
orders in deciding which path to take to affect policy.  
Another improvement that necessary is the creation of a new dependent variable.  
As alluded to earlier, the use of executive orders affect a great deal of policy, most 
frequently at lower levels of government.  By focusing solely on “significant” orders, as 
Howell (2003) does, one misses a plethora of policy changes made by the president.   
Furthermore, Howell notes that radical policy change will usually occur through 
legislation while unilateral action will be concerned with minor policy change.  This is 
likely the case, as presidents will not routinely have the discretion to make drastic 
changes without the formal consent of Congress.3  Because of this, any examination of 
presidential proclivity for utilization of executive orders must incorporate all orders that 
make policy 
Also, if one simply uses an overall count of the orders issued by the president, as 
Krause and Cohen (1997) and Mayer (1999; 2001) do, one includes a host of orders that 
have little, if any, policy relevance.  This option is even more problematic than using 
                                                 
3 Exceptions, of course, abound.  Presidents can, on occasion, make sizeable policy 
shifts without the consent of Congress.  President Reagan’s Executive Order 12291 is 
one example.  In this order, Reagan was able to provide a great deal of executive 
oversight to the regulations promulgated by agencies.  However, the usual nature of 
significant policy change is through legislation. 
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only “significant” orders as one may make conclusions after examining data that in 
reality reflect nothing more than variation in ceremonial or administrative orders. 
To account for the flaws present in the dependent variable of previous studies, a 
new dependent variable is needed.  To be acceptable, all orders that create policy should 
be included, while those that do not affect policy must be excluded.  While this is not a 
simple task, it is essential to explaining why presidents use executive orders rather than 
legislation in making policy. 
CONCLUSIONS 
 This literature review suggests two shortcomings in past work on presidential use 
of executive orders. There is a lack of good theory and empirical analysis in most past 
work.  Howell’s (2003) study marks a vast improvement over prior work.  However, as 
noted above, his theory and analysis also have serious limitations.  In the next chapter, I 
construct a theory of presidential policy-making that predicts when a president will seek 
policy change through legislation or through unilateral action.  Unlike previous work, 
this theory is generalizeable to different policy types. 
 The theory is developed from the transaction costs framework.  This framework 
has been used with success in other areas of political science. For example, it has been 
used to describe when Congress will delegate authority to the executive branch rather 
than writing detailed legislation.  The choice made by the president can be viewed as a 
similar decision.  Presidents can either make policy change themselves or push for 
changes to be made by another branch, in this case Congress.  There are relative 
advantages and disadvantages to each tactic.  The theory developed in the next chapter 
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predicts how presidents make decisions between each type of action when seeking 
policy changes. 
 Another limitation of past research is that most have used an easy to construct 
but improper dependent variable.  Most studies include a count of nearly all executive 
orders issued in a given period (usually monthly or yearly) as the dependent variable.  
Such an approach results in the inclusion of many orders that have little, if any, policy 
relevance.  When this method is used, one can only have confidence that the results 
show how presidents use executive orders broadly, as opposed to how presidents use 
executive orders to affect policy. 
 The other approach, taken by Howell (2003) and Mayer and Price (2002) is to 
utilize a count of those orders that are “significant” by some measure.  This has an 
advantage in that it eliminates orders that do not make policy (supposedly, there is a 
possibility that an order that did not make policy was covered by the news media, i.e. a 
symbolic order, and thus was deemed significant).  However, this route also removes a 
host of orders that do make policy.  Furthermore, most major changes in policy are made 
by legislation while executive orders usually concern themselves with minor policy 
changes.  By utilizing only “significant” orders, one is likely receiving a picture that 
differs from the reality of how presidents alter policy through executive orders. 
 Furthermore, annual counts are the lowest level of aggregation in these studies of 
significant orders.  Such aggregation ignores a sizeable amount of variation that occurs 
in the political environment.  For instance, presidential popularity exhibits a great deal of 
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variation from month to month; however, by aggregating at the annual level, forces one 
to ignore this additional information. 
 A more productive method of studying executive orders would be to examine 
each executive order and determine its policy substance.  By doing this, one can 
eliminate all orders that do not make or alter policy and include those that do in the 
analysis.  Then, one can aggregate these orders at the monthly level allowing one to 
capitalize on the variation that exists in the political environment.   
Past research on executive orders has provided an initial foundation for the study 
of presidential behavior when issuing executive orders.  The work in coming chapters 
builds on that foundation by presenting a coherent theory grounded in transaction costs 
and testing that theory with appropriate data.  
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CHAPTER III 
THEORY BUILDING 
 
 As noted earlier, presidents have multiple options available for altering public 
policy. Among these are pursuing changes legislatively and acting unilaterally by issuing 
executive orders. The study of presidential policy-making requires a theory that explains 
how presidents choose between these options.  In this chapter, I develop a parsimonious 
theory explaining how a president determines whether to pursue change through 
unilateral action or to attempt change through the legislature.   
In developing the theory, I rely extensively on the transaction costs framework 
developed originally by Coase (1937) and reintroduced by Williamson (1975). The 
transaction costs framework is a useful instrument that allows a researcher to consider 
how various impediments, or “costs,” affect the decision, or “transaction,” an individual 
makes. The transaction costs framework is mostly used in the economic literature to 
explain the “build or buy” decision facing firms.4  However, over the past several years, 
                                                 
4 The build or buy decision, also known as vertical integration or firm boundaries, is 
what a firm does with the realization that each production company must at some point 
stop making its own inputs.  Imagine a continuum of production where some raw good is 
manipulated at various steps beginning as a raw product, and is turned into an 
intermediate product by a company.  This intermediate product is then transformed into 
a finished good by some firm.  Some companies will concentrate on only producing 
finished products while buying all raw and intermediate goods from others.  Additional 
firms will take raw products and turn them into intermediate goods utilized by 
companies that only specialize in turning intermediate goods into finished products.  
Other companies approach full integration by beginning with raw products and 
producing a final product.  However, even these firms will acquire some goods from 
others, for instance, their office supply products.  The build or buy decision facing a 
firm, then, is simply the choice made by a company whether to produce the good within 
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the framework has been increasingly utilized in political science (Bawn 1995; Epstein 
and O’Halloran 1999; Globerman and Vining 1996; Huber and Shipan 2000; Ostrom, 
Schroeder and Wynne 1993; Potoski 1999).  There are also several studies that, while 
not explicitly framed in transaction cost theory, are quite similar to the transaction costs 
framework (Balla 1998; Balla and Wright 2001; McCubbins 1985; McCubbins, Noll and 
Weingast 1989; Moe and Wilson 1994).   
In this chapter, I will also review a sample of the work that has studied politics 
through a transaction costs approach. After examining political science literature that 
utilizes the transaction costs framework, I will discuss how it relates to unilateral politics 
and then develop a transaction costs based model that predicts when a president will 
pursue policy change through Congress versus striking out unilaterally and issuing an 
executive order.   
THE TRANSACTION COSTS FRAMEWORK 
Now, let’s define and discuss what the transaction costs framework means.  
Begin by imagining a world in which transaction costs do not exist.  In such a world, 
individuals would be completely free to negotiate with each other to reach an optimal 
contract for the exchange of goods and resources. Consider a non-political analogy from 
Epstein and O’Halloran (1999).  A given plot of land is more valuable when used to 
produce crops than when used to support cattle.  In this scenario, if the rancher controls 
the land, a farmer may enter into a contract to lease or purchase the land from the 
                                                                                                                                                
the business or to purchase the good elsewhere (see Epstein and O’Halloran 1999, 38-40 
for a concise discussion of the build or buy decision). 
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rancher.  Alternatively, if the farmer already controls the property, a rancher will be 
unwilling to pay the farmer enough to surrender control of the property.  With no 
transaction costs the land would be put to its most valuable use of farming, for the 
rancher would be unwilling to pay the farmer a high enough price to surrender control of 
the land or to use the property to support cattle as opposed to receiving rent from the 
farmer. 
Under the ideal scenario, value determines allocations and the equilibrium price. 
However, transaction costs can distort this ideal arrangement.  Many things can 
constitute a transaction cost.  For instance, if the agreement entails the maintenance of a 
barn, but the property owner is unable to observe that the barn is being properly 
maintained then a transaction cost is present (a principal-agent monitoring problem).  In 
such an instance, the property owner will have to either spend resources to observe the 
maintenance of the barn or accept the possibility that the barn may not be cared for.  
Either option produces less than ideal outcomes for the property owner.  Alternatively, 
the renter may know that the land possesses a vast oil deposit and is thus willing to pay a 
higher rent.  If the property owner is unaware of this, then the landowner is unable to 
obtain the maximum rent possible due to a transaction cost (asymmetric information).  
The lack of information causes a pricing outcome that differs from the equilibrium 
outcome if both individuals were aware of the oil deposit.  
This analogy is a brief introduction to the transaction costs framework that 
examines a simple situation where transaction costs can creep in.  More generally, a 
transaction cost is any cost that pushes an exchange away from the ideal relationship 
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where value fully determines allocations.  One does not have to consider this definition 
long before realizing that it is an expansive definition applicable to a variety of 
situations.    
While the preceding example pertained to economic exchange, the framework is 
also useful for studying politics.  Politics is about “who gets what, when and how” 
(Laswell 1936).  Therefore political science is, in large part, the study of allocations. The 
transaction costs framework seeks to determine how actors arrive at their decisions on 
allocations, and is thus useful to political scientists.  
Consider the following example where members of Congress are faced with a 
vote on a farm bill.  In a world with no transaction costs, members are free to vote their 
true individual preferences.  Were such a world to exist, the resultant policy would 
reflect the desire of the pivotal member of the chamber.5 
Such a world does not exist in reality.  Members of Congress are often pulled in 
multiple directions and receive pressure from many sources.  On any given issue, a 
member may have a personal opinion that differs from the majority attitude of the home 
district.  There may be a mobilized minority among the constituents that cares intensely 
about the issue and desires a vote different from the majority opinion.  In such an 
instance, the member faces potential transaction costs with any action taken.  On the one 
hand, if the member sides with the majority, there is a risk of alienating a passionate 
portion of the voting block, as well as voting against personal beliefs.  On the other 
                                                 
5 This could be the median member of Congress.  It could also be the filibuster pivot 
point, or the member that whose support could lead to a veto override (Krehbiel 1998).  
The point is simply that the member whose inclusion leads to a winning coalition is the 
expected outcome. 
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hand, a member that votes against the majority, risks potential electoral defeat by giving 
a challenger an issue to use for priming the majority in upcoming elections.  The manner 
in which constituents influence the voting behavior of members of Congress is not fully 
understood;6 however, there is little doubt the potential transaction costs imposed by 
constituents alter the decisions of legislators.  
The transaction costs do not end with the constituency; there are potential costs 
for going against the party.  Party resources such as money and support can be of vital 
importance to a member and going against the party is not a decision that one should 
make light-heartedly (Aldrich and Rohde 2000).   
Interest groups provide another potential source of transaction costs.  Members 
of Congress need the contributions and endorsements of willing interest groups for 
success in the electoral arena.  For nearly any issue, there is an interest group taking a 
keen interest in the decisions made by the members of Congress.  These groups can 
wield their power to impose costs on errant legislators by withholding valuable resources 
such as endorsements, money and information (Schlozman and Tierney 1983).   
The transaction costs framework is useful in determining how legislators 
navigate these potential impacts in making decisions on a given policy.  If one were to 
simply factor in the policy “wishes” of legislators, then one would likely obtain a 
misleading prediction concerning the outcome of the policy in question.  Only by 
explicitly acknowledging that there are potential costs for taking certain actions can one 
make a prediction that reflects reality. 
                                                 
6 See Hurley and Hill 2003; Miller and Stokes 1963 for parsimonious theories of 
constituency influence. 
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Rational choice analysts will often pay little attention to the costs facing an actor 
making decisions.  Despite elaborate equations and spatial maps, there is often only a 
passing mention of the costs associated with individual decisions.  Even when the costs 
are factored into a rational choice model, they are often included as a simple generic 
term.  Transaction costs analysis seeks to study the effect these costs have on the 
decisions made by actors as opposed to ignoring the influence of such costs. 
Krehbiel (1998) presents an example of rational choice work that does not factor 
in the transaction costs facing a political actor.  He outlines an elegant theory using a 
spatial model and the preferences of various political actors to make policy predictions.  
While the argument is convincing, the model does not incorporate the transaction costs 
facing policy-makers.  The assumption is that the preferences of the actors will drive the 
outcome, regardless of transaction costs.7 
Howell (2003) builds upon Krehbiel’s (1998) spatial model by incorporating the 
president’s ability to act unilaterally through the issuance of executive orders.  Like 
Krehbiel, the model is persuasive in many regards.  However, Howell also ignores the 
presence of transaction costs.  The resulting model predicts what will happen in the 
absence of transaction costs.  While the predictions are still of some value, we do not 
live in such a world free of transaction costs.  A better approach is acknowledging these 
                                                 
7 In Krehbiel’s defense, under his theory, the preferences of individuals can be 
influenced by transaction costs, though this is not clearly noted.  In this manner, 
transaction costs influence the outcome of policy.  However, explicitly including the 
costs into a model and determining their influence on policy would be more 
advantageous. 
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transaction costs and attempting to incorporate them into a theory of presidential policy-
making.   
Taking Howell’s model to its logical conclusion, the prediction would be that a 
president should always pursue policy change via executive orders or other unilateral 
action when there is enough discretion to do so.  When presidents are indifferent 
between obtaining a like policy through unilateral action and legislative action they 
should pursue all possible policy change through executive orders in order to eliminate 
much of the uncertainty present in the legislative process.  Even though a president can 
be confident that the administration’s legislative agenda will garner a vote, barring 
unusual circumstances, when a president proposes legislation to Congress, passage is not 
certain (Edwards and Barrett 2000).   
Even when ratification is certain, a president is unable to predict the exact format 
of the eventual bill.  Ceteris paribus, under this model of policy-making, a president able 
to get everything desired through executive orders would be better advised to create 
policy solely through unilateral action.   
When a president enters the legislative arena, compromise becomes necessary 
and the president is rarely able to guarantee that a submitted bill will pass in its initial 
form.  There must be some reason that presidents choose legislative policy change over 
unilateral action.  If the two paths were equal, then a president would always utilize 
executive orders (assuming that such action is legal) when pursuing policy change; for 
then the president would be able to get the exact policy outcome the administration 
desires.   
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Why, then, do presidents pursue legislation?  What drives them to choose 
surrendering control of the outcome of a policy in large degree to the legislature?  The 
answer is that there are transaction costs present in unilateral action. 
Explicitly integrating the transaction costs facing individuals into models adds 
value by allowing for a more complete theory.  The resulting theory is more realistic 
than the traditional rational choice models often criticized as devoid of reality. 
TRANSACTION COSTS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 
There is a common element running through most works that utilize the 
transaction costs framework (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; North 1990; Williamson 
1975; 1996; Wood and Bohte 2004).  The transaction costs analogy usually involves 
framing decisions in the context of a contract.  There should be a neutral third party to 
enforce the contract.  Actors entering into contracts have multiple options.  Also the 
framework assumes that actors are boundedly rational (Huber and Shipan 2000; Simon 
1957).8  The following pages discuss each of these characteristics and their relation to 
the study of politics 
Contract 
 The contract holds a great deal of importance in the transaction costs framework.  
In this study, the U.S. Constitution is the contract that binds the behavior of the president 
and his relation with other actors.  Though not explicitly stated, this is the implication of 
                                                 
8 Unlike traditional bounded rationality pioneered by Simon (1957), transaction costs do 
not assume that it is necessarily inadequate cognitive capacities that limit ones ability to 
maximize net value, instead there are transaction costs such as informational uncertainty 
that lead to one’s inability to fully maximize net value. 
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most assumptions of models in political science, for the Constitution states the rules for 
making policy in the United States 
 The Constitution outlines how the differing branches are to work together to 
affect policy.  Some of the requirements are direct.  For instance, the founders wrote the 
constraint that a two-thirds super-majority of both houses of Congress has the ability to 
override a presidential veto in such a manner as to leave no doubt as to the framers’ 
intentions.   
 Other parts of the Constitution give the branches discretion.  For example, 
Congress has a great deal of latitude in its organization and operation.  In forming its 
rules, Congress has created procedures and rules that have an influence on policy.  For 
instance, the Senate created the filibuster within its rules.  While this practice is absent 
from the Constitution, its presence has greatly altered the means by which laws are made 
in America (Krehbiel 1998). 
 Under the constitutional contract, the president has five options for influencing 
policy either explicitly or implicitly outlined.  Maintaining the status quo is the first.  
While this generates the least level of conflict, it is also the option of least value to a 
president wanting policy change.  By taking no action, the president essentially accepts 
that the current policy is better than any change after accounting for transaction costs.  
Seeking to maintain the status quo is not normally associated with presidential policy-
making.  However, the decision to do nothing does influence the outcome of policy, and 
therefore it is an important component of presidential policy-making. 
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 Unilateral action is the second option available to the president.  According to 
Cooper (2002), this can come in the form of national security directives, proclamations, 
or the subject of the next chapter, executive orders.  The president can also utilize vague 
or incomplete portions of existing law to shift policy.  By doing so, the president 
essentially utilizes the position as “chief administrator” to influence the implementation 
of policy.   
A president who alters policy through unilateral action is contractually bound by 
two factors: the Constitution and existing law.  With regard to existing law, the 
administration cannot violate the letter of the agreement between the president (even if it 
was a prior administration) and the enacting legislature (even if the composition of 
Congress is radically different from the enacting Legislature).  With respect to the 
Constitution, the president must abide by all restrictions from due process or rights 
embedded in judicial decisions.  
Unilateral action presents the president with a host of benefits relative to other 
options.  The president is able to shift policy to a position more consistent with his own 
preferences.  He may de-emphasize costs to particular political interests affected by the 
policy.  Relatedly, unilateral action does not entail transaction costs from negotiating 
with Congress.  
However, the president is not free to use unilateral action to move policy 
anywhere at all.  The president runs the risk that other political actors will convince 
Congress to overrule the unilateral action through legislation (McCubbins, Noll and 
Weingast 1989).  In addition, the policy must stay inside the bounds of existing law.  If 
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presidents do not, they face the possibility of an embarrassing ruling from the courts 
overturning the change.  This course of action, then, is not viable when the president 
desires a move in policy that is greater than existing law will allow. 
Time imparts another unique advantage to unilateral action.  Formally altering 
legislation is a time consuming process.  Rarely is a president able to push through a 
legislative proposal in a short amount of time.  However, by acting unilaterally a 
president is able to make the changes as soon as the administrative staff is able to draft 
and review an executive order.  A president facing immediate political problems has 
little time to wait on Congress to make changes in law.  At such a time, the president 
may be well advised to issue an executive order and alter the policy unilaterally. 
There are, however, costs to unilateral action.  As was mentioned previously, the 
president is constrained in how far policy can be moved through unilateral action.  The 
president cannot move policy to any desired position, or there is the risk of reversal by 
the legislature or courts.  The president must also work within the bounds of the existing 
law.  If a president desires a change in policy that exceeds the allowances of current 
statutes, then the only option is to seek new legislation. 
In addition, when acting unilaterally, the president faces the same statutory 
situation that existed before the action.  Granted, the president took action that may have 
been unexpected by Congress and thus altered the status quo to favor the 
administration’s desires.  However, since the original statutory framework is left in place 
with the same amount of discretion, any successive administration will be free to 
overturn the unilateral action.   
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If a president desires a more permanent change in policy, then unilateral action is 
not the best avenue.  For instance, President Reagan issued a ban on funding of foreign 
family planning organizations that counseled women on abortions or performed the 
procedure.  This policy stayed in effect under the like-minded President George H.W. 
Bush administration.  However, when President Clinton entered office in 1993 he issued 
an order reversing the Reagan order.  The policy was again changed in 2001 when 
President George W. Bush reinstituted the policy of his father and Reagan (Hall 2001).  
As this example shows, when there is not a change in the statutory agreement between 
Congress and the president, the long-term stability of the policy is in danger since any 
president is free to alter or remove any executive order from previous administrations. 
Certainly, each of the presidents in the above example would prefer their favored 
policy were the permanent policy.  However, these presidents likely did not possess the 
ability to coerce Congress into making permanent changes to the nation’s policy towards 
international family planning.  While unilateral action may not be the ideal solution in 
such circumstances, a temporary change in policy often serves a president better than no 
change at all.  
The third option available to the president is seeking policy change through 
legislative action.  This “textbook” approach requires the president to influence the 
legislative branch in an attempt to secure new law cementing a given policy.  This 
process of implementing policy change has unique advantages and disadvantages 
relative to the other forms of altering policy.   
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Permanence is a big advantage of changing policy through legislation.  Any 
future president desiring a change in policy initially made via legislation will have to 
muster at least a majority of both houses of Congress.  Given the slow turnover within 
the two chambers (Parker 1989, chapter IV), such action is much more difficult.  When 
long-term stability of the policy is of great importance, legislation is likely the best 
choice for the president. 
Another benefit of legislative action is that fewer legal barriers to action exist.  A 
president is constrained by current law and by the Constitution when acting unilaterally.  
In terms of legal restrictions, there are only Constitutional concerns to attend to when 
seeking legislative change.  Of course, the president has a host of de facto limitations in 
regards to legislative action.  A president must account for the wishes of members of 
Congress and the public at large.  However, if the president desires a policy change 
outside the bounds of current law, legislative change may be the only route available. 
One cost of legislative action is that the president is unable to craft an exact 
policy.  The legislature has created chamber practices that make it difficult for the 
president to push legislation through unaltered.  The committee system allows members 
to hold up legislation (Wilson [1885] 1956).  The conference committee structure allows 
members of Congress to have an “ex-post veto” on legislation as well (Shepsle and 
Weingast 1987).  The legislature also utilizes omnibus legislation to force the president 
into accepting some policies opposed by the administration in order to garner the 
passage of a more favored policy (Krutz 2001).  In the face of divided government, the 
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majority party can exercise great power in blocking legislation, forcing a compromise, or 
even enacting their own legislation (Rohde 1991).     
Even if there existed no institutional roadblocks to legislative action, the 
president would still be unable to craft a specific policy.  To garner passage of 
legislation, the president must secure the votes of at least half of the members of 
Congress (at least ten percent more in the Senate must be unwilling to pursue a filibuster 
to block the legislation).  Because of this, the president is faced with the realization that 
legislative action will likely result in a policy that is not the exact policy sought by the 
administration. 
Further, due to the complex system and the multiplicity of interests, the president 
is routinely unsure as to what form a passed statute will take.  This uncertainty is most 
pronounced when compared to the certainty that exists when a president issues an 
executive order.  Because the president makes the policy, there is little doubt what form 
it will take. 
The time involved in the legislative process is a further cost of congressional 
action.  If a president faces a situation, such as a natural disaster, hostile attack, or an 
economic hardship, there may be little time to wait on legislative policy change.  Such 
circumstances often require immediate action, something that only occurs in the rarest of 
situations within the Legislature. 
The fourth option available to the president for making policy change is 
attempting to influence the bureaucracy.  Because the federal bureaucracy is responsible 
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for implementing the policies of the government, if the president can successfully 
control the actions of agencies, then governmental policy can indeed be manipulated.   
The president can attempt to influence the bureaucracy through centralization of 
administrative tasks (Cooper and West 1988; Moe 1985; West 1995).  By limiting the 
discretion available to “street level” bureaucrats, the administration can more effectively 
control the outputs of the government.  Past research also shows that the president can 
affect control over bureaucracies by utilizing the power to appoint like-minded 
individuals (Durant and Warber 2001; Golden 2000; Nathan 1983; Waterman 1989; 
Weko 1995; West 1985; Wood 1988; Wood and Waterman 1991; 1993; 1994).  By 
doing so, the president can influence the outputs of administrative agencies. However, 
the president is limited in how far policy can be moved without formal policy changes 
such as occurs through legislation or executive orders. The law and the Constitution bind 
bureaucrats and they are not free to do whatever they please.  In addition, the Executive 
Office of the President is much too small to effectively monitor all actions of the 
bureaucracy (West 1995).  Therefore, presidents cannot be sure of the implementation of 
such policy changes.  
 While research has shown that presidents can effectively utilize appointees to 
control the bureaucracy, doing so is not a simple process.  Many appointees serve at the 
pleasure of the president; others do not.  In Humphrey’s Executor vs. The United States, 
295 U.S. 602 (1935) the Supreme Court ruled that Congress has the right to create 
appointed positions where appointees could not be removed by the president for political 
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purposes.  If the president makes a poor initial selection in appointing such an official, 
there is little recourse to punish the errant administrator. 
 There are a limited number of qualified, willing individuals to serve in appointed 
positions for the president to choose from.  Government service often does not pay what 
a comparable job in the private sector demands and the perks are much less than a job in 
the business community (Fesler and Kettl 1996).  Also, given the sheer number of 
appointed positions, as many as three thousand, with over five hundred at top levels 
(Ingraham 1995, 104), the president is unable to properly screen each appointee for 
loyalty and ability (West 1995).   
Even if the president were able to successfully screen appointees and select only 
those willing to faithfully execute the policies of the administration, there always exists a 
possibility that the appointee will leave prematurely.  Wood and Marchbanks (2004) 
show that appointees typically serve only a short time, and are more likely to leave 
during times of economic prosperity. When appointees leave, the president loses loyalty 
to the administration and the president’s desired policies. The loss of administrative 
competence and experience results in amateurs acting for the president (Fesler and Kettl 
1996; Heclo 1977; Ingraham 1995). 
 Controlling the bureaucracy is possible.  Through centralization and utilization of 
appointees, the president can sometimes influence public policy.  However, achieving 
policy change through these means can be difficult, and at times may not be the most 
effective method.  As with legislative change, policy change through administration can 
be slow and uncertain of matching the president’s desired position.  Moreover, like 
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executive orders, altering policy through the bureaucracy does not result in permanent 
policy change and can be overturned by a future administration. Therefore, pursuing 
policy change through the bureaucracy will typically have the transaction costs 
associated with the prior approaches without the advantages that come with them.  As a 
result, it is likely not the preferred course for the president to create policy change. 
 The fifth option available to the president for altering policy is the pursuance of a 
court challenge to existing law.  This option is perhaps the most difficult path for a 
president seeking policy change. To achieve change through the courts there must be a 
relevant case somewhere in the judicial venue. Then the president must convince the 
judiciary to hear the case.  Finally, the president must achieve a favorable court ruling, 
typically showing that a pre-existing law is in some way errant.  Such means are not 
likely to be an effective route for presidential policy-making. The courts do not bow to 
the president in choosing cases, and may not agree with the president in deeming the 
status quo errant. In addition, a judicial challenge can be a slow process, resulting in an 
outcome that does not match the president’s desired policy position. Thus, change 
through judicial means is typically not a viable approach for most policy changes sought 
by the president.  
 Of the options that are implied or granted in the Constitutional contract for 
presidential policy-making, the legislative route and unilateral action are likely the ones 
most practical.  While it may be useful to study the administrative and judicial 
presidencies, this dissertation will focus on presidential policy making through 
legislative change and unilateral action.  In particular, I seek to determine when 
  
70
presidents choose unilateral action through executive orders versus legislative action to 
pursue policy change. 
 Table 3.1 lists selected transaction costs associated with both legislative and 
unilateral action.  The items in bold represent transaction costs included in empirical 
tests in the coming chapters. 
 
Table 3.1 Selected Transaction Costs for the President 
Associated with Unilateral and Congressional Action 
Legislation Executive Orders 
Time Required for Passage Limited Discretion 
Inability to Set Policy Lack of Permanence 
Uncertainty Regarding Outcome   
Items in bold represent transaction costs that will be tested in the  
coming chapters  
 
 
Neutral Third-Party 
 A second assumption of transaction cost analysis is that a neutral third party 
exists to enforce the contract.  As was mentioned previously, the Constitution is the 
contract guiding the American political system.  Under this document, the court system 
reigns as the arbiter of what adheres to the Constitution.  This study, then posits the 
courts as the third party mediating between the executive and legislative branches.  This 
is consistent with the approach of Epstein and O’Halloran (1999). 
 In theory, the courts are neutral; however, there is a high likelihood that judges 
have some level of bias.  Judges, like any other citizens, have policy preferences.  To 
assume that these individuals ignore these opinions when making a legal ruling is likely 
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naive.  What is more probable is that justices act upon their own policy preferences 
when making a ruling.  There is a great deal of research to support such a conclusion 
(Segal and Cover 1989; Segal and Spaeth 1993; 1996).  The relationship may be 
complicated as well, with justices relying on a mix of their own personal ideologies and 
law and precedent (Songer and Lindquist 1996).  The simple fact that the president 
appoints these justices and the Senate accepts them suggests that there is some level of 
ideology and partisanship underlying the behavior of judges. 
 Another variable that can limit the court’s ability to act as a neutral arbiter is 
public opinion.  Flemming and Wood (1997) show that individual justices do adjust their 
votes on cases in a manner that reflects public opinion, even after controlling for their 
ideologies (see also Mishler and Sheehan 1993).  If the courts do indeed respond to the 
mass opinion of the public, then they are unable to fully serve as an unbiased arbiter to 
whether actions are in accordance with law, for until formally altered, the letter of the 
law is not responsive to the whims of the public.  However, Flemming and Wood’s 
findings indicate that justices only marginally change their views in light of public 
opinion.  Thus, politicians must recognize that public opinion may enter in to the court’s 
deliberations; however, it should not be the driving force behind judicial decisions. 
 Regardless of their ability to remain strictly neutral, the courts are the arbiters of 
the American political system.  The probable bias that is present may be either beneficial 
or harmful to the president.  A president may have more or less leeway on a particular 
issue with a given court.  The uncertainty and bias caused by this lack of neutrality can 
be viewed as a transaction cost, limiting the ability of politicians to take the letter of the 
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law at face value.  However, politicians are able to formulate expectations of what the 
courts will decide on a given case and can adjust their actions based upon these 
predictions.  This expectation of judicial reaction, then, can be viewed as altering the 
available options for a president.  The president holds certain beliefs as to what the 
court’s reaction to potential actions taken by the administration will be and will take 
action after considering those beliefs. 
Multiple Options 
 Transaction costs analyses also assume that decision makers have multiple 
options when making decisions.  Otherwise, there would be little value derived by 
utilizing the framework, as the actors would make the same decision regardless of the 
associated transaction costs.  In this study, I assume the president can choose between 
altering policy through legislation or through unilateral action.  The decision is made 
after weighing the transaction costs associated with each choice. 
Bounded Rationality 
Utilization of the transaction costs framework assumes that individuals are 
boundedly rational (Huber and Shipan 2000; Simon 1957).  This means that actors 
attempt to navigate an uncertain environment by making the best decisions that they can 
with limited knowledge and rationality.  However, due to transaction costs, they will be 
unable to act in a manner that will always result in the maximum payoff.  They will seek 
instead to maximize their expected payoff by trying to balance the projected costs with 
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the projected benefits of various courses of action.  When doing so, they take the action 
that they expect will yield them the highest net value. 
In regards to political actors that are boundedly rational, Huber and Shipan 
(2000, 26-27) provide a description of the transaction cost framework from a 
bureaucratic control perspective.  Borrowing heavily from their criteria, the following 
points are relevant to boundedly rational policy actors: 
1. Political actors are rational optimizers.  That is, presidents, 
legislators, bureaucrats, or other political principals adopt 
strategies that maximize expected payoff. 
2. Political actors are boundedly rational in a narrow sense.  They 
face informational problems limiting their ability to achieve 
ideal outcomes, despite efforts to optimize. 
3. Political actors are policy-oriented.  That is, politicians want to 
implement legislation to obtain the best possible policy 
outcome. 
4. Political actors face particular types of transaction costs in their 
efforts to optimally structure policy. 
5. Political actors choose institutions that maximize net value, 
given the tradeoff between policy and transaction costs (Huber 
and Shipan 2000 26-27).9 
                                                 
9 These criteria have been changed to some extent, but portions are quotations from 
Huber and Shipan (2000, 26-27).  The entire portion is treated as a direct quotation, 
though there is some changes made to the wording. 
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Bounded rationality is an important concept in transaction costs analyses.  
Transaction costs affect not only the expected net values associated with unilateral and 
legislative action, but also the potential for error in arriving at an accurate estimation of 
payoff.  
The expectation in this analysis, then, is that a president selects among the 
options available, either legislative or unilateral action, based upon a consideration of the 
transaction costs and benefits associated with each, selecting the one with the greatest 
expected net value.  In essence, the president has a “build or buy” decision to consider.  
The build or buy decision facing the president is this: policy can be made unilaterally, or 
built.  Conversely, the president can attempt to convince Congress that a policy change 
is prudent.  In this scenario, the president is “buying” policy change for the president 
does not have complete control over the outcome of the policy, but rather seeks change 
through another organization and must face the realization that Congress may act in a 
manner that is not in the best interests of the administration.   
The president then selects the option that holds the highest expected payoff 
relative to the other alternative. Due to limited knowledge, the president may sometimes 
be uncertain about the appropriate method of achieving policy change, but acts in the 
manner that expected to lead to the greatest net value.  
Some general factors may affect the expected net value to the president of taking 
legislative action versus unilateral action.  Among them is political efficiency.  This 
derives from the ability to maximize public approval or re-election chances (or in the 
case of a second term president, the re-election chances of the party).  A president caring 
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about public approval or the electoral chances of the party would be remiss in failing to 
consider the role each of the administration’s decisions has on those chances.  Policy that 
increases approval or electoral chances thus carries greater net value, ceteris paribus. 
Public policy that is of importance to the president is another consideration that 
can affect net value.  Most individuals have certain policies they care about and have 
favored positions for said policies; presidents are certainly no different.  Unlike John Q. 
Public, however, presidents are in a position to act on their policy preferences and push 
for policy reflecting those goals.  The resulting policy will generate outcomes that carry 
some benefit to the president.  Legislation of more importance to the president carries 
greater potential net value, ceteris paribus. 
A president also attaches importance to the historical legacy of actions. No 
president wants to go down in history as a poor steward of the nation.  Because of this, a 
president has an incentive to work towards sound public policy that will benefit the 
nation (or at the very least, policies that the president believes will benefit the nation).  
Policy that expected to result in a better legacy will carry a higher net value than a policy 
that impugns the president’s legacy, ceteris paribus.  
POLITICAL SCIENCE RESEARCH USING A TRANSACTION COSTS 
FRAMEWORK 
 The past several years have witnessed a growth in the use of the transaction costs 
framework within political science.  What follows is but a sampling of that work.  As 
evidenced, the framework provides a flexible and useful lens through which to view 
questions of a political nature. 
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Wood and Bohte (2004) utilize the transaction costs framework in examining the 
way Congress and the president design administrative agencies.  According to their 
theory, current and future transaction costs affect the design of administrative agencies. 
Under some political conditions, Congress and the president design agencies insulated 
from future political control.  Under other conditions, they design agencies to facilitate 
future political control.  Indeed, the design of an agency determines transaction costs for 
future political actors seeking to alter or control policy.  Specific predictions flowing out 
of their theory are that higher future transaction costs occur when there is a heightened 
degree of conflict between the president and Congress, higher electoral turnover, higher 
levels of coalitional conflict, and weak political parties (177). 
 Empirical tests support Wood and Bohte’s core theory: when there is a greater 
likelihood that rival politicians in the future will desire to influence agency action, either 
through the presidency or through a new legislative make-up, there is a tendency 
towards incorporating additional transaction costs into the agency design.  Additionally, 
when there is a political environment that is more difficult to legislate, such as weak 
parties, there will be fewer transaction costs incorporated into the agency design.  These 
transaction costs might include broadening the agency leadership to multiple actors, 
imposing party requirements on those serving in a leadership role, or giving appointees 
longer terms.  
 One important note to take from this study is that Congress and the president are 
cognizant of present and future transaction costs.  Not only are they aware of transaction 
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costs, but also they utilize these costs in designing administrative agencies so as to 
influence future efforts to change policy. 
 Another notable application of the transaction costs framework is Epstein and 
O’Halloran’s (1999) analysis of determinants of legislative delegation of authority to the 
bureaucracy.  They build upon Mayhew’s (1974) popular assumption that members of 
Congress seek to maximize their electoral chances.  Using this assumption, the authors 
postulate that when creating policy, legislators weigh the inherent transaction costs of 
detailing explicitly all factors of legislation with the potential transaction costs of 
delegating this authority to the executive branch. 
 By delegating to the executive, Congress lessens its workload and is able to 
capitalize on the expertise possessed by the bureaucracy.  Additionally, by delegating, 
Congress avoids many of the inefficiencies created by the current committee system.  
Among inefficiencies noted by the authors are legislative delays caused by the system 
and the informational asymmetry present in the current structure (48-49).  The entire 
Congress is unable to ascertain when a committee is forthcoming in regards to 
information surrounding a given policy.  Because of this, there is always the possibility 
that a committee can mislead the body into enacting a policy that is not in the greatest 
interest of Congress as a whole.  When there is a greater chance that committees are 
misleading the collective legislature, Congress is better off delegating authority to the 
bureaucracy. 
 Delegation, however, presents inefficiencies as well.  Most notably, legislators 
must expend precious time monitoring the bureaucracy. There is no guarantee that the 
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agency will not act in a manner different than intended by Congress (49).  When an 
agency is likely to shirk its responsibility to represent the legislature, Congress is better 
off enacting policy on its own.  Epstein and O’Halloran utilize the transaction cost 
framework to explain how Congress balances these inefficiencies in order to create 
policy. 
 After developing a theory that explains when Congress will make policy on its 
own and when it will delegate its authority, the authors test their theory with empirical 
data.  They find that when committees are composed of individuals outside the 
congressional mainstream, Congress delegates more power to the executive.  
Conversely, when the minority party in Congress controls the bureaucracy, the 
legislature delegates the administrative state less authority.  Contentious policy areas are 
another characteristic of delegated policies. 
Epstein and O’Halloran’s empirical tests support their general theory that 
Congress will delegate authority to the executive branch when doing so is more 
politically valuable than making the policy internally.  This study dovetails nicely with 
the work in this dissertation. The authors explain when Congress will make policy on its 
own versus when it will delegate its authority to another branch.  This dissertation 
predicts when a president will make policy unilaterally and when the administration will 
attempt to influence another branch to alter the policy.   
Epstein and O’Halloran’s study also can be seen as the starting point in studying 
unilateral action.  When Congress decides whether to delegate to the executive branch, it 
is explicitly acknowledging that the President will be able to alter the expected 
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placement of the policy by administrative influence.  Once Congress delegates power 
over a policy to the executive branch, then the president faces a decision of what to do 
with the policy.  The administration can leave it untouched and accept the intentions of 
Congress, or utilize its discretion to move the policy into a direction that is more 
favorable to the administration.  A third option is to attempt alteration of the policy 
formally through the legislature.   
In this regard, the president is making a personal delegation decision.  While 
legislative action is not truly delegation, the president does have a say in the outcome, 
the president does cede a great deal of the power inherent in the office when legislative 
action is called for.  Like Congress, the president can also choose to alter the policy 
internally rather than delegate the authority.  However, as in the legislature, doing so 
presents inefficiencies.  As such, this dissertation is essentially an extension of Epstein 
and O’Halloran’s framework to the presidency. 
Another study using a transaction cost framework is Bawn (1995), which also 
seeks to explain Congressional delegation of authority to the bureaucracy.  Though her 
work never explicitly mentions transaction costs, she does utilize the transaction cost of 
uncertainty to predict the policy moves of Congress.  According to Bawn’s theory, 
Congress balances its uncertainty about the preferences of an agency with its uncertainty 
regarding the policy consequences that will occur when the expertise of the bureaucracy 
is not utilized.  Bawn’s theory has not been not subjected to systematic empirical testing.  
However, she does examine two examples of policy decisions made by Congress and 
notes how the delegation decision made by Congress mirrors her theory. 
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As these three examples show, the transaction costs framework provides a useful 
lens through which to view the political world.  Although the framework has been most 
widely used in economics, it is also a valuable tool for political scientists and is useful in 
the study of presidential policy-making. 
TRANSACTION COSTS AND PRESIDENTIAL POLICY-MAKING 
As noted, a president usually must choose between acting in concert with 
Congress and acting unilaterally when seeking to change policy.  There are inefficiencies 
inherent in either course.  The inefficiencies can be viewed as transaction costs as they 
push the president away from the ideal policy location.  With legislative action, the 
inefficiency is that the president likely will not obtain the preferred policy outcome.  The 
administration will likely have to make some concession to win approval of the policy.  
This inefficiency is most evident when comparing to the potential policy outcome if the 
president were to act unilaterally.  In a world of no transaction costs, the president is free 
to set the policy wherever it is most advantageous to the executive.  In this regard, then, 
the distance of legislative action from the president’s preferred policy outcome 
represents the inefficiency of legislative action. 
The possibility that the legislature will write the law in such a manner that limits 
the president’s discretion is a related transaction cost of choosing legislative action.  
Wood and Bohte (2004) show that Congress can create policy in such a way as to reduce 
the ability of an executive to affect policy outputs.  Such action would decrease the net 
value of the change in policy and is a transaction cost that the president must consider 
before pursuing policy change through legislative action. 
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 Another key inefficiency in seeking legislative action is that Congress often 
moves at a snail’s pace.  If there is any need for rapid action, the president will be hard 
pressed to pursue a legislative remedy.  The speed of subordinates represents the only 
time constraint for the president when acting unilaterally.  As soon as the executive 
branch creates an executive order and review it for legality, the president is free to make 
the policy change; this is obviously less tedious and more efficient than legislative 
action.  The speed of the legislative route is, therefore, a transaction cost that presidents 
must consider.   
 With unilateral action, the primary inefficiency lies in the non-permanence of the 
policy.  Any subsequent executive is free to remove any policy change made by 
unilateral action.  However, if the president were to garner that change through 
legislative means, the policy would be much more difficult for a future president to 
revoke.  No policy is immune to change; even the Constitution is amendable.  Under any 
circumstance, though, legislation is much more difficult for a future president to alter 
than an executive order. Thus, a president would receive a higher net value by pursuing 
legislation rather than issuing an executive order if there is not much difference in the 
expected policy outcomes of the two processes. 
 At times, the president is unable to achieve a desired policy change through 
unilateral action.  This occurs when the president lacks sufficient discretion to move the 
policy in the desired manner.  If the president desires a change that is outside of the legal 
discretion, the only available options are to pursue change through the legislature or to 
issue an executive order that lies within the allowable parameters and accept the fact that 
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the resultant policy does not reflect the true wishes of the administration.  In such an 
instance, if the president chooses unilateral action, the inefficiency is the difference 
between the desired policy and the policy made through the order. 
 How the president balances these inefficiencies in making a determination of 
policy action is the crux of the transaction costs analysis of presidential policy-making.  
Because these inefficiencies are present, the president must consider carefully the action 
taken and seek to maximize payoff by minimizing the transaction costs faced through 
each potential course.  The president will take the action that produces the highest 
expected net value after accounting for present transaction costs. 
The Model 
 Using this framework, the assumption is that a president will act unilaterally 
when the expected net value of doing so is greater than the expected net value of acting 
through the legislature.  We can formalize the framework and preceding discussion as 
follows. First, to embody the expected payoff of legislative action the following formula 
will be utilized: 
VL=PL*TL  
Where: VL= The expected net value of a bill that goes to the legislature. 
PL= The expected net value of legislative action. 
  TL= The net value the president places on having the policy change being  
made in a more permanent manner. 
 This formula encompasses a president’s desire for long-term policy change.  
While the change may not be assured permanence, the president knows that any 
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following president will have a more difficult time changing the policy than if the 
change were made unilaterally where a new administration need only revoke the 
executive order.  PL represents the net value of legislation to the president after 
accounting for all of the benefits and transaction costs.  The representation PL also takes 
into account the fact that the president is not able to set policy at a given point, but must 
cede that authority to the legislature.  This can be important, especially when the 
president faces a hostile Congress. 
 To represent the expected net value of unilateral action the following formula is 
utilized: 
VU=PU*TU 
Where: VU= The net value obtained by acting unilaterally. 
  PU= The payoff of the policy obtained by acting unilaterally without  
legislative modification.  The president may not act beyond legal 
discretion. 
  TU= The value the president places on being able to act quickly and  
without waiting on Congress.  
 This formula represents the president’s desire to make specific changes to a 
given policy.  PU represents the net value to the president of unilateral action after 
accounting for all benefits and transaction costs.  Important is the idea that the president 
cannot move the policy beyond legal discretion.  This may be somewhat controversial as 
Howell (2003) contends that the courts do not do an adequate job of containing the 
president.  Even if this is true, which is debatable, there is a limit to a president’s 
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discretion.  Presidents cannot act in any way they desir.  The net value here is simply the 
most favorable point at which the president can alter the policy without facing a negative 
ruling from the courts or being overturned by Congress. 
 Also represented in the formula is the benefit the president receives by being able 
to act quickly.  There are times, when national emergencies or economic hardships 
demand immediate attention.  The president should receive a higher net value by acting 
immediately rather than waiting on Congress in these instances. 
 
 
 The president, then, faces a decision similar to that in Figure 3.1.  For each 
policy, the president can accept the status quo, alter the policy unilaterally, or seek a 
legislative remedy.  If neither legislative nor unilateral action improves upon the status 
quo then the president will elect to maintain the current policy.  However, assuming that 
one of the potential changes improves the net value of the policy, the president will act 
unilaterally when the expected net value of doing so exceeds the net value surrounding 
legislative action.  This will occur when: 
Status Quo 
Legislation 
(VL) 
Status Quo Executive Order 
(VU) 
Figure 3.1 Decision Facing President 
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VU >VL 
or 
PU*TU >PL*TL 
With simple algebra, we see that this will also occur when: 
PU >(PL*TL)/TU 
 Using this formula and comparative statics, one is now in the position to make 
predictions concerning when a president will act unilaterally for policy change as 
opposed to acting in the traditional fashion.  First, a president will be more likely to act 
unilaterally the higher the net value of PU.  This will occur when there is a greater degree 
of discretion given the president under the current law because there is little benefit to a 
president in acting unilaterally when there is little discretion.  Doing so essentially 
results in the maintenance of the status quo.  However, when discretion is high, the 
president is likely able to pinpoint the exact policy position that is preferred by the 
administration.  Whenever the expected policy location of legislative action falls within 
the discretionary area of the president, the net value of PU is always at least as great as PL 
since the president is able to pinpoint the exact policy when acting unilaterally, 
something that cannot be done through legislation.  
 Besides the legal boundaries of discretion, there also exists a de facto level of 
discretion.  This is the range at which the president is able to change policy without 
facing a legislative override.  A legislative override can come in two ways.  The first 
way is by enacting legislation overturning the executive order.  If Congress attempts to 
do so, it will likely need the support of a super-majority given the near certainty of a 
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presidential veto.  Because of this, such action is not probable unless the president takes 
action that is considerably outside the political mainstream.  However, the president 
must consider the possibility before taking unilateral action.  When there exists a higher 
likelihood that Congress will overturn a potential executive order, the net value of PU 
will be lower. 
 Another form of legislative override occurs when Congress refuses to fund a 
policy change made by the administration.  Because Congress holds the purse strings it, 
does have the ability to “check” actions taken by the president.  However, presidents 
have been able to use emergency funds and other discretionary sources of money to fund 
programs created by executive order.  Again, the higher the possibility of a 
Congressional action that terminates funds for a policy, the lower the net value of PU will 
be. 
 Another prediction that arises from this model is that a president will be more 
likely to prefer unilateral action when the expected policy outcome of congressional 
action differs from the executive’s favored policy position.  The president is unlikely to 
desire legislative action when doing so produces mediocre gains to the administration, or 
worse, negative changes in the policy space.  When such a situation arises, the president 
is better off acting unilaterally. 
 In addition, according to this model, presidents are more likely to pursue 
legislative remedies when there is greater importance attached to the permanence of the 
policy.  When a president desires long-term change in policy, unilateral action is a poor 
choice.  Any incoming president is free to revoke or amend any such action.  Because of 
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this, policy generated by unilateral action has little permanence.  Granted, legislation can 
be overturned, but not unilaterally and obtaining overriding legislation is difficult.  Thus, 
a president placing a high net value on the longevity of policy should consider a 
legislative course. 
 Another prediction flowing from the model is that a president is more likely to 
act unilaterally when there is a desire for rapid alteration of policy.  A president desiring 
swift change can achieve it without any delay when acting via executive orders.  
However, when acting through the legislature, rapid action is by far the exception rather 
than the rule.  When moving towards quick action, then, executive orders are the 
superior tool. 
 The model is intentionally parsimonious.  However, it does capture certain 
elements that a president must consider when determining what policy action to take.  
The model makes clear predictions concerning what will lead to a higher probability of 
unilateral action and what will lead to a greater likelihood of legislative action. 
 The transaction cost framework traditionally applied to the economic literature to 
study the “make or buy” decision facing companies, with a few modifications, fits well 
into the study of presidential policy-making and explains well the “legislate or dictate” 
decision facing the chief-executive.  It is a framework that allows for clear predictions 
concerning how a president will pursue policy change.   
Through the rest of this dissertation, I will test the predictions made by this 
model utilizing a series of empirical tests.  By doing so, I will show that presidents are 
cognizant of their political environment and seek the most efficient manner of obtaining 
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policy change.  They seek unilateral action, when the legislature is not poised to overturn 
such action and when legislative action would not result in policy that reflects the desires 
of the administration. 
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CHAPTER IV 
TESTING THE THEORY 
 
 In the previous chapter, a theory was developed rooted in the transaction costs 
framework.  This theory postulates that when seeking policy change, presidents weigh 
the costs and benefits of legislative action and unilateral action.  After making this 
calculus, presidents take the action expected to deliver the highest payoff.  The theory 
produces predictions of when presidents will be more likely to issue executive orders.  In 
this chapter, I will review the specific predictions of the model, and then test these 
predictions utilizing an original data set derived from each policy relevant executive 
order from 1946 to 2004.  
PREDICTIONS FROM THE MODEL 
 Recall that in the previous chapter introduced a simple model of presidential 
decision-making.  The model is restated below: 
The expected payoff of legislative action is: 
VL=PL*TL  
Where: VL= The expected net value of a bill that goes to the legislature. 
PL= The expected net value of legislative action. 
  TL= The net value the president places on having the policy change being  
made in a more permanent manner. 
The expected net value of unilateral action is: 
VU=PU*TU 
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Where: VU= The net value obtained by acting unilaterally. 
  PU= The payoff of the policy obtained by acting unilaterally without  
legislative modification.  The president may not act beyond legal 
discretion. 
  TU= The net value the president places on being able to act quickly and  
without waiting on Congress.  
According to the transaction costs framework, the president will act unilaterally 
when the payoff of doing so exceeds the expectation surrounding legislative action.  This 
will occur when: 
VU >VL 
or 
PU*TU >PL*TL 
With simple algebra, we see that this will also occur when: 
PU >(PL*TL)/TU 
 In words, the president will act unilaterally when the net value of doing so is 
greater than the expected legislative outcome, even after the president accounts for the 
transaction cost of limited policy duration.  When will this happen?  Three propositions 
describe when a president will gravitate towards unilateral action. 
 One factor profoundly affecting a president’s proclivity to act unilaterally is the 
expected net value of legislation.  When a president is confident that the legislature will 
give the administration the bulk of its policy wishes, there is little room for improvement 
by taking unilateral action.  Congress may be more willing to act in concert with the 
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president’s wishes when there is a high level of ideological agreement between the two 
branches.  When there is less disagreement between these two institutions, Congress has 
less cause to resist the policy proposals of the president.  There may also be policy areas 
where Congress is more likely to yield to a president’s wishes.  Wildavsky (1966) argues 
that presidents experience greater success on foreign policy matters than they do for 
domestic issues.  Despite limited support for Wildavsky’s theory (see Bond and Fleisher 
1990, chapter VI; Edwards 1985; 1989, chapter IV; Fleisher and Bond 1988), there may 
be times when the president should expect greater support from the legislature.  
Conversely, if the legislature is poised to resist the president, there is little to gain 
by introducing a bill in Congress, for doing so will likely result in little benefit to the 
president, or worse: a policy that actually is less desirable to the president than the 
original policy.  At such times, presidents are more likely to issue executive orders 
because acting through the legislature presents them with higher transaction costs.  Since 
such presidents are unable to accomplish much through legislation, executive orders 
become an attractive alternative relative to Congressional action.   
These presidents still face other transaction costs due to using the executive 
order.  These transaction costs include limited discretion and the uncertain permanence 
of unilateral action.  When acting unilaterally, presidents are constrained by statutory 
limits.  They may not act in a manner prohibited by law.  Furthermore, Congress can 
react to any unilateral action, overturning an executive order by legislation.  Presidents 
must consider the likely congressional and judicial reactions to their executive orders.  
Because of this, they may not be able to accomplish all of their goals unilaterally due to 
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the limited amount of de jure and de facto discretion available. However, these 
transaction costs are always present, and when legislation proves to be especially 
difficult, presidents are more likely to accept the transaction costs associated with 
executive orders.  This leads to proposition one. 
Proposition One: As the expected net value of legislation decreases, legislative  
action becomes more costly, increasing the likelihood that a president will 
take unilateral action. 
 Another factor that should greatly influence the likelihood a president will act 
unilaterally is the urgency of the desired policy change.  Nations are sometimes faced 
with problems requiring swift action.  Whether dealing with terrorist threats such as the 
9/11 attacks and the Oklahoma City bombing or with economic crises, the country 
routinely faces situations where leadership is sought and the president is the main focal 
point of the public’s attention.  At such times, rapid policy change may be needed if the 
situation is to be resolved adequately and the president is to escape without blame. 
 Congress is not known for its rapid deliberation.  Even legislation passed in 
response to a crisis often takes more time relative to unilateral action.  For instance, the 
“Patriot Act” (P.L. 107-56) is unusual in the speed at which it reached final passage after 
the immediate need felt following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.  However, 
this act did not gain legal status until October 26, 2001, more than six weeks after the 
attacks.  If quick action is a requirement for the president, then legislation is fraught with 
the transaction costs resulting from delay. 
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 Further, as a president enters the waning days of the administration’s term, 
legislative delay may become unacceptable.  Congress can simply “wait out” a president 
and block any legislation.  Even if the president is able to convince the legislature that 
policy change is prudent, there may not be sufficient time for Congress to pass a bill 
before the president leaves office.  Considering these limitations, the second proposition 
is the following. 
Proposition Two: When a president desires rapid policy change, legislative  
action entails greater transaction costs leading to a greater likelihood that 
the president will act unilaterally to accomplish policy change. 
 The third factor that will influence a president’s propensity to act unilaterally is 
the amount of discretion available to the president.  When a president enjoys greater 
discretion, unilateral action is better able to mirror the favored policy of the 
administration.  When there is little discretion available to a president, they are unable to 
accomplish policy change without legislative consent.  However, presidents are typically 
only able to move policy to the edge of discretionary limits, which may differ from the 
president’s preferred policy.  During a period such as this, unilateral action is more 
costly than at other periods, as it does not provide the administration with as great a 
change as is desired.  Given this, the third proposition is the following.  
Proposition Three: As the amount of presidential discretion increases, the  
transaction costs associated with unilateral action decrease, making their 
use more likely. 
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 In the remainder of the chapter, I will empirically test these three propositions 
that flow from the transaction costs model of presidential policy-making.   
DATA 
Studying executive orders empirically presents unique challenges.  Ideally, one 
would like to have data on each instance where presidents are deciding when/whether to 
make policy and the transaction costs facing the president.  Unfortunately, such a data 
set is not likely to exist in the near future.  However, if one focuses on the overall use of 
executive orders in a given period, then one can infer support for the model if there is an 
increase in use of executive orders when the model predicts an increase in the likelihood 
of acting unilaterally.  To take such an approach, one must first decide what executive 
orders to include in the analysis.  Mayer (1999, 2001) utilized a monthly count of 
virtually all executive orders.10  While Mayer’s work was instrumental in bringing the 
study of executive orders into the mainstream of political science, the utilization of all 
executive orders is problematic.  While a president does influence policy on many 
occasions by utilizing executive orders, many orders call for action that is trivial and has 
no relevance to policy.  Many executive orders are little more than narrow directives 
aimed at the bureaucracy.  For instance, executive order 11884 designates the design of 
the seal of the vice-president (Ford 1975).  By any objective standard, this is not an issue 
that the president is greatly concerned with, and has minimal, if any, policy substance.   
                                                 
10 Mayer (1999; 2001) eliminated all orders that dealt with exclusions from civil service 
rules for individual employees, and any order dealing with the use of federal lands 
(2001, 93). 
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 Howell (2003) improved on Mayer’s initial work by utilizing only what he 
termed “significant” executive orders rather than the complete count of executive orders.  
Since it purportedly eliminated the executive orders that had no policy relevance, 
Howell’s work represented an enhancement over previous research.  Unfortunately, his 
work also ignored a host of orders with policy relevance that did not meet his threshold 
of significance.11   
 Furthermore, presidents likely will make mostly minor changes in policy through 
unilateral action.  Presidents routinely do not have the discretion to make major policy 
changes without the formal approval of Congress.  Even Howell’s (2003) work suggests 
that major policy change will occur through legislative change rather than through 
unilateral action.  He states, “The model predicts that Congress and the president 
together, rather than the president alone will shift relatively extreme status quo 
policies…landmark laws usually take the form of legislation while policies of lower to 
intermediate importance fill the ranks of unilateral directives” (p. 47-48).  Howell is 
correct.  Presidents do not normally have the power to greatly alter most policies through 
executive orders, nor do they possess the legal discretion.  Courts can overturn the action 
if the president does not have the formal discretion to act unilaterally.  They also lack the 
de facto discretion, for Congress can overturn any policy change that goes against the 
super-majority wishes of the body.12 
                                                 
11 Since Howell does not include a list of all orders that are deemed significant, one can 
not categorize the nature of those orders that are not included in his analysis. 
12 There are examples of presidents making significant policy changes through unilateral 
action.  For instance President Reagan greatly centralized the regulatory process through 
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 Mayer’s work included too many executive orders by including a large number 
of orders that were trivial and of no consequence. Howell’s work included too few 
executive orders by omitting many with policy consequences.  In order to strike a 
balance between these two extremes, beginning with the Truman administration I coded 
every executive order to the end of George W. Bush’s first term.13  After examining an 
order, a determination was made whether the order had policy substance.  Anderson 
(2003) defines policy as a “purposive course of action followed by an actor or set of 
actors in dealing with a problem or matter of concern” (2003, 2).  In this light, I treat any 
order that alters the current course of action of the nation as creating policy.  This 
process was repeated for each order issued during the time frame.    
Anderson’s “definition focuses on what is actually done instead of what is only 
proposed” (2003, 2).  Because of this, orders that create advisory committees are 
eliminated from consideration, unless the order grants the committee authority to make 
policy, or gives the committee authority to implement its recommendations.   
In addition, since Anderson’s definition is concerned with what is done rather 
than who is doing it, orders that delegate power to subordinates are not coded as making 
policy.  Of course, when an order creates policy along with the delegation of authority, 
                                                                                                                                                
Executive Order 12291 (1981).  However, most significant policy change occurs through 
statutory means rather than through unilateral action. 
13 The data set for this paper runs from April 1945 until 2004.  I was unable to find one 
order, executive order 12681.  While I continue to search for a copy of this order, in this 
particular study, I treat it as if it had no policy substance.   The title of the order, 
“Exclusions from the Federal Labor-Management Relations Program” is identical to 
executive order 12559 and similar to several other orders.  All of these orders dealt with 
implementation of a statute and did not create policy.  Because of this, the exclusion of 
12681 is not influencing the results. 
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the order is coded as making policy.  The vast majority of delegations simply state that a 
given individual, usually a cabinet level secretary, shall possess a power that has been 
given the president by statute.  Such delegation does influence on policy; however, the 
delegation does not make policy. Rather, it simply states who has the authority to act.  
Since it does not set the “purposive course of action” (Anderson 2003, 2) to be taken by 
the government it does not meet Anderson’s definition of policy. 
After coding all policy relevant executive orders, the data were then aggregated 
by month to create a monthly count of executive orders creating policy.14 
 How do the new data compare to overall counts?  A look at Figure 4.1 shows that 
the data do co-vary to some extent.  The figure contains annual counts of total executive 
orders and only those orders that make policy.  There is considerable fluctuation, 
                                                 
14 What to do when two presidents occupy the same month presents somewhat of a 
problem.  I elected to solve the problem in the following manner.  Whichever president 
is in office for the majority of the month is coded as holding office the entire month.  
The total count for the month is adjusted to reflect the number of orders the president 
would have issued had he been in office for the entire month and issued the orders at the 
same rate he did during the month according to the following formula: 
( )MD
OT = where T = to the total number of orders entered in the data set (rounded to 
the nearest integer); O= the number of orders the president actually issued in the month; 
D= the number of days the president was in office during the month; and M= the number 
of days in the month.  The orders issued by the president serving the smaller portion of 
the month are carried over into the next month for incoming presidents, or credited to the 
previous month for outgoing presidents and the month’s total is adjusted according to the 
following formula: 
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where T = to the total number of orders entered 
in the data set (rounded to the nearest integer); Op= to the number of orders the president 
actually issued in the partial month; Ow= to the number of orders the president actually 
issued in the whole month; Dp= the number of days the president was in office during 
the partial month; and Mp= the number of days in the partial month. 
  
98
however, in the relationship between the total count of orders and the number of orders 
that make policy.  The overall correlation between the two is .54, so there is a 
relationship. However, it is sufficiently weak to question earlier research.     
 
Figure 4.1: Annual Counts of Executive Orders
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Howell (2003) states that there has been an increase through time in the use of 
executive orders to make policy.  According to his data, presidents issue more than three 
times as many “significant” orders each year in the post 1945 era than they did before.  
He contends that this increase reflects a broader pattern of an expansion of the power of 
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the presidency (2003, 83-85).  Mayer (2001) also notes that there is an increase in the 
use of “significant” executive orders to make policy, leading him to conclude that 
executive orders have increased in importance over the past several decades (2001, 86) 
Is there an increase in executive orders that alter policy over time?  As the results 
in Table 4.1 show, presidents have shown a slight increase in executive orders to make 
policy.  Presidents issued an average of 21.5 executive orders to create policy from 
1946-1975, and an average of 23.3 orders that crafted policy from 1976-2004.  However, 
the increase fails to reach statistical significance. This suggests that Howell and Mayer 
may have overstated the propensity of presidents to increasingly use executive orders.   
 
Table 4.1: Use of Executive Orders to Alter  
Policy Through the Years  
  1946-1975 1976-2004 
Annual Avg. 21.50 23.31 
Variance 93.29 60.58 
n= 30 29 
t -stat -0.794  
df 55  
P(T<t) one-tail 0.215   
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal 
Variances 
 
 
As a more rigorous test of an upward trend in the use of executive orders, the 
annual number of executive orders was regressed on a trend variable.  As the results of 
Table 4.2 make clear, there is no statistically significant upward trend in the use of 
executive orders to make policy through time. The coefficient is, in fact, negative, 
though statistically non-significant. 
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Thus, contrary to the findings of Mayer (1999, 86) and Howell (2003, 83-5), one 
cannot conclude from these data that presidents are increasing their use of executive 
orders to make policy. By using datasets that failed to consider presidential policy 
making more broadly, these authors reached the erroneous conclusions that presidents 
have been increasingly prone toward use of executive orders through time. This is 
simply not the case; presidents have not been increasingly utilizing executive orders 
throughout time to alter policy.   
 
Coef. Std Error p<
Trend -0.01 0.0675311 0.86
Constant 22.73 2.271095 0.00
n=59 R-Squared =.001 F(1,57) = 0.03
Table 4.2: Testing for a Trend in the Use 
 of Executive Orders to Make Policy
 
 
One potential cause of the contrary findings of Mayer (2001) and Howell (2003) 
is the nature of their coding schemes.  Each author used press coverage as an indication 
of significance.  As technology has increased reporters have gained ready access to 
much more information and can, in turn, distribute the information more freely. Thus, 
their results may be due to greater press coverage rather than presidential actions. 
Another potential cause for their differing results may be the increasing litigious 
nature of society.  Each author utilized some form of judicial measures as an indication 
of the significance of executive orders.  Howell codes an order as significant if it is 
mentioned in the opinions of two or more cases (2003, 80).  Mayer treats an order as 
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significant if it leads to federal litigation (2001, 84).  As our society moves towards 
increasing levels of legal action, an order has an increased opportunity of triggering a 
lawsuit, and thus a higher chance of being included in a judicial opinion.  Given this, one 
would expect that any measure of significance derived by judicial mention would see an 
upward trend. 
 Because the dataset in this dissertation has been carefully constructed by 
examining every executive order since 1946, it allows a more appropriate test of 
presidential proclivity towards the use of executive orders to make policy.  In addition, 
since most policy change that occurs through executive orders is at lower levels, this 
data set does not require that analyses focus on orders that are likely the exception rather 
than the rule. 
HYPOTHESES 
 Earlier I stated three propositions that flow from the transaction cost theory of 
unilateral action by the president. In this section, I outline five hypotheses used to test 
the three propositions and, in-turn, the presidential policy-making model developed in 
the previous chapter. 
Proposition One 
 Recall that proposition one stated that as the expected net value of legislation 
decreases, legislative action presents increased transaction costs, increasing the 
likelihood that a president will take unilateral action.  What is needed, then, is a measure 
of what net value a president believes legislation will return to the administration.  One 
possible measure is the DW-NOMINATE scores created by Poole and Rosenthal (1997).   
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The DW-NOMINATE scores create ideology measures for each member of 
Congress and the president using each person’s votes or positions on individual pieces of 
legislation, finding the most likely array of ideology among the individuals given their 
votes (in the case of the president stated support or opposition to a bill, or the 
introduction of a bill by the president).15  The measures are arranged with liberal 
members receiving negative values and conservative individuals receiving positive 
values. 
 Poole and Rosenthal also calculate an average winning DW-NOMINATE 
position of a bill that makes it through the House of Representatives.  This represents the 
policy position on the DW-NOMINATE scale of the average passed bill.  This value 
provides a measure of how liberal or conservative a president would expect a policy to 
be if changed through the legislature.   
Knowing a president’s DW-NOMINATE score and the expectation of what 
legislative action will produce, one can create a measure of how much a president must 
“cede” to the legislature in order to get a particular policy change through Congress by 
taking the absolute value of the difference between the president’s DW-NOMINATE 
score and the average winning position of a policy in the House of Representatives.  This 
measure represents the transaction costs a president faces by pushing for policy change 
through Congress.  From this measure the first hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis One: The greater the absolute value of the distance between the president’s  
                                                 
15 Estimates for presidents prior to Eisenhower were made solely on the introduction of 
legislation by the president.  Because of this, these past scores may not be as reliable as 
current estimates made from a president’s stated opinion of legislation and bills 
introduced due to the decreased number of bills used to create the estimate.   
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House of Representatives DW-NOMINATE score and the DW-NOMINATE 
location of the average winning bill in the House of Representatives, the more 
likely a president is to issue executive orders.  
 Measuring what a president should expect to “give up” by pursuing legislation, 
provides an adequate proxy of a transaction cost associated with legislative action, and 
will allow for a sufficient test of proposition one.16 
Proposition Two 
 As outlined previously, proposition two holds that when a president desires rapid 
policy change, legislative action imposes greater transaction costs leading to a greater 
likelihood that the president will act unilaterally to accomplish policy change.  
Presidents frequently encounter situations that dictate rapid action.  The transaction costs 
associated with legislative action may be too great to bear, as Congress simply takes too 
long in passing legislation. 
 One circumstance where presidents may desire rapid action is when they are 
faced with situations that may affect their prestige with the public at large.  The public 
holds the president responsible for the state of the union.  Whether right or wrong, the 
president receives the bulk of the credit when times are good and the lion’s share of the 
blame when the nation is troubled (Brace and Hinckley 1991; Norpoth 1996).  Thus, a 
                                                 
16 Because of the difference in calculating Truman’s DW-NOMINATE score, I tested 
with and without the Truman administration.  The results without the Truman 
administration do not perform quite as well, likely due, in part, to the lower degrees of 
freedom.  However, the DW-NOMINATE based indicators of congressional difficulty 
are significant (at the p<.10 level) on the test of the whole data set and in one of two of 
the split-sample tests (at p<.001). 
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president can ill afford to sit idly by while the nation travels over rough political or 
economic waters.  When the nation is experiencing economic hardships, the president 
would be well advised to pay special attention to the problem.  Inattention, or even the 
perception of inattention, can lead to difficulty in the upcoming election for first-term 
presidents, and lowered prestige for both first and second-term presidents.  One need 
only remember the 1992 election where President George H.W. Bush was lambasted for 
his handling of the economy to see the importance the economy has for a president’s 
standing with the public. 
 One characteristic of a troubled economy is the presence of a recession.  
Recessions are usually defined as two or more consecutive quarters of negative growth 
in real gross domestic product.  However, the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) publishes an alternative measure of recession (National Bureau of Economic 
Research 2005).  This measure takes a picture of the economy as a whole and defines a 
recession as “a significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, 
lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real GDP, real income, employment, 
industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales” (Hall, et al. 2005).  The NBER 
measure provides a more complete picture of the economy, and is a more realistic 
measure of what citizens likely use in evaluating a president’s performance.  Average 
citizens are not likely to keep up with GDP, but they likely feel some of the variation in 
the other variables such as income and employment.  An additional benefit of this 
measure is that it is reported monthly as opposed to quarterly so more variation is 
present.   
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 Since the public holds presidents accountable for economic performance, 
presidents are mobilized to take action when the nation is in a recession, but likely desire 
more rapid action than Congress will produce.  Considering this, I present the second 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis Two: When the nation is in a recession, as measured by the NBER,  
presidents are more likely to issue executive orders. 
Another circumstance where presidents face transaction costs due to the slowness 
of legislative action relates to time in office effects. As a president enters the waning 
days in office, the opportunity to alter policies through legislation begins to wither.  
Quick action must be taken if the president is to succeed in securing policy change.  
Even if the president were able to persuade the members of Congress that change is 
prudent, the president may not have sufficient time to sign legislation before leaving 
office.  During such times, congressional action imposes greater transaction costs; thus 
preventing it from being feasible.  If such a president desires to be a part of changing the 
status quo, the only alternative left is to issue an executive order.  Such action requires 
no cooperating action by any other individual or group, leaving the president free to take 
immediate action.  Considering this, I propose hypothesis three: 
Hypothesis Three: During a president’s last month in office, the issuance of executive  
orders becomes more likely.17 
                                                 
17 The last month here, is not always a full month.  Rather, for most presidents, it is the 
January in which they leave office.  For, Richard Nixon, this is the July before he left 
office.  John Kennedy was not coded as having a last month in office.  Since he was 
unaware that it was his last month in office, there is no theoretical justification for listing 
it as his last month. 
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When a president is in the final days in office and the incoming administration is 
ushering in a party change, the president should become more protective of the policies 
created during the current administration.  The incoming president may hold major 
differences on many policy areas from the previous executive.  Of course, the new 
president has the ability to override any executive order issued by the outgoing 
president.  However, political pressures may impose constraints on an incoming 
president resulting in some reluctance to overturn earlier actions, and thus the survival of 
last minute executive orders of the prior administration. A strategic president can issue 
the order in such a way as to make it difficult for the new administration to eliminate the 
order.  For instance, a Democrat president with a desire for strong environmental policy 
can issue an order calling for safety standards for drinking water.  The incoming 
Republican president may disagree with the policy, but going on the record in opposition 
of clean water can pose political problems.  It may be advantageous for the Republican 
to leave the policy in place rather than overturning it.   
Furthermore, when a new administration of a different party is forthcoming, 
inaction may pose additional costs, as the incoming president will likely not champion 
the same issues as the current administration when there are partisan differences.  In 
such a case, if the current president does not cause a policy change, there may be little 
impetus for alteration for at least the next four years.  Considering the transaction costs 
involved with legislative action, a president will likely move towards executive orders.   
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Thus, hypothesis four is: 
Hypothesis Four: When there is an administration change forthcoming, the outgoing  
president will issue more executive orders in the last month in office when the 
new president is from the opposing party.18 
 The three hypotheses listed above test the second proposition that presidents 
attempt to avoid transaction costs due to significant delay in legislative action. Not only 
do they test a president’s proclivity to act unilaterally based upon institutional factors 
such as end-of-term effects, but they also evaluate the political environment’s effect on a 
president’s decision.  Together these tests should give a good picture of how a president 
is influenced by the need for swift action.   
Proposition Three 
 The third proposition that flowed from the model is that as the amount of 
presidential discretion increases, the transaction costs associated with unilateral action 
decrease, making their use more likely.  Ideally, one would know how much discretion a 
president possesses for each policy area.  Unfortunately, such data are unavailable, and 
outside the scope of this project.  However, one can isolate particular times when a 
president should possess more discretion to act unilaterally. 
 One time when presidents should have greater levels of discretion is when the 
same party as the president controls Congress.  Party labels provide voters with a 
                                                 
18 Rather than treat the last month in office the same for those who are preceding a party 
change and those who are not and adding an interaction to test for a difference, I chose 
to separate the last month in office first, and allow them to each have their own effect.  
This allows a more intuitive interpretation of the coefficients.  Mayer (1999; 2001) takes 
a similar approach. 
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simplifying heuristic with which to make a decision on election day for most races, 
including congressional campaigns (Campbell, et al. 1960).   
As the figurehead of the party, the success of the president can have a profound 
effect on the net value of associating with the party.  Action by the president’s party 
overturning an executive order would be embarrassing to the president and harm the 
administration’s standing with the public.  If the president’s standing with the public is 
important to the electoral success of fellow partisans, one might expect that action 
overturning a president’s order would harm members of the president’s party electoral 
chances.  If this is true, fellow partisans have less incentive to vote against the president 
when an executive order is in question.  When the president’s party controls Congress, 
there should be less likelihood that a vote will be taken on a bill that overrules an 
executive order and if the vote is taken, the president stands a greater chance of winning.  
Thus, presidents under unified government should have a greater level of discretion than 
presidents faced with a legislature controlled by the opposition party.  Presidents that 
have this increased level of discretion face smaller transaction costs when acting 
unilaterally, making executive orders more attractive than they otherwise would be.  
Considering this, I present the fifth hypothesis: 
Hypothesis Five: Under unified government, presidents will be more likely to issue  
executive orders. 
 Contrarily, one might predict that unified government would make presidents 
less likely to issue executive orders because they will be more likely to be successful in 
the legislative arena.  However, what a president expects to receive out of legislation is 
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already included in the analysis through hypothesis one above.  Because of this, any 
significant effect from unified government should be reflective of the increased 
discretion as opposed to legislative expectations. 
Controls 
 To ensure that findings are not spurious, certain controls also need to be in the 
analysis.  One control is a dummy variable for the beginning of the president’s term.  All 
presidents inherit a status quo, which they had very little role in creating upon entering 
office.  Even if a president was a key player in the legislature or the vice-president prior 
to arrival in Oval Office, the current collection of policies likely differs from the one 
desired by the president to some extent.  Such presidents are likely to desire a higher 
degree of policy change than other presidents do.   
 Furthermore, a president entering office faces with the sum total of previous 
executive orders.  A president desiring to alter these policies need only issue an order 
overruling it.  If the president decides to take such action, there is no need waiting to 
overrule the order, for speedy action should prove to be more beneficial to the president 
as the desired change will be obtained sooner.  For these reasons, presidents are likely to 
issue more executive orders during the first few months in office than at other times 
during their administrations.   
Presidents are also likely to have (or at least believe they will have) increased 
legislative success during their first few months.  Since Franklin Roosevelt’s early days 
in office, there has been a perceived “honeymoon effect” where the president’s agenda is 
assumed to have a greater chance of success.  During such times, presidents may face 
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fewer transaction costs when seeking legislative action, making them more likely to 
pursue statutory change rather than executive orders.  Given these factors, one should 
control for a presidents first few months in office.  There are two factors that can 
influence the likelihood of unilateral action, the “honeymoon effect,” and the increased 
desire for policy change that likely occurs in the first few months and each affects the 
prediction differently.  Because of this, I include a dummy variable representing a 
president’s first three months in office.  Since there are reasons to predict both a positive 
and negative relationship between the first three months and executive order usage, I 
withhold prediction concerning the direction of the coefficient. 
 The desire to issue new executive orders in the beginning of a presidential term 
may be different for presidents who are of a different partisan persuasion than the 
president they are replacing.  Such presidents face a status quo that is likely more 
divergent from their preferences than a president whose inauguration does not represent 
a party change.  Because of this, I separate the first three months in office variable by 
whether their administration marked a partisan change in the presidency.   
 Another factor that needs to be controlled for is a president’s ideology.  
Presidents that are more extreme in their ideology may be more likely to seek policy 
change than do their more moderate counterparts.  They may be more likely to desire 
longer-term policy change in an effort to cement their policy preferences.  If this were 
the case, they would be more likely to accept the transaction costs associated with 
legislative action than moderate presidents would.  However, they may also be more 
likely to desire exact change, making the transaction costs associated with legislative 
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action too great to bear.  I make no predictions as to which is true since they influence a 
president’s likelihood of issuing executive orders differently.  However, there is reason 
to believe that a president’s ideology alters a president’s propensity to use executive 
orders.  As such, I introduce the absolute value of Poole and Rosenthal’s (1997) DW-
NOMINATE scores into the model.  Using this approach, presidents who are extreme in 
their ideological nature, whether conservative or liberal, receive higher values than do 
more moderate presidents.  
 The approach outlined above allows for a test that can lend support to the 
transaction costs model of presidential policy-making.  Because it focuses on total use of 
executive orders rather than on individual policy decisions, however, it is not a direct 
test of the theory.  Thus, one could view the transaction costs framework as a metaphor 
that guides the expectations of this study.  The expected net value of legislation is 
included in the model through the DW-NOMINATE measure of congressional 
expectations, however individual pieces of legislation are not examined. 
METHODS 
The dependent variable is a count of the number of executive orders creating 
policy issued during a given month.  Because the dependent variable is a count, 
traditional methods are problematic due to their inefficiency, inconsistency, and biased 
results (Long 1997, 217; Greene 2003).  By utilizing a method that accounts for the 
strictly discrete nature of the dependent variable, one can obtain more efficient results 
than would be obtained through OLS (Long 1997).   
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The Poisson regression model provides a useful starting point when modeling 
data of this type.  However, the Poisson model imposes the restriction that the expected 
count equals the variance in the expected count. Given that the expected count may be 
heterogeneous with respect to time, this may be an unreasonable restriction.  A popular 
method for relaxing this restriction is to utilize a negative binomial model.  This model 
incorporates an overdispersion parameter that enables accounting for variances larger 
than the expected count. When this term is statistically zero, the negative binomial 
model reduces to the Poisson model (Long 1997, 231; StataCorp 383-388).  When the 
true data generating process follows a negative binomial distribution and Poisson 
regression is used, estimates are still consistent, but are not efficient.  Also, when the 
Poisson regression is used, there is a downward bias in the standard errors resulting in 
artificially large z-statistics (Long 1997).  For this project, then, I will begin the test of 
the outlined model with negative binomial regression. 
RESULTS 
 Table 4.3 reports the results from this.  As can be seen from the chi-square 
statistic for the alpha dispersion parameter, negative binomial regression is superior to 
the Poisson.    
Proposition One 
As the results show, the transaction costs framework performed well in 
explaining presidential use of policy relevant executive orders. Each proposition of the 
model received support in the empirical tests.  For example, the first hypothesis that the 
more presidents must give up in order to secure passage of legislation, the more likely
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Effect of Std. Effect of Max
Dev. Change Change on Dep.
Independent Variable Coef. Std. Error on Dep. Var Var. 
Distance Between Cong.
Expectations and Ideology
Recession
Last Month Before
Party Change
Last Month With 
No Party Change
Unified
Government
First 3 Months of Administration
With Party Change
First 3 Months of Administration
With No Party Change
Ideology: Absolute Value of the
H.R.  DW-NOMINATE Score
Constant
Alpha .204 .040
LR test against Poisson chi-square 1 d.f. = 48.6 p<.000
AIC 2525.5
Log-Likelihood -1252.73
N of Cases 717
For substantive interpretation, all continuous variables were held at their mean, dummies at zero
Negative Binomial Regression
0.721
0.122
0.456* .213
-----
-----
-1.656
0.003 .134
1.510
0.370
4.913
0.093 .186
0.793*** .098
-----
-----
1.597***
Table 4.3  The Political Environment's Influence on Unilateral Action
2.326
0.290
2.405*** .397 0.628
.209**
Dependent Variable = Monthly Count of Executive Orders that Create Policy
.088 -----
.213 -----
0.260 .596
----- -----
-1.979*** .387 -0.442
** Significant, p<.01
*** Significant, p<.001
One tail test used for all variables except controls and constant
* Significant, p<.05
 
 
they are to issue executive orders performed exactly as hypothesized, obtaining 
significance at any conventional level.   
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The expected value in negative binomial models is found by the following: 
)exp(ˆ iii xY εβ += (Long 1997, 230).  Because the expected value is determined by 
exponentiating the observation’s values and the coefficients, the effect of one variable is 
determined, in part, by the values of the other variables.  Like logit or probit, one can 
make directional interpretations from the coefficients, but in order to draw substantive 
intuitions, one needs to account for the values of the other variables.  Using the program 
XPOST (Cheng and Long 2000), one can estimate the effect that changes in an 
independent variable will have on the predicted count of observations, in this case 
executive orders issued, while holding all other variables at fixed values.  Table 4.3 
reports the substantive interpretations as well.  
With ideology held at its mean value and dummy variables held at zero, a one 
standard deviation increase in the amount of policy concessions a president must make 
in order to secure passage of legislation results in an increased expectation of more than 
an additional 0.6 substantive orders issued each month.  At first glance, this may seem 
like a small increase.  However, consider that over a four-year term this increase results 
in an expectation of more than 30 additional orders.  When viewed in this light, the 
findings are of substantive importance.   
Figure 4.2 shows the effect that the increased transaction costs associated with 
legislative action has on the predicted number of executive orders.  The x-axis represents 
the predicted number of substantive executive orders issued in a month, while the y-axis 
represents the probability associated with each possible number.  The “base” line is 
representative of the probabilities with all continuous values held at their means and 
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dummy variables fixed at zero.  The “decreased expectations” line represents the 
probabilities when there is a one standard deviation increase in the winning bill’s 
distance from the president’s preference.   
As is evident, presidents are more likely to issue higher numbers of policy orders 
when Congress appears less willing to grant the president policy considerations.  Such 
presidents have a 0.15 greater probability of issuing at least one substantive executive 
order during the month and are more likely to issue greater numbers as well.  
Furthermore, when one examines the total possible change the difference 
becomes more pronounced.  If one moves from the smallest amount a president had to 
give up to the greatest amount presidents must cede to garner passage of policy change 
there is an increase of more than two substantive orders issued each month.  Considered 
over a four-year term, this leads to an additional 111 orders issued.  Considering that  
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President George W. Bush only issued 173 total orders (non-policy orders included) 
during his first term, the transaction costs a president faces in Congress clearly influence 
the likelihood that executive orders will be utilized to create policy change.  
Presidents faced with a Congress that is not likely to give them what they want 
apparently decide to mitigate their transaction costs by making policy change 
unilaterally through executive orders.  This is consistent with the notion that presidents 
will be more likely to favor unilateral action when the transaction costs associated with 
legislation are greater.  Proposition One is thus strongly supported. 
Proposition Two 
Proposition two, that presidents issue more executive orders when delay poses 
additional transaction costs, received support in the analysis as well.  Two of the tests 
were statistically significant with the third showing that partisanship is also an important 
intervening variable. According to the analysis, presidents faced with recessionary 
conditions are significantly more likely to issue executive orders to alter policy than are 
presidents that face rosier economic times.  With all continuous variables held at their 
means and other dummy variables held at zero, the difference between being in 
recession and not being in recession is an expectation of .29 additional orders issued 
each month.   
As Figure 4.3 makes evident, there is a slight, but real increase in the probability 
that presidents will issue higher numbers of executive orders during economic hardships.  
There is an increased probability of .09 that presidents will issue at least two substantive 
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executive orders when the nation is in a recession.  While this does not lead to an 
overwhelming increase in unilateral action, it does lead to a very real increase in the use 
of executive orders that should not be trivialized, especially when one considers that 
recessions typically last many months.  The shortest recession in the data set lasted six 
months (January, 1980 to July, 1980).  Thus, even the slight monthly increase in 
unilateral action during recessions leads to an escalation in the president’s use of 
executive orders.  In the six-month case, 1.7 additional orders are expected. The longest 
recessions in the data set were two separate recessions of sixteen months each 
(November, 1975 to March, 1975 and July, 1981 to November, 1985).  During a sixteen-
month recession one would expect to see an additional 4.6 substantive orders issued.   
 
Figure 4.3: Effect of Reccesion on the Use of 
Executive Orders
0.000
0.100
0.200
0.300
0.400
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Predicted Number of Substantive Orders Issued
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
Base Recession
 
 
  
118
Thus, presidents attempt to avoid the transaction costs of slow legislative change 
during a recession. Working through Congress can be a gradual process, and this delay 
poses transaction costs for a president who often receives blame from poor economic 
conditions (Brace and Hinckley 1991; Norpoth 1996). Because of this, executive orders 
become an attractive alternative since they are not plagued by the transaction costs 
associated with delay. 
Finally, consider the end of office effects. Presidents who are in their last month 
in office with no impending party change do not issue significantly more executive 
orders than do presidents who still have time left in their terms when no party change is 
forthcoming.  The effect is in the direction predicted by Proposition two, but not 
statistically significant. However, this is not too surprising, as the incoming president 
likely holds similar beliefs and will likely seek to implement policy in line with the 
current president’s preferences.  In such a case, there is not an overwhelming need for 
rapid policy change. 
However when the forthcoming president is from the opposing party, presidents 
are much more likely to move towards executive orders to cause policy change than they 
are at other times.  A president in the last month in office is expected to issue nearly an 
additional five substantive orders when the incoming president is from the rival party.  
Furthermore, as Figure 4.4 shows, there is a substantial increase in the probabilities that 
these presidents will issue higher numbers of executive orders in their last month. There 
is an increased probability of 0.7 that a president will issue three or more substantive 
orders during such a period. 
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 Presidents in their last month do not have time to wait on Congress; they simply 
cannot rely on the body to take swift action.  For presidents wanting to alter policies, 
notably those who are facing a partisan change in the office, the transaction costs of 
legislative action are prohibitive, making executive orders an attractive option. 
Overall, the tests of proposition two supported predictions from the transaction 
costs model.  Presidents that are in the need of rapid policy change are more likely to 
issue substantive executive orders than are other presidents.  This finding is in harmony 
with the notion that when quick change is required, working through the legislature 
poses transaction costs that make unilateral action an appealing alternative for securing 
the desired change.  
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Proposition Three 
The empirical test of proposition three also performed well.  Presidents that are a 
part of a unified government are significantly more likely to issue executive orders than 
presidents that are in a divided government.  Recall that what a president expects to 
accomplish through the legislature is already included in the model and controlled for in 
the test of hypothesis one.  Because of this, any variation caused by unification of 
government is attributable to changes in the level of discretion to act unilaterally.  A 
president in a unified government would be expected to issue an additional 1.5 
substantive executive orders each month.  This is especially noteworthy when one 
considers that the average number of substantive orders issued each month is less than 
two.   
If one translates these expectations to an entire four-year term, there would be 
nearly seventy-two more orders issued when the president is of the party that controls 
both Houses of Congress when continuous variables are held at their mean and all other 
dummy variables are held at zero.  To show the magnitude of this finding, consider that 
an average four-year term sees only ninety-four substantive orders issued.  Clearly, this 
finding carries great substantive importance. 
Furthermore, consider Figure 4.5.  This figure shows the probability of a 
president issuing given numbers of executive orders under divided government (Base) 
and unified government with all continuous variables held at their mean and all other 
dummy variables held at zero.  As the figure makes plain, presidents are much more 
likely to issue greater numbers of executive orders under unified government.  Presidents 
  
121
have an increased probability of 0.35 of issuing three or more substantive executive 
orders when they are a part of a unified government rather than a divided government 
and all variables are held at their base.   
One potential challenge to this finding is that in reality, presidents should be able 
to accomplish more in the legislature under unified government, making the transaction 
costs smaller in the legislature as well.  This objection would be quite true were it not for 
the inclusion of the first hypothesis.  What a president expects to accomplish through the 
legislature is already included in the model and controlled for.  Because of this, any 
variation caused by unification of government is attributable to changes in the level of 
discretion to act unilaterally.  
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Presidents who have fellow partisans controlling Congress should be less likely 
to face legislative challenges to their executive orders.  Considering this, there should be 
smaller transaction costs associated with unilateral action.  During such a time, then, one 
should see an increase in the use of executive orders during this period.  The test 
supports the third proposition: presidents are more likely to utilize executive orders to 
alter policy when they have more discretion available. 
Controls 
 While not the focus of the analysis, the coefficients associated with the control 
variables warrant some discussion.  First, of particular note is that more ideological 
presidents are less likely to issue substantive executive orders than are their more 
moderate counterparts.  A standard deviation increase in a president’s ideology score, 
would lead to a decrease of more than 0.4 expected substantive executive orders issued 
each month.  Moreover, a move from the most moderate president (Eisenhower), to the 
most ideological president (Reagan) would result in an expectation of more than 1.6 
fewer substantive orders issued each month. 
Likely, what is occurring here is that ideologues place additional weight on the 
longevity of policy change.  Because of this, they are more willing to accept the 
transaction costs associated with legislative action because they associate a greater 
payoff to change that occurs through Congress rather than unilateral action. 
The controls for a president’s first three months in office had mixed results.  
When the president’s inauguration represents a partisan change in the White House, 
there is not a significant effect on the president’s proclivity for unilateral action.  
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However, when the new president represents a continuation of the party’s control over 
the executive branch, there is an increased likelihood of executive order use to create 
policy.   
When presidents are replacing a chief executive of the same party, they have an 
expectation of issuing an additional 0.721 substantive orders in each of their three 
months.  This would represent just over two additional policy orders in their first ninety 
days in office.   
Though this was not a test of the theory, the finding is interesting.  One possible 
explanation is that presidents ushering in a party change desire massive alterations in the 
policy landscape.  As has been noted elsewhere, great policy change is most often 
accomplished through legislation rather than unilateral action (Howell 2003).  Fellow 
partisans are more likely to desire marginal changes.  These modifications can likely be 
made through executive orders.  Because of this, one might expect to see the observed 
relationship of new presidents issuing more executive orders to alter policy in their first 
year when they do not represent a partisan change in the office. 
ADVANCED METHODS   
As noted, the analysis above largely confirms the transaction costs based theory 
of presidential policy-making.  However, the data that are examined in this study are 
time-series data.  The analyses of time-series data often require special attention (Enders 
1995; McCleary and Hay 1980).  The observation at a given time period is often 
determined, at least in part, by the observations at a prior time period.  For instance, a 
president that did not issue any orders in a previous month, may be more likely to issue a 
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greater number of orders in the current month due to the constant need presidents have to 
make policy.   
Furthermore, presidents may have less need to issue executive orders following 
months where they issued an abnormally large number of orders.  They may have 
accomplished a great proportion of the policy change that they were seeking during a 
certain period.   
If the time-series does, indeed, possess some sort of dynamic property where 
observations at one period influence the observations at another period and traditional 
methods are used, the estimates will be inefficient (Brandt, et al 2000; Brandt and 
Williams 2000).  Moreover, when one estimates a model without explicitly including the 
dynamic process, the model is misspecified unless the omitted dynamic variables do not 
Granger cause the conditional mean (Brandt and Williams 2000; White 1994).   
Until recently scholars had little recourse but to accept the fact that their 
estimates were likely inefficient and their models misspecified.  Fortunately, Brandt, 
Williams and colleagues (Brandt, et al 2000; Brandt and Williams 2000) have developed 
methods for dealing with event count models that demonstrate a dynamic time-series 
process.  One of these methods is the Poisson autoregressive model [PAR(p)] introduced 
by Brandt and Williams (2000).  This method allows researchers to model processes 
characterized by short memories and quickly revert to their mean.  This method allows 
for a shock in one period to influence the next period [or however many periods are 
tested for, the (p) in PAR(p)].   
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When using this method one assumes that the series quickly returns to its mean 
level, absent any further shocks.  This is likely what happens in presidential policy-
making.  When a president issues an abnormally small or large number of executive 
orders in a given month, the adjustments likely occur in the next few months.  There is 
little likelihood that a shock in the beginning of a president’s term where the president 
issued several more orders than usual will influence the use of executive orders several 
years down the road. 
Estimating these models in the past would be nearly impossible, as their 
estimation requires large amounts of computing power.  Even given the current speed of 
modern computers, one may spend multiple hours running these models.  However, it is 
now feasible to use the methods, and one should not sacrifice the proper method for 
convenience.  In this section, I report results from the PAR(p) model. 
As shown in Tables 4.4 and 4.5, the PAR(p) results did not change the major 
findings of the negative binomial models.  In fact, some of the findings have higher z-
statistics than were reported in the negative binomial model.  Table 4.4 represents a 
PAR(1) model, while Table 4.5 reports the findings of the PAR(2) analysis.  
As the Wald test makes plain, the PAR(1) and PAR(2) models are clearly 
superior to the Poisson model.  However, determining which model is superior and 
whether that model is better than the negative binomial is somewhat trickier.  The best 
method is to rely on Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC).  This method allows one to 
compare non-nested models to determine which model is superior to the other.  Smaller 
AIC values are considered better.  In addition, the model accounts for parsimony, with  
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Independent Variable Coef. Std. Error
Distance Between Cong.
Expectations and Ideology
Recession
Last Month Before
Party Change
Last Month With 
No Party Change
Unified
Government
First 3 Months of Administration
With Party Change
First 3 Months of Administration
With No Party Change
Ideology: Absolute Value of the
H.R.  DW-NOMINATE Score
ρ 0.107*** 0.033
Constant
Wald test against Poisson= 10.300 p<.01
AIC 2524.3
Log-Likelihood -1253.14
N of Cases 717
For substantive interpretation, all continuous variables were held at their mean, dummies at zero
PAR(1) Regression
** Significant, p<.01
*** Significant, p<.001
One tail test used for all variables except controls, rho and constant
* Significant, p<.05
0.026 0.033
-2.188*** 0.445
0.119
0.411 0.595
Table 4.4  The Political Environment's Influence on Unilateral Action, AR(1)
2.545*** 0.464
0.248**
Dependent Variable = Monthly Count of Executive Orders that Create Policy
0.097
-0.042 0.229
0.849*** 0.107
1.876***
0.746*** 0.160
 
models penalized for each additional explanatory variable that is included (assuming that 
it does not make the model perform better).  
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Independent Variable Coef. Std. Error
Distance Between Cong.
Expectations and Ideology
Recession
Last Month Before
Party Change
Last Month With 
No Party Change
Unified
Government
First Year of Administration
With Party Change
First Year of Administration
With No Party Change
Ideology: Absolute Value of the
H.R.  DW-NOMINATE Score
ρ(1) 0.133*** 0.035
ρ(2) 0.059 0.041
Constant
Wald test against Poisson= 23.60 p<.000
AIC 2446.99
Log-Likelihood -1213.497
N of Cases 691
For substantive interpretation, all continuous variables were held at their mean, dummies at zero
0.385** 0.122
-0.079 0.150
0.928*** 0.135
1.934***
Table 4.5.  The Political Environment's Influence on Unilateral Action, AR(2).
2.006*** 0.463
0.324***
Dependent Variable = Monthly Count of Executive Orders that Create Policy
0.092
0.126
0.364 0.649
* Significant, p<.05
-0.062 0.169
-1.634*** 0.472
PAR(2) Regression
** Significant, p<.01
*** Significant, p<.001
One tail test used for all variables except controls, rho and constant
 
 
When the AIC is utilized, the negative binomial model performs slightly better 
than the PAR(2) model, though not greatly, and the PAR(2) model is superior to the 
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PAR(1) analysis.  The negative binomial has an AIC of 2515.7, the PAR(1) an AIC of 
2519.23, and the PAR(2) an AIC of 2517.52.19  Given the closeness of the values, one 
would not be misguided by utilizing either method. This is especially true given the 
significance of the autoregressive term that is present in the PAR(1) and PAR(2) models.  
According to this model, presidents are slightly more likely to issue policy orders when 
they have done so in the prior month.  If one ignores this information, there is the 
possibility of obtaining spurious results.  
The intuitive understanding of what the PAR(p) model is adding to the analysis is 
that even after accounting for the history of the time-series, the variables that represent 
transaction costs still explain variation in the president’s propensity to alter policy 
unilaterally.  The findings are robust to the method used, and as such, one can have 
confidence that they are not an artifact of either using an inappropriate method, such as 
OLS or the Poisson distribution or simply using “sexy” methods that many in the 
discipline often view as “voodoo” capable of generating any result that is desired 
(though nothing could be further from the truth). 
                                                 
19 The AIC for the negative binomial and the PAR(1) models mentioned here differ 
slightly from the ones reported in Tables 3 and 4 because when comparing models using 
the AIC one must ensure that the same sample is utilized.  Because the PAR(2) model 
takes into account the first two observations in calculating the autoregressive terms, the 
sample is smaller by two and one than the samples used in the negative binomial and 
PAR(1) models respectively.  Because of this, the negative binomial and PAR(1) models 
are recalculated on the smaller sample to ensure a proper comparison. 
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DISCUSSION 
 The predictions of the transaction cost model of presidential policy-making were 
largely supported in this analysis.  Not only did the model receive support with one 
method, but with three different statistical estimators.    
 One observation from the analysis is that presidents have less need to issue 
executive orders when they have the greatest freedom to act unilaterally.  Presidents 
have lower transaction costs associated with unilateral action when they are a part of a 
unified government.  There is less chance that Congress will take action overturning 
their orders when the body is composed of like-minded partisans.  However, this is 
precisely the time when presidents are most likely to be successful in obtaining 
legislative change in-line with their policy desires.  However, when presidents would 
most desire the ability to act unilaterally, when Congressional action will not accomplish 
favorable change, they likely will not possess the discretion needed to alter policy 
through executive orders. 
 Further, presidents appear to prefer legislation to unilateral action.  If presidential 
preferences were for unilateral action over legislative change, then one would not expect 
to see a significant relationship between the use of executive orders to affect policy and 
what a president can expect from legislative action.  If presidents preferred unilateral 
action to statutory change then the presidents would take unilateral action at all times 
when possible, and would be no less likely to take direct action when legislation is more 
promising. 
  
130
 If presidents prefer unilateral action to legislation, then only those areas where 
the president does not possess sufficient discretion to set the policy at the desired 
location would generate the results obtained here.  At such a time, the president would 
weigh the expected policy outcomes of unilateral action versus Congressional action.  
This, of course, remains a possible cause of the above findings.  Because of this, one 
cannot state with certainty that presidents do, in fact, prefer legislative change to 
unilateral action.  However, that presidents prefer statutory change to unilateral action, 
ceteris paribus, is a more likely explanation for the results.  
 Furthermore, if presidents preferred unilateral action to accomplish policy 
change there would be little reason to expect the flurry of executive orders issued in the 
last month of a term when a party change is forthcoming.  There would be no rationale 
for waiting to accomplish the policy change, for a president would receive a higher net 
value from the change by accomplishing the alteration sooner, thus obtaining the gains 
over a longer period of time.   
However, if presidents prefer legislative change to unilateral action then it would 
be prudent to delay taking action while seeking a legislative remedy.  Once the president 
reaches the end of the term and legislation becomes nearly impossible, then the president 
can issue an executive order producing the change. 
 There is one implication of presidents preferring one policy method to the other.  
Howell’s (2003) model hinges upon the president’s indifference as to whether the policy 
changes through statutory means or unilateral action.  If this is not the case, and I do not 
believe it is, alterations are required of his model.  Formal models are only as good as 
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their assumptions.  Given the questionable nature of this assumption, the model itself is 
also in question. 
 Congress can, and does, present a constraint to the president’s power to act 
unilaterally.  If presidents were confident that all of their orders would stand up against 
legislative scrutiny, there would be little reason to pay attention to the composition of 
Congress.  However, as the results show, presidents are much less likely to alter policy 
through unilateral action when the opposing party controls Congress.  This is precisely 
when the legislature should be most poised to take action overturning executive orders.  
The conclusion that follows is that presidents account for the available discretion before 
issuing their orders.   
 Given this finding, one should not be surprised to see the dearth of congressional 
action that overturns presidential unilateral actions.  As Howell (2003) notes only four 
executive orders have been amended or overturned by statutory means since 1972 (p. 
114-115).  This fact does not, however, point to congressional weakness as Howell 
assumes (chapter V).  Instead, it suggests that presidents are able to predict the likely 
reactions of Congress to their orders and that they are rational actors that do not issue 
orders that are likely to be overturned.   
The four instances where the legislature did take statutory action altering 
executive orders are representative of times that the presidents misinterpreted the 
likelihood that Congress would take action overruling the orders.  In all likelihood, these 
presidents would not have issued these orders if they knew that Congress would take 
action against them.  Presidents stand to lose power in relation to Congress.  Howell 
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notes the power of the president “is inversely proportional to legislative strength.  
Presidential power expands at exactly the same times when, and precisely the same 
places that, congressional power weakens” (2003, 101).  He is indeed correct in this 
assessment, and presidents likely see the wisdom behind these words.  What benefit is 
gained by acting in a manner that would lead to an expansion of Congressional power?  
Knowing this, presidents will not issue orders that are likely to be overturned.   
The analysis above points to the idea that presidents alter their behavior based 
upon the likelihood that Congress is poised to strike back.  This casts a different light on 
most of the literature on unilateral action.  The impression given by most authors in this 
area (Cooper 2002; Mayer 1999; 2001; Howell 2003) is that presidents can act in a 
relatively carte blanche fashion.  However, my work suggests that this is a 
misunderstanding of the president’s power.   
Presidential power with executive orders is not absolute, but checked by 
Congress (and most likely the courts as well).  Furthermore, the president’s changes do 
not have the same permanence as policy alterations achieved through statutory 
modification.  Any future president is free to return the policy to the prior status quo.  
Legislation, on the other hand, is more difficult to change, making it a more permanent 
route for changing policy than executive orders. 
If presidents did not have the ability to act unilaterally, Congress would certainly 
be more powerful in relation to the president.  The executive branch could make no 
formal alteration of policy without first obtaining the consent of Congress.  However, 
one does not have to think hard to see the inefficiencies that would be present were this 
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true.  The nation often faces crises that require immediate attention.  Were Congress 
forced to take legislative action each time such an event occurred, the nation would be 
paralyzed by the slowness of the deliberative body. 
Presidents do, in fact, increase their use of unilateral action when the nation faces 
turmoil.  As the analysis above shows, when the country is in a recession the president is 
more likely to alter policy through executive orders.  Of course, it would be 
advantageous to have all 535 members of Congress involved in the deliberations to alter 
the policy.  However, Congress rarely, if ever, is capable of quick action.  Were the 
president forced to wait on a legislative reaction to a problem, then the nation as a whole 
could suffer due to the delay in response to the issue at hand. 
CONCLUSIONS 
 The transaction cost theory of presidential policy-making outlined in the previous 
chapter produced three propositions.  This chapter developed hypotheses to test each of 
these propositions.  The hypotheses were then tested using a unique dataset with results 
supporting the theory. 
 Each executive order issued from the beginning of President Truman’s 
administration to the end of 2004 was coded by determining if it altered policy using the 
definition proposed by Anderson (2003).  Only orders that created or modified policy 
were included in final measure and analysis.  This produced a better measure than 
previous studies that either included too many orders that were trivial or too few orders 
based on purported policy significance.   
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Earlier studies included total counts of orders (such as Krause and Cohen 1997; 
Mayer 1999; 2001) which included a host of orders with little policy relevance.  Other 
studies (such as Howell 2003) included only “significant” orders.  This was an 
improvement; however, it missed a great deal of presidential policy-making and did take 
into account that most “major” policy change occurs through statutory means.  Executive 
orders are frequently a tool for smaller policy changes.  Due to its inclusion of all 
presidential attempts at influencing policy by executive orders, the data set employed 
here allows for a more holistic approach to studying presidential use of executive orders 
to alter policy than previous studies.  Because of the superiority of the data, one can be 
more confident that the findings from this study are more representative of reality than 
are previous studies. 
Each of the propositions received empirical support.  The analysis found support 
for the notion that presidents are more likely to act unilaterally when the expected net 
value of legislation is lower. The analysis also found support for the second proposition, 
that when a president desires rapid policy change, legislative action poses increased 
transaction costs leading to an increased likelihood that the president will act unilaterally 
to secure policy change.  Also, when presidents are in their last month of office and the 
incoming president is of the opposing party, they feel an immediate need to alter policy 
and legislation poses transaction costs that are prohibitive.  The third proposition, that as 
the amount of presidential discretion increases, the transaction costs associated with 
unilateral action decrease, making their use more attractive, and thus more likely, also 
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received empirical support.  When presidents are participants in a unified government, 
they are less likely to have their executive orders overturned by Congress.   
 To ensure that the empirical support that the model received was not an artifact 
of non time-series methodologies being utilized, the analysis was repeated using the 
PAR(p) method introduced by Brandt and Williams (2000).  The findings were robust to 
the change in methods, lending additional support to the transaction costs based model 
of presidential policy-making. 
 The transaction costs framework has proven useful in explaining presidents’ 
likelihood of acting unilaterally.   The theory produced the many hypotheses tested in 
this chapter and the theory is robust to those tests.  Further, the theory adequately 
explains the surprising findings of past works that unified government leads to increased 
use of executive orders (see Mayer 1999; 2001).  In addition, the analyses utilize a 
superior dependent variable that only includes executive orders that make policy.  
Because of this, one can be confident that the results reflect how presidents utilize 
executive orders to make policy 
 In the next chapter, I divide the sample to determine if the model is robust to 
different policy types.  This will ensure that individual policy types do not drive the 
results in this chapter and that the theory is applicable across categories of policies. 
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CHAPTER V 
FURTHER TESTS OF THE THEORY 
 
 Previous research, notably Marshall and Pacelle (2005), finds that presidents 
employ executive orders differently based upon the policy area in question.  They find 
that the use of executive orders in matters of foreign policy is unrelated to the president’s 
party’s strength in Congress.  Conversely, party strength is related to the use of 
executive orders in domestic policies.  The authors conclude that this is due to the 
increased discretion presidents have in foreign policy over other policy areas.  Presidents 
are not as tightly bound by Congress in foreign policy matters, and as such, are not led to 
executive orders as frequently to alter foreign policy. 
Foreign policy is only one domain where presidents may have more discretion.  
Thus, it is possible that presidents utilize executive orders differently for other types of 
policies as well.  For instance, as chief executive the president is responsible for 
overseeing the bureaucracy.  Considering this, there should be greater discretion 
afforded the president to unilaterally craft policy dealing with bureaucratic matters than 
for policies affecting the nation as a whole.   
Are the results reported in the previous chapter an artifact of those areas where 
presidents have greater discretion? Does presidential use of executive orders differ 
across policy domains? Is the theory generalizable across multiple policy domains? 
To be adequate, a theory of presidential policy-making should be robust to 
changes in policy area.  It should explain when a president will act unilaterally, 
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regardless of the broader discretion that presidents possess in certain areas.  In this 
chapter, I test the transaction costs based model of presidential policy-making in areas 
where presidents should theoretically possess greater levels of discretion and in areas 
where they have less discretion.   
DATA 
 The same data set is utilized in this chapter as in chapter III.  Each policy 
relevant order is coded as to policy type. This allows me to split the data and analyze by 
sub-samples to evaluate variations across domains and the generalizability of the theory.  
As noted above, Marshall and Pacelle (2005) find that presidents utilize 
executive orders differently in foreign policy matters relative to domestic policy issues.  
They conclude that this is due to increased levels of discretion that executives have in 
foreign policies relative to other policy areas.  
To ensure that the results in chapter III are not an artifact of policy areas where 
presidents have decreased levels of discretion and that the transaction costs based model 
of presidential policy-making explains the use of executive orders in all policy areas, I 
look at two subsets of the data.  In the first subset, orders that are in areas where 
presidents are likely to have higher levels of discretion are included.  For example, 
orders that directed solely at the bureaucracy and its employees comprise one category 
of orders included in this group.  For instance, President Clinton’s Executive Order 
12834 (1993) outlining the ethics requirements of political appointees sets policy.  
However, since the policy deals with the administrative branch he should not expect as 
great a challenge to his authority to act unilaterally. 
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 Another group of orders included in this subset is those dealing with the military.  
For instance, there is a host of executive orders setting the standards of court marshal for 
members of the armed forces.  While this does set regulations for some citizens, civilians 
are unaffected by the policy.  The president is able to draw on the constitutional charge 
of head of the military to issue the orders; so long as the issued regulations are not 
greatly controversial, wide latitude is present allowing the president broad freedom to set 
the policy as desired. 
 The last category of orders included in this subset is orders dealing with foreign 
affairs.  Wildavsky (1966) argues that presidents are more successful pursuing their 
foreign policy concerns than their domestic policy goals.  If this is indeed the case, then 
presidents should have more latitude in acting unilaterally in matters of foreign policy 
than in domestic matters.  While the empirical tests of Wildavsky’s theory have been 
less than convincing (see Bond and Fleisher 1990, chapter VI; Edwards 1985; 1989, 
chapter IV; Fleisher and Bond 1988), foreign policy remains a realm where the 
conventional wisdom holds that a president retains discretion to act.  The perception of 
discretion is of most importance, for this is what presidents will use when calculating 
which action to take.   
Furthermore, there is some hint that presidents will have more leeway in acting 
in matters foreign.  In United States v. Curtis-Wright, 299 U.S. 304 (1936), the courts 
noted that the president is the “sole organ of the federal government in the field of 
international relations” (quoted in Howell 2003, 20).  For this reason, the court held that 
Congress could delegate its authority to the president in matters of foreign policy 
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(Howell 2003).  While presidents do not have limitless powers in foreign policy, they are 
likely to have some added discretion and, as such, executive orders dealing with foreign 
policy are analyzed in the sub-sample where presidents have greater discretion. 
The remaining policy orders comprise the second sub-sample.  Because of the 
nature of those orders removed, those that remain in this sub-sample are domestic orders 
not affecting the bureaucracy.  These are orders where the president is less likely to 
possess large amounts of discretion.   
HYPOTHESES 
 The hypotheses tested in this chapter mimic the ones laid out in chapter IV, save 
that the analysis is run on two separate sub-samples.  The propositions from the model in 
Chapter IV were derived using comparative statics.  Using this approach one can make 
clear directional predictions by deducing what a change in each independent variable 
will have on the dependent variable.  Because the model used is the same for these two 
samples, there is no reason to predict that they will perform any differently, the 
comparative statics are the same for the two sub-samples.  Presidents should still weigh 
the transaction costs associated with policy change and make their decisions based upon 
which course of action provides the highest expected gain after accounting for those.  
While presidents will likely possess greater amounts of discretion in the first sub-sample, 
there is still variation in the amount of discretion present.  Thus, the transaction costs 
that are present should still influence presidents and, as such, there should be little 
empirical difference between the findings of the two sub-samples. 
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If the transaction costs based theory of presidential policy-making is robust to 
these alternate tests, more confidence can accrue that presidents do indeed alter their 
proclivity for unilateral action based upon the transaction costs associated with the use of 
executive orders and the transaction costs linked to congressional action.  However, if 
the findings are inconsistent with the predictions, then one must be suspicious of the 
earlier findings and left wondering whether the results are an artifact of simple luck. 
RESULTS 
Increased Discretion 
Proposition One 
As the results in Table 5.1 show, the transaction costs presidents face influences 
their proclivity to issue orders where they traditionally possess more discretion.  Recall 
that proposition one held that as the expected net value of legislation decreases, 
legislative action becomes more costly, increasing the likelihood that a president will 
take unilateral action.   
Consistent with the findings of the complete sample, congressional expectations 
play a key role in the likelihood presidents will issue executive orders even in policy 
areas where the president has higher levels of discretion.   Like the analysis in Chapter 
IV, the substantive interpretations of all coefficients are included in Table 5.1.  The 
mean value is used for the base on all continuous variables, while all dummy variables 
are held at zero.  A standard deviation decrease in the expectations of Congressional 
action leads to an expectation of 0.34 additional substantive executive orders being 
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issued in policy areas where the president is assumed to have higher levels of discretion.  
This would lead to an expectation of nearly sixteen additional such orders being issued 
during a standard four-year term. 
 
Effect of Std. Effect of Max
Dev. Change Change on Dep.
Independent Variable Coef. Std. Error on Dep. Var Var. 
Distance Between Cong.
Expectations and Ideology
Recession
Last Month Before
Party Change
Last Month With 
No Party Change
Unified
Government
First 3 Months of Administration
With Party Change
First 3 Months of Administration
With No Party Change
Ideology: Absolute Value of the
H.R.  DW-NOMINATE Score
Constant
Alpha .292 .082
LR test against Poisson chi-square 1 d.f. = 22.81 p<.000
AIC 1755.3
Log-Likelihood -867.638
N of Cases 717
For substantive interpretation, all continuous variables were held at their mean, dummies at zero
in Areas Where President is Believed to Posess Greater Levels of Discretion
** Significant, p<.01
*** Significant, p<.001
One tail test used for all variables except controls and constant
* Significant, p<.05
-0.387
-1.480*** 0.211 ----- -----
0.269 -----
0.569 0.698
1.760***
Table 5.1.  Discretionary Policy and Unilateral Action
1.283
0.128
2.860*** 0.595 0.338
0.205#
Dependent Variable = Monthly Count of Executive Orders that Create Policy 
0.127 -----
0.554* 0.231
0.643*** 1.490
-0.111
1.902
0.431
2.706
-----
-----
# Significant, p<.10
0.020
1.740
0.035 0.360
-----
-----
-1.109# 0.544
 
  
142
Figure 5.1: Effect of a One Standard Deviation Decrease in 
Congressional Expectations: Discretionary Policies
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As Figure 5.1 makes plain, there is a noticeable increase in the use of executive 
orders in response to decreased expectations associated with statutory action, even in 
policy areas where increased discretion exists.  There is an increased probability of more 
than 0.18 that presidents will issue at least one such order when there is a one standard 
deviation decrease in congressional expectations.  This finding stands in contrast to the 
findings of Marshall and Pacelle (2005).  While these authors find that presidents do not 
respond to congressional opposition by issuing executive orders in areas where they 
have discretion, this analysis finds that presidents still respond to the transaction costs 
that are present in congressional action regardless of the policy type and the usual 
discretion afforded by that type of policy.  The findings support proposition one: that 
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presidents react to increased transaction costs in the legislature by issuing more 
executive orders. 
Proposition Two 
 Proposition two, outlined in Chapter IV, holds that when a president desires rapid 
policy change, legislative action possess greater transaction costs leading to a greater 
likelihood that the president will act unilaterally to accomplish that change.  Recall that 
one measure of urgency is the presence of a recession; presidents will seek rapid policy 
change when the nation is in recession in hopes of correcting the economic woes of the 
nation.   
 When the nation is in a recession, presidents turn towards executive orders to 
alter policy in areas where they have higher discretion.  This result is only significant at 
the p<.10 level, however with a p-value of .053.  During a recession, presidents are 
expected to issue and additional 0.128 such executive orders.  While this is not a 
monumental increase in the use of executive orders, if one considers the two longest 
recessions that occurred during the sample, sixteen months (November, 1975 to March, 
1975 and July, 1981 to November, 1985), one would expect to see approximately an 
additional two such orders being issued.  As Figure 5.2 reflects, there is an increased 
probability of 0.06 that a president will issue one or more such executive orders when 
the nation is experiencing a recession.  This represents a slight but real increase in the 
use of executive orders in response to economic crises.   
 As presidents enter their final days in office, their opportunity for altering 
policies ceases as well.  For a president desiring policy change, the transaction costs 
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associated with legislative delay make statutory changes nearly impossible in the waning 
days of an administration.  As the results show, presidents are significantly more likely 
to issue executive orders during their last month in office, though only when the 
incoming president is not of the same party.  This result is also consistent with the 
findings of the combined sample.  Such a president is expected to issue an additional 2.7 
orders in policy areas where additional discretion is assumed.   
 
Figure 5.2: Effect of Recession on Use of Executive Orders: 
Discretionary Policies
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The above finding is important in that it shows that presidents appear to favor 
legislation even in areas where they have greater abilities to act unilaterally.  When there 
is not enough time left to pursue statutory change, they instead focus on changing the 
policies in the only way they can, through executive orders.  As Figure 5.3 makes plain, 
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there is a substantive increase in the use of executive orders in the last month of office 
preceding party change.  There is an increased probability greater than 0.6 that such 
presidents will issue two or more executive orders in discretionary policy areas. 
 
Figure 5.3: Effect of the Last Month in Office with Party 
Change on the Use of Executive Orders: Discretionary 
Policies
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Proposition two, that when legislative delay presents transaction costs, executive 
orders become more likely, received support in this portion of the analysis.  Presidents 
issue more executive orders in discretionary policy areas when time is of the essence.  
This is true for both end-of-term effects and when the political environment demands 
rapid action. 
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Proposition Three 
 Recall that the third proposition holds that as the amount of presidential 
discretion increases, the transaction costs associated with unilateral action decrease, 
making their use more likely.  The nature of this sub-sample is such that presidents have 
higher levels of discretion than in the following sub-sample; however, presidents can 
still have higher levels of discretion within those areas traditionally affording them 
greater freedom.  Just as in the chapter IV analyses, the assumption is that a unified 
government affords the president higher levels of discretion, even in those policy areas 
generally ceded to the executive. 
 
Figure 5.4: Effect of Unified Government on the Use of 
Executive Orders: Discretionary Policies
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 As the results show, presidents are indeed more likely to issue executive orders 
in discretionary policy areas under unified government.  Presidents issue an expected 0.5 
more executive orders in such policy areas when part of a unified government.  Taken 
over a standard four-year term, this would represent an expectation of nearly an 
additional twenty-four such orders being issued.   
 Consider figure 5.4.  As this graph shows, presidents exhibit a greater propensity 
for unilateral action when fellow partisans control Congress.  Under unified government 
presidents have an increased probability of 0.20 of issuing at least one executive order in 
high discretion policy orders. 
The likelihood of Congress stepping in and rebuking the president appears to 
greatly influence the issuance of executive orders by altering the net value the president 
associates with unilateral action.  This also suggests that while there are areas where 
presidents have increased levels of discretion, this discretion is not limitless; they must 
consider the reactions of the other political branches.  Thus, proposition three is 
supported by this analysis as well. 
Controls 
 Some of the control variables are also worthy of mention.  Contrary to the 
findings of the complete sample, presidents in their first three months in office issue 
more executive orders in discretionary policy areas than they do later in their terms, but 
only when replacing a president of the opposition party.  These presidents are expected 
to issue an additional 0.42 such executive orders per month.  Over the first ninety days, 
this translates into more than 1.2 additional orders. Though not a test of the theory, this 
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result is interesting.  Apparently, previous presidents utilized the increased discretion 
available in these policy areas to move policies closer to their policy preferences.  When 
a new president comes into office, that same discretion is available to move the policy 
closer to the policy preferences of the new administration.   
 Another interesting result is that more ideological presidents [again measured by 
the absolute value of the president’s DW-NOMINATE (Poole and Rosenthal 1997)] are 
less likely to issue executive orders in discretionary policy areas.  This result is only 
significant at the p<.10 level, however.  Apparently, ideological presidents are more 
willing to bear the transaction costs associated with legislation in order to secure long-
term policy change. 
 As the preceding analysis shows, presidents alter their use of executive orders in 
policy areas where increased discretion is assumed based upon the transaction costs 
presented by legislative action and executive orders.  The transaction costs based model 
of presidential policy-making receives support through this analysis.  
Decreased Discretion 
Proposition One 
 As the results in Table 5.2 show, presidents alter their use of executive orders to 
affect policy in low-discretion policy areas based upon the transaction costs associated 
with legislative change and unilateral action.  Consistent with the predictions of 
proposition one and the findings of the entire sample, presidents respond to decreased 
expectations for legislative action by issuing more executive orders, even in those policy 
areas where they are not assumed to possess increased levels of discretion.  A one  
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Effect of Std. Effect of Max
Dev. Change Change on Dep.
Independent Variable Coef. Std. Error on Dep. Var Var. 
Distance Between Cong.
Expectations and Ideology
Recession
Last Month Before
Party Change
Last Month With 
No Party Change
Unified
Government
First 3 Months of Administration
With Party Change
First 3 Months of Administration
With No Party Change
Ideology: Absolute Value of the
H.R.  DW-NOMINATE Score
Constant
Alpha .418 .081
LR test against Poisson chi-square 56.42 p<.000
AIC 1987.9
Log-Likelihood -983.94
N of Cases 717
For substantive interpretation, all continuous variables were held at their mean, dummies at zero
in Areas Where President is Believed to Posess Lower Levels of Discretion
** Significant, p<.01
*** Significant, p<.001
One tail test used for all variables except controls and constant
* Significant, p<.05
-1.177
-.105 0.174
0.309 -----
-0.320 1.103
-----
-0.298
Table 5.2  Non-Discretionary Policy and Unilateral Action
0.968
0.119
1.914*** 0.533 0.265
.165#
Dependent Variable = Monthly Count of Executive Orders that Create Policy 
0.522 -----
0.957
-0.182
2.158
-0.447 0.302
.891*** 0.130
-----
-----
1.445***
# Significant, p<.10
0.579
-0.240
.626* 0.277
-----
-----
-----
-2.493*** 0.522
 
 
standard deviation decrease in the net value associated with legislative action leads to an 
estimated 0.27 more orders issued in lower-discretion policy areas.  This translates into 
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an increased expectation of nearly thirteen additional executive orders issued during a 
four-year term. 
As is evident by Figure 5.5, there is a noticeable increase in the use of executive 
orders in lower discretion policy areas when presidents face a Congress that is unlikely 
to provide them with legislation meeting their preferences.  A one standard deviation 
decrease in the expectations of legislative action leads to an increased probability of 
approximately 0.12 that the president will issue at least one such order during a given 
month. 
 
Figure 5.5: Effect of a One Standard Deviation Decrease in 
Congressional Expectations on Executive Order Use: Low-
Discretionary Policies
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Even in those areas where presidents are not assumed to possess high levels of 
discretion for unilateral action, they are more likely to issue executive orders to shape 
policy when legislative action presents increased transaction costs.  At such times, 
presidents appear willing to accept the fact that cooperative action with Congress will 
not produce results that are as beneficial to them as unilateral action.  This is consistent 
with the predictions of proposition one. 
Proposition Two 
 When presidents desire rapid action, legislative action poses additional 
transaction costs making unilateral action more likely according to proposition two.  As 
the results show, the presence of a recession does have an effect on the likelihood that a 
president will issue an executive order in a lower-discretion policy area, though the 
coefficient is only significant at the p<.10 level.  The presence of a recession leads to an 
expectation of 0.12 additional orders being issued each month.  Considered over the 
longest recessions in the sample, sixteen months (November, 1975 to March, 1975 and 
July, 1981 to November, 1985), one would expect to find the issuance an additional 1.9 
substantive orders. 
 As Figure 5.6 shows, there is a slight, but real increase in the likelihood that 
presidents will act unilaterally during recessionary periods.  There is an increased 
probability of approximately 0.05 that presidents will issue at least one executive order 
during a recession versus non-recession periods. 
Presidents that are entering their last month in office are more likely to issue 
executive orders than at other times in their administrations, but only when the incoming 
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president is not a fellow partisan.  Such presidents are expected to issue an additional 
2.16 executive orders in lower discretion policy areas. 
 
Figure 5.6: Effect of Recession on the Use of Executive 
Orders: Low-Discretionary Policies
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 As Figure 5.7 illustrates there is a dramatic increase in the use of executive 
orders for outgoing presidents that are part of a party change in the White House.  There 
is an increased probability of 0.49 that these presidents will issue two or more 
substantive executive orders in limited-discretion policy areas during their last month of 
office. 
 As presidents spend their final days in office, their opportunities for altering 
policy are concluding as well.  Legislation is a time consuming process.  For a president 
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who only has days remaining, the transaction costs associated with this process are 
prohibitive.  At this time, executive orders are an attractive alternative that allows 
presidents to alter policy quickly.  This is consistent with the predictions of proposition 
two. 
 
Figure 5.7: Effect of the Last Month in Office with 
Party Change on the Use of Executive Orders: 
Low-Discretionary Policies
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Proposition Three 
 Recall that proposition three holds that when presidents have more discretion to 
act unilaterally, the transaction costs associated with unilateral action are smaller, 
making executive orders more likely.  The nature of this sub-sample is such that 
presidents have less discretion than they did in the previous sub-sample.  However, they 
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are still able to have more or less discretion depending on the political climate at hand.  
This change in discretion should influence presidents’ likelihood to act unilaterally.   
 In this analysis, unified government stands as a measure of discretion available to 
the president.  At such times, presidents should expect that legislative challenges to their 
orders are less likely than they would be under divided government.  As the results 
show, presidents are significantly more likely to issue executive orders in lower-
discretion policy areas when their party controls Congress than when confronted with 
divided government.   
Presidents under unified government are expected to issue an additional 0.96 
substantive executive orders in lower-discretion policy orders than presidents faced with 
divided government.  Over a standard four-year term, this translates into nearly forty-six 
additional executive orders.  Considering that the average number of lower-discretion 
policy orders issued per month is 1.1, this is a finding of great substantive importance. 
 As Figure 5.8 makes clear, there is a pronounced increase in the use of executive 
orders among presidents when the nation is under single-party rule.  Such presidents 
have an increased probability of 0.28 of issuing two or more substantive executive 
orders in lower-discretion policy areas per month. 
As the results show, presidents are cognizant of the potential reactions of 
Congress, and anticipating the legislature’s reaction to unilateral action, only issue 
orders when confident that the order will not be overturned.  This explains why Howell 
(2003) finds that Congress has only successfully overturned four executive orders since 
1972.  Presidents anticipate congressional reactions and avoid actions that will 
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embarrass the administration.  Thus, presidents are aware of the de facto discretion that 
they possess to act unilaterally and this discretion influences their proclivity to issue 
executive orders, consistent with the third proposition. 
 
Figure 5.8: Effect of Unified Government on the Use of 
Executive Orders: Low-Discretionary Policies
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Controls 
The results for two of the control variables also deserve mention.  First, 
consistent with the combined sample, presidents are more likely to issue substantive 
executive orders in lower-discretion policy areas during their first three months in office, 
though only when they are continuing their party’s hold on the office.  These presidents 
are expected to issue an additional 0.58 such orders each month, or roughly 1.7 orders 
over the first ninety days. 
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Perhaps what is occurring with a party change is that the status quo in these 
policy areas is greatly different from the incoming president’s preferences due to the 
prior president’s ability to influence legislation through the veto power for at least four 
years (Cameron 2000).  Given the limited discretion categorized by policy areas in this 
sub-sample, presidents likely lack the discretion to unilaterally move the policies close to 
the administration’s wishes.  They instead pursue legislative change.   
A president replacing a fellow partisan likely faces a status quo more reflective 
of the president’s wishes.  Most desired changes are likely incremental and within the 
president’s discretion to act.  During such a time, executive orders may be sufficient to 
accomplish the desired changes. 
Another finding worthy of discussion is that more ideological presidents are less 
likely to pursue executive orders to alter lower-discretion policies.  A one standard 
deviation increase in presidential ideology leads to an expectation of 0 .30 fewer 
substantive executive orders issued in lower-discretion policy areas.  Considered over a 
standard four-year term, this would translate into fourteen fewer executive orders.   
Surely, ideological presidents do not desire less policy change than their 
moderate counterparts do.  Rather, a more likely explanation is that ideological 
presidents place a higher net value on the longevity that legislative change provides.  
While it is easier to alter policy through unilateral action than through Congress, future 
presidents may just as easily “re-alter” policy made through executive order.  Ideological 
presidents probably care more about the duration of their policy changes than do 
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moderates, and as such are more willing to bear the transaction costs associated with 
legislative action. 
Model Similarity 
Does the theory adequately explain the use of executive orders across policy 
types?  The results have shown that the model does do a good job of predicting when a 
president will act unilaterally.  An additional question that arises is: does the model 
perform any differently in the two samples?  One standard test for the structural stability 
across sub-samples is the utilization of the Chow test (Chow 1960, Gujarati 1995, 263).  
This test allows an examination as to whether the coefficients are significantly different 
across models.  The following formula determines the Chow: 
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Where:  RSS1 = Residual sum of squares in the combined sample 
  RSS2  = Residual sum of squares in the first sub-sample 
  RSS3 =  Residual sum of squares in the second sub-sample 
  n2 = Number of observations in the second sub-sample 
  n3 =  Number of observations in the second sub-sample 
  k = The number of parameters in the model 
 Since residual sum of squares is not routinely reported in negative binomial 
regression, I computed predicted values based upon the coefficients and the values of the 
observations.  I then sum the squared errors, essentially duplicating what the 
computation of the standard residual sum of squares in OLS regression.  The following 
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are the results: RSS1= 2111.4; RSS2 = 867.7; and RSS3= 1226.3.  Utilizing this 
information, one receives a value of 1.309.  This value is F distributed with degrees of 
freedom = (k, n2+ n2 – 2k) or in this case, (9, 1416).  Given this, there is a p-value of 
0.23.  Thus, one cannot reject that the coefficients in the models are in fact different 
across sub-samples.  This places Marshall and Pacelle’s (2005) results in a light of 
skepticism.  Further, it lends greater credence to the transaction costs model of 
presidential policy-making.  The theory adequately explains when presidents will act 
unilaterally even when changes are made to separate the sample by policy type. 
DISCUSSION 
 Conventional wisdom holds that presidents possess greater freedom to act in 
certain policy areas (see Wildavsky 1966).  This increased discretion leads presidents to 
utilize executive orders to affect policy differently based upon the policy area (Marshall 
and Pacelle 2005).  To be adequate, a theory of presidential policy-making that explains 
presidential uses of executive orders should be robust to changes in the policy area.  The 
transaction costs based model meets this standard.  As the preceding tests show, 
presidents account for the transaction costs of both legislative and unilateral action 
before determining which route to pursue for affecting policy regardless of the broader 
level of discretion usually afforded the president in the policy area. 
 Simply because presidents possess increased discretion to act in a given policy 
area does not mean they are less desirous of securing the long-term policy change 
legislation provides.  Rather, they continue to consider the transaction costs associated 
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with unilateral and legislative action, choosing the course that provides the largest net 
value. 
CONCLUSION 
Overall, the split-sample tests support the transaction costs based model of 
presidential policy-making.  In areas where presidents are believed to possess greater 
degrees of discretion, they account for the transaction costs that exist in the political 
environment.  They exhibit this same pattern of behavior in areas where they possess 
less discretion.  The split-sample tests are largely consistent with the test on the 
combined sample, leading to increased confidence in the transaction costs based model 
of presidential policy-making. 
Taken in conjunction with the results from chapter IV, the transaction costs based 
model of presidential policy-making has considerable support.  The model has been 
robust to changes in both methodology and different samples.  This chapter has shown 
that isolated policy areas do not drive the results in Chapter IV, and that the theory is 
generalizable across policy areas.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Since the early days of America, presidents have altered policy unilaterally 
through executive orders.  Until recently, political scientists have ignored this important 
tool and the effect on public policy in the United States.  Despite the recent attention 
executive orders have received, most work has been devoid of theory explaining when 
presidents gravitate towards this influential policy instrument.  The lone exception, 
Howell (2003), employed a theory substantially borrowed from the earlier work of 
Krehbiel (1998), but the direct translation of that theory to presidential use of executive 
orders proved unrealistic.   
This study develops a parsimonious theory rooted in transaction costs that 
explains when presidents will act through executive orders to alter policy versus seeking 
statutory change through the legislature.  The goal of this work has been to fill a 
theoretical void and expand scientific knowledge through empirical testing.   
Transaction cost theory is not new, but its application to unilateral action by the 
president is an innovation. Transaction costs have proven useful in the past for 
explaining when Congress will act on its own, writing explicit legislation, and when it 
will delegate its policy-making authority to the administrative branch (Epstein and 
O’Halloran 1999).  The choice presidents face when seeking policy change is similar to 
that of Congress.  They can either make the policy alone through the issuance of 
executive orders or they can seek legislative change.  Since the president does not have 
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much control over the outcome of the policy when Congress tackles the issue (only a 
veto threat), this can be viewed as the president delegating to Congress the role of policy 
changer.  Given the similarities of the decision process facing the president and that 
facing Congress, the use of transaction costs to explain when a president will act 
unilaterally is a sound approach. 
The transaction costs based model of presidential policy-making produced 
several predictions of when a president will act unilaterally versus seeking legislative 
action to initiate policy change.  The first prediction is that when congressional action 
presents additional transaction costs for the president, the use of executive orders 
becomes more likely.  When presidents face congressional opposition to their policy 
wishes, they are less likely to achieve a policy change that they view as beneficial 
through statutory means.  In such instances, unilateral change can produce policy change 
of benefit to presidents without requiring costly negotiations with legislators. 
Secondly, the model predicts that when presidents desire a rapid change in 
policy, the transaction costs of legislation can be prohibitive, thus leading to an increased 
likelihood of executive orders usage.  Congress does not work for the president.  
Because of this, a president cannot order the legislature to take action on a given matter.   
Furthermore, Congress is a highly structured body.  A bill must first pass through 
sub-committees, committees, floor votes, conference committees and another round of 
floor votes before the president is able to sign it into law.  Under most circumstances, 
this process is time-consuming.  Unilateral action, on the other hand, can be 
accomplished immediately.  Action can be taken as soon as the president wishes.  There 
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are standard operating procedures for a president to take before issuing an executive 
order; however, these were created by executive order and presidents can ignore them 
without penalty.  As such, when a president desires rapid action, executive orders can be 
an attractive alternative to the delay caused by legislative change. 
The model’s third prediction is that as presidential discretion to act unilaterally 
increases the transaction costs associated with executive orders decreases, thus making 
their use more likely.  When presidents possess increased levels of discretion, they are 
better able to pinpoint the exact policy that they desire through executive orders, making 
unilateral action more attractive relative to the probable policy outcome of legislative 
action, where presidents are virtually assured the produced policy will differ from their 
desires to some extent.  However, presidents faced with less discretion, are less able to 
cause the specific policy changes they desire.  If a president wishes to make a policy 
change that is outside of the discretionary bounds of unilateral action, legislation 
becomes more likely, as greater change is available through statutory alteration. 
To test the predictions of the model, a new dataset was developed, compiled from 
every executive order from the beginning of the Truman administration to 2004. Each 
order was read, analyzed, and coded based upon policy content.  The resulting data set 
has the additional advantage of not relying solely on a limited set of “significant” 
executive orders.  Unilateral policy-making is characterized by many smaller policy 
changes, interspersed with occasional executive orders that make large changes.  
Ignoring most orders that make policy and concentrating solely on those generating 
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much change produces a misleading picture of how presidents affect policy through 
executive orders. 
Using this dataset, the model was subjected to a variety of empirical tests.  All 
predictions of the model withstood the scrutiny of traditional methods of empirical 
analysis.  To ensure that the results were not due to the utilization of non-time-series 
methodologies, the model was further analyzed using the PAR(p) method proposed by 
Brandt and Williams (2000).  This method allows one to control for the variation that 
occurs based upon the history of the time-series.  When results are robust using this 
methodology, one can have increased confidence that the obtained results are non-
spurious. 
To further test the transaction costs based model of presidential policy-making, 
the dataset was divided into two sub-samples.  One sub-sample included only policy 
areas where the president is assumed to possess high levels of discretion to act 
unilaterally.  The other sub-sample included the remaining policy areas, ones where the 
president is not assumed to enjoy high levels of discretion.  This action produces greater 
confidence that isolated policy types did not drive the results.   
Marshall and Pacelle (2005) find that presidents utilize executive orders 
differently based upon the type of policy altered.  However, an adequate theory of 
presidential policy-making will be able to predict presidential behavior regardless of 
policy area.  The findings of this analysis were robust to the changes in policy type, 
giving additional support to the transaction costs based model of presidential policy-
making. 
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Through various methods and sub-samples, one is lead to the strong conclusion 
that presidents weigh the different transaction costs of their actions before seeking policy 
change.  When unilateral action presents additional transaction costs to presidents, the 
pursuance of legislative action becomes more likely.  Conversely, when statutory change 
presents additional transaction costs, the president is more likely to make policy change 
unilaterally via executive orders. 
OBSERVATIONS 
 As has been noted, the theory outlined in the chapter III received support 
throughout this study.  Through the course of this research, I have made several 
observations that bear note.  First, as was noted in chapter IV, presidents are least able to 
act unilaterally when they would most like to.  When Congress is least likely to overrule 
an executive order, they are also more likely to support the presidential prerogative on 
legislation.  However, when presidents face opposition to their legislative agendas, they 
are likely to have lower levels of discretion.  This can explain some of the differing 
findings that have occurred in previous studies in regards to congressional party control.  
Krause and Cohen (1997) and Marshall and Pacelle (2005) find that party strength in the 
Senate is negatively associated with executive order usage while House party strength is 
positively related to the use of executive orders.  Other studies utilizing a measure of 
divided government, find that presidents issue more orders under unified government 
(i.e. Howell 2003; Mayer 1999; 2001.  Unless one includes a variable for both legislative 
expectations and for expected discretion, one is likely to find conflicting results 
depending on the other variables in the model.  
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 This is only the second attempt that I am aware of where a researcher has 
examined each executive order over a large time span.20  During the collection of the 
data, one thing became apparent: the normal use of executive orders is to make little, if 
any, policy change.  If an executive order were randomly selected for study, one would 
likely be unimpressed by the policy impact that the order has.  In fact, there a large 
number of the orders make no policy changes at all.  This observation does not mean, 
however, that presidents do not utilize executive orders to make major policy changes.  
Quite the contrary, presidents will, at times, utilize their ability to act unilaterally to 
make significant policy changes.  For instance, with Executive Order 12291, President 
Reagan (1981) greatly altered the regulatory process in the United States.  Without the 
consent of Congress, he required that all major regulations be justified with cost-benefit 
analyses and move through the Office of Management and Budget.  This move has 
provided the president increased control of the regulatory process, and thus, the 
produced regulations.   Executive Order 12291 is noteworthy, but not unique, as an 
example of significant policy change made unilaterally.  Presidents relying upon 
executive orders to declare states of emergency, affect labor policies, and alter abortion 
policy are but a few examples. 
Presidents have the ability to make significant and meaningful policy without 
consultation or compromise with any other individual or political branch.  This does not 
mean, however, that presidents have carte blanche to make any policies they desire.  
Congress does have the ability to reign in presidents that stray too far.  Besides the 
                                                 
20 To my knowledge, Warber (2002) is the only other study. 
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power to limit appropriations funding an order, killing the directive by starvation, 
Congress also has the ability to overrule an executive order.  Such action would be 
embarrassing to presidents in an era where presidential prestige is coveted.   
To be sure, there are only a handful of examples of Congress successfully taking 
action to overturn executive orders.  According to Howell (2003) there are only four 
instances of Congress legislatively voiding an executive order since 1972 (2003, 114-
115).  However, presidents being rational actors who seek to avoid being overturned by 
Congress can also explain this observation.  If presidents are able to predict what actions 
Congress will find unacceptable and avoid such actions, then one would expect to find 
very few examples of congressional action overturning executive orders.  This 
explanation seems more credible than the conclusion that Congress is unwilling to strike 
out a president that bites off more than the legislature is willing to chew.   
This proposition received support in the empirical chapters of this dissertation.  
Presidents issue fewer executive orders under divided government ceteris paribus.  At 
such times, presidents face a higher likelihood that a hostile Congress will overturn their 
orders.  Presidents consider this limited discretion and alter their behavior to account for 
the increased likelihood that Congress will strike back.  Such an explanation is more 
likely, receives empirical support, and is more in line with the “textbook” approach to 
United States government where political branches share powers in a system of checks 
and balances. 
The account presented here is somewhat gloomier for the president than other 
studies of unilateral action present.  However, I do believe that presidents are far better 
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off being able to act unilaterally than they otherwise would be where they to be stripped 
of the power.  Through unilateral action, presidents are able, at times, to set the policy 
exactly as they wish without negotiations.  They are also able to take action in an 
immediate fashion.  Neither the exactitude nor the timeliness is likely to result when 
policy changes are accomplished through legislation.  Any tool conferring upon a 
politician the ability to alter policy without the consent of another is advantageous.  
Executive orders provide the president with said ability, but it is not a limitless power. 
NORMATIVE ISSUE 
 While executive orders produce many notable normative issues, one stands out: 
they are not subject to the constitutional rules of policy-making and thus violate the 
separation of powers.  This is indeed an issue that can and should cause alarm.  
However, there are some benefits for the nation arising from executive orders.  First, 
executive orders allow the government to take rapid, coordinated action at times when 
delay would lead to sub-par outcomes.  For instance, in the aftermath of the September 
11 attacks, the Bush administration took legal action more rapidly than Congress.  
Granted, the policy changes were not deliberated by Congress and were not subject to 
the usual checks and balances, but in times of emergency, delay may not be acceptable.   
Furthermore, presidents are constrained by the wishes of Congress.  An executive 
order that makes policy changes in excess of the super-majoritarian wishes of the 
legislature faces a likely statutory challenge, one that is likely to result in the overturning 
of the unilateral action.  In essence, then, there is a system of checks and balances in 
place for executive orders. 
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 An additional benefit of executive orders is that they allow Congress to write 
statutes that are not explicit.  If the legislature were forced to write down every detail for 
the implementation of a policy, the body would be hamstrung, spending the bulk of its 
time debating a single policy.  In addition, Congress would lose the expertise that the 
bureaucracy affords.  The legislature is better able to use its time efficiently, and 
capitalize on the expertise of the administrative branch by stating their goals for a policy 
and allowing the bureaucracy to implement those goals, (see Epstein and O’Halloran 
1999 for a complete discussion on the pros and cons of legislative delegation).  Since the 
president is the head of the bureaucracy, the position has the ability to influence the 
implementation of policies through executive orders. 
Possible Solutions 
 If one is convinced that the normative drawbacks of executive orders outweigh 
the benefits of their use, a few tacks can be taken to deal with the issue.  The first is for 
Congress to write explicit laws.  Though this approach would bestow on Congress a 
much more powerful role in the creation of policy, as was mentioned above, this 
approach is not beneficial to the legislature, nor is it of advantage to the nation.  If no 
power is to be delegated to the administrative branch, then all levels of discretion must 
be removed from policies.  Such an approach can work well in policy areas such as 
Social Security formulas; the legislature can direct the amounts to be paid retirees.  
However, who qualifies for Social Security disability benefits?  Creating a definition that 
removed all levels of discretion from street-level bureaucrats would be a Herculean task.  
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Many other policies, such as natural disaster relief, by their nature elude concrete 
definitions and would not benefit from explicit congressional dictates.   
If Congress wishes to provide for such a policy, the most efficient route is to 
articulate its goals and allow the bureaucracy to implement those goals to the best of 
their abilities, and conduct oversight.  If, later, Congress believes that the bureaucracy’s 
implementation did not match their wishes, legislators can take action, either amending 
the law (this of course may require a 2/3 super-majority to override a presidential veto) 
or withholding appropriations.  Though explicit legislation would help alleviate some of 
the normative concerns of executive orders, there are too many problems associated with 
that choice, making it an unattractive option. 
Another approach would be to institute a legislative veto system for executive 
orders.   Under this system, presidents would have to submit all executive orders to 
Congress.  The legislature would then have a set period, for instance thirty days, where 
they could overturn the order with a majority vote of either chamber.  To allow for the 
advantage of rapid action that executive orders possess, the system could allow orders to 
be in effect until, and unless, the order receives a legislative veto.   
The legislative veto system would allow Congress to speak when it feels that the 
president is taking action contrary to its intentions.  Unilateral action could not proceed 
against the majority wishes of either house of Congress.  Each action taken by the 
president would, in effect, be new legislation since it receives the consent of the majority 
of both houses and is, by its nature, approved by the president.  The only difference is 
that it would not have to meet the cloture requirements of the Senate. 
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Implementing this plan, however, could prove difficult.  In Immigration and 
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), the Supreme Court found that 
legislative vetoes are unconstitutional because they are an encroachment on the 
executive’s authority to utilize the authority delegated by Congress and thus a violation 
of separation of powers (p. 922, 954).  Further, the Court held in Chadha that the 
legislative veto is essentially making law without the approval of the president (or the 
2/3 veto override), and thus unconstitutional (p. 921).  Due to this, there are 
constitutional issues concerning the legislative veto.   
A constitutional amendment may be necessary to keep such a legislative veto 
from facing a constitutional challenge  Furthermore, the law would need to be written in 
such a way as to not allow presidents to utilize non-executive order methods of unilateral 
action such as national security directives and proclamations to cause policy change 
without being subject to the legislative veto. 
The legislative veto helps alleviate the normative concerns of presidential action 
without congressional consent.  It also allows the nation to capitalize on the advantages 
executive orders present.  However, as the Immigration and Naturalization Service v. 
Chadha case evidences, the method is not without its own problems.  Overall, though, 
the method presents many more advantages than disadvantages, and if implemented 
through constitutional amendment can eliminate the constitutional concerns. 
The remaining course of action is the most likely: do nothing new.  Executive 
orders have been present since the beginning of the nation, their use likely will not lead 
to the downfall of the United States and its values.  While executive orders do lead to 
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policy-making without the approval of Congress, they do not allow for policy-making 
without influence from the legislature.  The simple threat of having an executive order 
overturned by Congress is enough to cause presidents to alter their actions.  This is not to 
say that Congress is not at a disadvantage relative to presidents where executive orders 
are concerned.  The body must muster a two-thirds super majority in the face of a certain 
presidential veto to override an executive order.  However, if a president strays too far, 
the legislature can, and likely will, strike back. 
Likely, the nation will continue on its current path, with legislation made through 
the “textbook” process and presidents possessing the tool of unilateral action.  Given that 
executive orders are a significant component of policy-making in the United States, 
political scientists need to understand more about how presidents utilize them.  This 
project has developed a concise theory of presidential policy-making and subjected that 
theory to empirical scrutiny.  To gain a better understanding of unilateral action, there is 
a variety of paths for future research. 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 One approach that would be beneficial is to subject the transaction costs based 
model of policy-making to analyses using a case study approach.  This project utilized 
large-n quantitative analyses to test the theory.  This type of analysis provides 
generalizability.  However, case studies allow for an in-depth analysis of how a theory 
explains isolated events.  One approach is not superior to the other, but when one uses 
both approaches and the theory is robust, there is increased confidence that the theory 
adequately describes reality. 
  
172
 The ideal case study would require access to presidents and to the inner-circles of 
their administrations, for few outsiders are aware of how presidents and their closest 
advisors arrive at decisions on policy matters.  One approach that could allow for 
“pseudo-access” is to conduct elite interviews with former and current top administration 
officials.  These insiders are more likely to possess knowledge of how presidents make 
decisions between unilateral and legislative action.  Ideally, one would gain interviews 
with former presidents, but other top-level officials would provide valuable insight into 
presidential decision-making.  One potential source of interviewees would be those 
officials in the Office of Management and Budget that review and prepare most 
executive orders.  Given that this is a theory of how presidents make decisions, access 
would be an integral component of an adequate case study. 
 Experimentation is another avenue that can provide a test of the theory.  Once 
used mostly in the psychology field, experiments have recently been useful for theory 
testing in political science.  For instance, Chin, Bond and Geva (2000) provide a unique 
test of whether money buys access to members of Congress, finding that constituents are 
more likely to gain access to members than are political action committee members.   
Though limited in their external validity, experiments are excellent in regards to 
internal validity; with careful planning, one can be sure that the results are indeed a test 
of the theory.  With creativity, one could design an experimental test of the transaction 
costs based model of presidential policy-making.  By altering the transaction costs 
subjects receive and by monitoring their actions, one can see how individuals respond to 
transaction costs and how those costs affect decision-making. 
  
173
An additional avenue would be to examine how presidents use other tools of 
unilateral action and whether the transaction costs based model of presidential policy-
making adequately explains the presidents’ use of these tools.  Cooper (2002) examines 
the varying tools of unilateral action including executive orders, proclamations, national 
security directives, and legislative signing statements.  There has not been much theory 
development or testing for use of these other tools. 
Furthermore, other areas of political science may benefit from the application of 
the transaction costs framework.  As this dissertation has shown, it provides a clear 
conceptual guide to the decision-making process of individuals.  It is also fruitful in 
explaining the decision-making process of political bodies as well (Epstein and 
O’Halloran 1999).  For international relations scholars, the framework could be useful in 
predicting when nations will seek to form strategic alliances.  In this case nations face a 
“build or buy” decision in that they can seek to work towards their own security by 
building up its own military strength (build) or they can seek to utilize the perceived 
strength of another nation to ensure their security (buy).  Judicial scholars can utilize the 
framework to explain when courts will review an appeal of a lower court’s decision.  
Courts can either respect the ruling of the lower court (buy) or hear the appeal and make 
their own decision (build). 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Presidential use of unilateral action is an important component of policy-making 
in America.  How presidents utilize executive orders presents fundamental questions for 
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students of policy and the presidency.  This dissertation contributes to the literature in 
this area by showing when presidents will turn towards this tool to alter policy.   
More importantly, however, are the implications of this study for democratic 
theory.  The American system has separation of powers as its foundation.  This system 
finds eloquent support from the founders of the nation (see The Federalist Papers) and 
from philosophers (Montesquieu 1914; Rousseau 1762).  At first glance, presidents are 
able to make policy in a carte blanche fashion. This idea receives support, at least by 
implication, in other works on executive orders (Cooper 2002; Howell 2003; Mayer 
1999; 2001). 
However, this work has shown that the president considers the policy wishes of 
Congress before acting unilaterally.  While this is not the strict separation of powers 
established in the Constitution, it is less alarming than if presidents routinely made 
policy without even the consideration of the policy leanings of the other branches.   
The scenario presented here, is the one predicted by Federalist 51 in that 
ambition does check ambition (Madison [1788] 1982).  The president is acting in an 
effort to garner as much power as the office allows.  Congress, on the other hand, acts in 
a constraining fashion, keeping the president from seizing complete control.  The body 
allows the executive to make marginal changes in policy while saving the bulk of major 
changes for itself.  Given that the executive order allows the president to take swift 
action when the country needs it, and that the tool does not allow the president to 
dominate Congress, its presence should not be cause for great concern. 
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